Einde inhoudsopgave
Exit remedies for minority shareholders in close companies (IVOR nr. 82) 2011/3.4.1.1
3.4.1.1 The origin of the oppression remedy: dissolution legislation
dr. Q. Wang, datum 02-05-2011
- Datum
02-05-2011
- Auteur
dr. Q. Wang
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS410789:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Ondernemingsrecht (V)
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minority Shareholders and Its Impact upon Valuation of Minority Shares, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 425, 426 (1990), see also, Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 Business Law. 699, 709-12, 715-716 1993.
Charles W. Murdock, op cit., p. 10.
Ibid., p. 21.
Mary Siegel, Fiduciary Duty Myths in Close Corporate Law, 29 Del.J. Corp.L. (Delaware Joumal of Corporate Law) 377, 2004, p. 3.
Only a few statutes specifically define oppression. For example, Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. § 450.1489(3) ('[W]illfully unfair and oppressive conduct' is defined as 'a continuing course of conduct or a significant action or series of actions that substantially interferes with the interests of the shareholder as a shareholder. The term does not include conduct or actions that are permitted by an agreement . . . .').
Entire faimess is the standard applied in the Delaware courts. The concept of faimess has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price. 'The former embraces questions of when the misconduct was made, how it was initiated, structured, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained. The latter aspect of faimess relates to the economic and financial considerations of the proposed action.' For more discussion see Allen Kraakman, Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organization, Chapter 12.
The term "oppression", as a ground for dissolution, was first introduced in Illinois in section 86 (a) (3) of the 1933 Act.1 Hereby courts were given the power to dissolve a corporation upon the petition of a shareholder when certain "oppressive" conduct by the controlling shareholders could be identified.2 This 1933 Act was later considered as the basis for section 90 (a) (2), later section 97 (a) (2), and finally section 14.30 (2) (ii) of the various versions of the oppression remedy in the RMBCA.3 Section 14.30 (2) (ii) reads: "the court may dissolve a corporation in a proceeding by a shareholder if it is established that the directors or those in control of the corporation have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent". In this provision, the term "oppressive" attracts a great deal of literature from commentators because it is not as familiar a concept as "illegal" or "fraudulent".
To date, thirty-seven states across America have provided for statutory involuntary dissolution if oppressive conduct has been identified.4 As most of these statutes do not define oppression, the construction of this term varies among states, for example it may be "abusive conduct, recurring breaches of fiduciary duty, or frustration of a shareholder's reasonable expectations."5 In the rest of the states, such as Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Massachusetts and Louisiana, where no oppression remedy has been enacted for aggrieved shareholders, relevant cases are mainly reasoned on the basis of entire faimess or breach of fiduciary duties through common law.6 As we see, therefore, in the USA, either by the oppression remedy or by the fiduciary duty analysis from common law, oppressive behaviour can be tracked down. This is a remedy with which China is not familiar. Questions such as whether China has this remedy or not and how it could be applied are discussed in Chapter 5.