Einde inhoudsopgave
Corporate Social Responsibility (IVOR nr. 77) 2010/2.8.2.1
2.8.2.1 Enforceability of desired conduct
Mr. T.E. Lambooy, datum 17-11-2010
- Datum
17-11-2010
- Auteur
Mr. T.E. Lambooy
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS369505:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Ondernemingsrecht (V)
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
C. de Groot, Facetten van Ondernemingsrecht [Aspects of Corporate Law], (Rozenberg Publishers: Amsterdam, 2002), p. 46; S.M. Bartman, De Code-Tabaksblat: een juridisch lichtgewicht [The Tabaksblat Code: a legal featherweight], in Ondernemingsrecht, 4, 2004, pp. 123-125 and legal literature quoted by him; Das, supra note 116, p. 127; Raaijmakers, supra note 110, § 5.3.
Generally speaking, these are the provisions that require legislative amendments according to the recommendations of the Tabaksblat Committee; Tabaksblat Code, supra note 32, pp. 62-65.
In § 2.8.1.1 the open norm of reasonableness and fairness within the organisation of the legal entity, and the open norms pertaining to the inquiry procedure (doubt as to correct course of action, and obviously incorrect course of action) were discussed.
In corporate governance issues this will be even more difficult if the general meeting of shareholders has not clearly expressed its displeasure with choices of the board of directors with respect to a certain corporate structure, Maatman, supra note 17, p. 119.
Article 2:393, § 2 DCC.
Article 2:58 DCC (Articles 2:163/273 DCC ceased to have effect because of the Dual-Board Company Structure Reform Act.
Article 2:114a DCC.
G.T.M.J. Raaijmakers, Beleggers, aandeelhouders en de AVA, [Investors, Shareholders and the General Meeting], in Ondernemingsrecht, 4, 2005, pp. 106-112.
Tabaksblat Code, supra note 32, p. 47. Winter, supra note 116, pp. 339-341.
Corporate governance can be traced back to various sources of law:
legal norms in company law and securities law, enforceable through the courts;
private rules, such as rules established by, for instance, professional associations of accountants, which in some cases are enforceable through disciplinary courts and in other cases through ordinary courts;
private agreements with stock exchanges, such as rules of procedure applicable to companies that have concluded a listing agreement with a stock exchange. Acting in breach of such agreements may, for instance, lead to delisting, or to other contractual sanctions that the parties have agreed beforehand;
standards of conduct included in the business community's self-established codes of conduct, such as the Tabaksblat Code.
The enforceability of corporate governance concepts laid down in company law, securities law, private rules, or agreements will not be addressed in this section; only the enforceability of the standards of conduct recommended in the Tabaksblat Code will be discussed. Enforceability can be assessed by considering the Tabaksblat Code as a whole, or by considering each provision separately. First the enforceability of the separate provisions will be discussed, followed by the enforceability of the code as a whole.
From discussions about the enforceability of the separate provisions of the Tabaksblat Code in legal literature it can be deduced that these provisions can be divided into three categories:1
provisions that correspond with written or unwritten rules of law (for example: principle IV.2 stipulating that the general meeting appoints the external auditor, corresponds with article 2:393 paragraph 2 DCC). These provisions are definitely binding;
provisions that are contrary to written or unwritten rules of law (for example: best practice provision II.2.7 regarding the maximum severance pay for directors upon dismissal differs from Dutch labour law provi-sions;2 best practice provisions may also be contrary to the provisions of a company's Memorandum and Articles of Association). Such best practice provisions are non-binding until an amendment is made and/or provisions in the articles of association to the contrary are amended; and
provisions that neither correspond nor conflict with written or unwritten rules of law (for example: the recommendation to adopt a code of conduct as an internal risk management and control system and to publish this code on the company's website; best practice provision II.1.3 sub b.) The fact that such provisions are included in the Tabaksblat Code does not imply that they should be considered binding rules of law, albeit they may have some legal significance. They may - similar to what is stated above in section 2.8.1.1 on the enforceability of voluntarily adopted codes of conduct that contain standards of conduct regarding CSR - guide the court in its interpretation of certain open norms in the Dutch legal system.3 In this respect, the fact that the Tabaksblat Code is entrenched in law, and the question whether or not the company has stated in its annual report its intention to adhere to the Tabaksblat Code provisions are of importance. A company that has included such a statement, but subsequently acts contrary to these provisions, will have difficulty explaining why those (non-binding) provisions of the Tabaksblat Code should be without legal effect. On the other hand, it will not be easy for a shareholder to demonstrate to the court that the board of directors made an improper' decision, since the board of directors has to take a multiplicity of interests into account and not only the interest of the shareholders.4
With regard to the enforceability of the Tabaksblat Code as a whole, it should be borne in mind that corporate governance is about the distribution of power within the company, and the exercise of that power by the company's internal bodies in their interaction. Shareholders are probably the first to suffer the consequences of non-compliance with the Tabaksblat Code by members of the board of directors or the supervisory board, or the external auditor. As internal corporate rules are concerned, the enforcement of compliance with such rules lies primarily with the shareholders. Shareholders have powers conferred upon them by law and by the Memorandum and Articles of Association to prompt the board of directors to modify the corporate governance structure. Besides this, they can use other means to exert pressure. For example, shareholders can resolve to:
adjust the remuneration policy for directors;
withdraw the instruction to the external auditor and award it to another auditor;5
refuse to adopt the annual accounts;6
use their right to place an item on the agenda of the shareholders meeting;7 dismiss members of the board of directors and/or the supervisory board; or
sell off their shares.
In practice, however, it will not be easy to unite all shareholders to act, as the composition of the general meeting changes frequently and different shareholders may have different interests.8
Such private law enforcement by shareholders of listed companies takes place in the public eye, which puts a lot of pressure on the company's board of directors.9
In conclusion, it can be argued that it is up to the general meeting of shareholders to decide on how to respond to conduct of directors or supervisory board members that deviates from those provisions of the Tabaksblat Code that were not pre-approved by the general meeting of shareholders. The general meeting of shareholders can deploy legal and non-legal means in doing this. When arriving at that decision, the fact that not all provisions of the Tabaksblat Code are legally binding will most probably play a role.