Einde inhoudsopgave
Exit remedies for minority shareholders in close companies (IVOR nr. 82) 2011/4.4.7.2
4.4.7.2 Valuation date
dr. Q. Wang, datum 02-05-2011
- Datum
02-05-2011
- Auteur
dr. Q. Wang
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS409663:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Ondernemingsrecht (V)
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
SCWS v. Meyer [1959] AC 324,369; Re a Company, (No 002612, 1984) (1986) 2 BCC 99, at p. 453, 492-499. ('Where a share purchase order was made under sec. 75, there was no rigid rule applicable to all circumstances for deciding the proper date for valuation of the shares. However, the court inclined to the view that the date of the petition was the correct starting point (the valuation being adjusted to take account of unfair conduct which had depreciated the value of the shares). The date of the petition was the date on which the petitioner had elected to treat the unfair conduct of the majority as in effect destroying the basis on which he had agreed to continue to be a shareholder, and to look to his shares for his proper reward from participation in a joint undertaking. A departure from that date would have to be justified on the ground of some special circumstance. A number of other factors in this case confirmed or pointed to the date of the petition as the proper date for valuation.')
Profinance Trust SA v. Gladstone [2002] 1 BCLC 141, p. 152, see also Bennett v. Bennett, Para. 12.
Bennett v. Bennett, 2003 WL 116927 (He (the petitioner) had chosen to compete with A and had made use of his inside knowledge to do so. Although it was not possible to quantify the extent to which A's profitability had been affected by the petitioner's conduct, it was fair that the conduct should be taken into account in valuing the shares.)
O'Neill v. Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092, 1107 (H.L.), per Lord Hoffmann; see also Bilkus v. King [2003] EWHC 2516 (Ch) (With a single valuation date each side bears the risk of the 'rough edge' to which Lord Hoffmann referred in O'Neill v. Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092, 1107 (H.L.).)
See Chapter 3 for the advantages and disadvantages.
As the Bennett v. Bennett case shows, not only different valuation methods but also different dates for a valuation can cause the results to vary greatly. 1 It was agreed in this case that there are three options for the valuation date: 1) 30 June 1997 — the date when Paul Bennett, a minority shareholder with a 30 per cent shareholding, lelt the company Abtech as a director, 2) 23 February 2000 — the date the petition was filed onder section 459 of the Act, 3) 9 May 2002 — the date when the purchase order was made. According to the suggested dates, the petitioner's shareholding was valued respectively at 540,777, 361,000 and 334,250 pounds. These numbers are far apart. Consequently, the court in the UK is also faced with the issue of deciding which date is a reasonable date for the valuation. Lord Danning and Judge Vinelott proposed that the petition date should be the valuation date because the petitioner stood out to sue against the unfair prejudicial conduct on that day, and the basis for cooperation was gone.2 Later, by weight of precedents, the law on the date of valuation was reviewed and summarized in the decision of the Court of Appeal in Profinance v. Gladstone,3 and the date of the purchase order was recommended as the presumptive valuation date:
The starting point should in our view be the general proposition stated by Nourse J in Re London School of Electronics Ltd [1985] BCLC 273 at 281, [1986] Ch 211 at 224: "Prima facie an interest in a going concern ought to be valued at the date on which it is ordered to be purchased." That is, as Nourse J said, subject to the overriding requirement that the valuation should be fair on the facts of the particular case.
In the Bennett v. Bennett case, the court adopted the presumption suggested above, and the particular facts in this case also supported such a choice decisively. In this case, the date of valuation of the petitioner's shares was the date of the purchase order because after he left the board of the company A, the petitioner, a minority shareholder with a 30 per cent shareholding, was engaged by a competing business to assist the competing business with his inside knowledge of A's customers, so this affected the profitability of company A. Consequently, the petitioner's conduct since he had left A made it unfair to A to choose an early valuation date.4 The overriding rule here is, as in the valuation method: to ensure that the minority receives fair value on a case by case basis. An earlier valuation is sometimes better if the miscount has reduced the value of the company. At times, a later valuation date may be better if the minority was excluded from sharing in the new plans or potential profits, while the company's value is on the rise. Courts generally reject the average of a twostage valuation, however, because the objective in a valuation should be "economy and expedition, even if this carries the possibility of a rough edge for one side or the other (and both parties in this respect take the same risk) compared with a more elaborate procedure".5
As stated in the review of Profinance Trust SA v. Gladstone: "the general trend of authority over the last 15 years appears to us to support that (the date of the purchase order) is the starting point," the date of valuation is a matter of discretion. Robert Walker LJ has summarized some indications given by previous authorities that an earlier date may be appropriate in the following circumstances:6
(i) Where a company bas been deprived of its business, an early valuation date (and compensating adjustments) may be required in faimess to the claimant (Meyer).
(ii) Where a company bas been reconstructed or its business bas changed significantly, so that it has a new economic identity, an early valuation date may be required in faimess to one or both parties (OC Transport, and to a lesser degree London School of Electronics). But an improper alteration in the issued share capital, unaccompanied by any change in the business, will not necessarily have that outcome (DR Chemicals).
(iii) Where a minority shareholder has a petition on foot and there is a general fall in the market, the court may in faimess to the claimant have the shares valued at an early date, especially if it strongly disapproves of the majority shareholder's prejudicial conduct (Cumana).
(iv) But a claimant is not entitled to what the deputy judge called a one-way bet, and the court will not direct an early valuation date simply to give the claimant the most advantageous exit from the company, especially where severe prejudice has not been made out (Elgindata).
(v) All these points may be heavily influenced by the parties' conduct in making and accepting or rejecting offers either before or during the course of the proceedings (O'Neill v. Phillips).
In sum, the overriding principle is the same as onder the oppression remedy in the US, that the price must be fair on the facts of the particular case. But the two jurisdictions do not share the same starting point. In the US, the presumption is the petition date, whereas in the UK, it is the date of the purchase order. Since there is no hard and fast rule; any presumption can be departed from based on the special circumstances of a case. What really matters, therefore is the advantages and disadvantages of each option,7 which are then combined with the facts of the case to achieve a fair result.