Exit remedies for minority shareholders in close companies
Einde inhoudsopgave
Exit remedies for minority shareholders in close companies (IVOR nr. 82) 2011/3.3.3.1.1:3.3.3.1.1 Compensation for the loss of veto rights
Exit remedies for minority shareholders in close companies (IVOR nr. 82) 2011/3.3.3.1.1
3.3.3.1.1 Compensation for the loss of veto rights
Documentgegevens:
dr. Q. Wang, datum 02-05-2011
- Datum
02-05-2011
- Auteur
dr. Q. Wang
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS408531:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Ondernemingsrecht (V)
Toon alle voetnoten
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, The Appraisal Remedy and the Goal of Corporate Law, 32 UCLA. L. Rev. 429, Feb., 1985, p. 1.
Deze functie is alleen te gebruiken als je bent ingelogd.
As mentioned above, traditionally, unanimous consent by shareholders was required in the situation of fundamental changes in the life of a corporation. When this requirement was dropped, the appraisal remedy emerged. It was thus posited that the appraisal remedy was legislative compensation for the loss of veto power by those dissenting shareholders who could no longer block the majority's will.1 Since majority rule is a well-established corporate norm nowadays, this view of compensation for loss of veto power is anachronistic. Relating appraisal rights to voting power is no longer the practice today.