Einde inhoudsopgave
EU Equity pre- and post-trade transparency regulation (LBF vol. 21) 2021/1.IV.7
1.IV.7 Liquidity
mr. J.E.C. Gulyás, datum 01-02-2021
- Datum
01-02-2021
- Auteur
mr. J.E.C. Gulyás
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS267072:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Bank- en effectenrecht
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Financiële dienstverlening / Financieel toezicht
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
See IOSCO, Transparency and Market Fragmentation, November 2001, p. 3 and L. Harris, Trading and Exchanges: Market Microstructure for Practitioners, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 394.
Commission, Glossary of useful terms linked to markets in financial instruments, 25 May 2015, p. 9.
The Commission notes that ‘(m)arket fragmentation refers to the dispersion of business across different trading venues. It is considered to reduce readily access to liquidity’ (Commission, Glossary of useful terms linked to the market for financial instruments, May 2015, p. 10). Market fragmentation is the opposite of (market) ‘concentration’, being the situation where trading is located on one or a few venues.
‘Market impact’ (also known as ‘price impact’) refers to the situation when traders move prices to fill their orders. Market impact increases in case of large (market) orders, since such orders are more difficult to execute than smaller ones (L. Harris, Trading & Exchanges: Market Microstructure for Practitioners, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 72).
L. van Setten, The Law of Institutional Investment Management, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 257.
Besides the limited liquidity available in this given market, the market impact is increased due to information leakage. For example, where market participants know that a pension fund is interested in buying a large amount of Unilever shares, the market participants could attempt to buy the shares before the pension fund, resulting in a higher price. See in this context I. Zovko, ‘Navigating Dark Liquidity – How Fisher Catches Poisson in the Dark’, arXiv: Trading and Market Microstructure, 2017, p. 1
See L. van Setten, The Law of Institutional Investment Management, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 256-257 and ICMA Secondary Market Practices Committee, ‘The Current State and Future Evolution of the European Investment Grade Corporate Bond Second Market: Perspectives from the Market’, November 2014, p. 16.
N. Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation, Third Edition, Oxford EU Law Library, 2014, p. 431; and D. Valiante, Setting the Institutional and Regulatory Framework for Trading Platforms: Does the MiFID definition of OTF make sense?, ECMI Research Report, April 2012.
A ‘liquidity provider’ is a person that generates revenue intra-day by taking both buying and selling positions in financial instruments with the aim of earning from the spread (i.e. the difference between the bid and offer price in a financial instrument) (L. van Setten, The Law of Institutional Investment Management, Oxford, 2009, p. 256).
L. Harris, Trading and Exchanges: Market Microstructure for Practitioners, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 101.
Liquidity is generally considered to be one of the most important – if not the most – important feature of a well-functioning financial market.1 MiFID I introduced a definition of ‘liquid shares’ and a ‘liquid market’.2 MiFID II/MiFIR has introduced additional provisions referring to liquidity.3 These definitions are quite static and do not really say what liquidity is. Thankfully, the Commission has provided an interpretation. The Commission describes liquidity as follows:
‘Liquidity is a complex concept that is used to qualify the markets and the instruments traded on these markets. It aims at reflecting how easy or difficult it is to buy or sell an asset, usually without affecting the price significantly. Liquidity is a function of both volume and volatility. Liquidity is positively correlated to volume and negatively correlated to volatility. A stock is said to be liquid if an investor can move a high volume in or out of the market without materially moving the price of that stock. If the price moves in response to investment or disinvestments, the stock becomes more volatile’.4
The description of the Commission shows that liquidity is a complex, but essential, feature in ensuring an efficient allocation of capital. A high degree of equity pre- and post-trade transparency is overall associated with supporting liquidity based on the advantages of pre- and post-trade transparent equity markets. A high degree of equity pre- and post-trade transparency can support liquidity, among other things, by facilitating so-called price discovery, reduced search costs, and through providing an overview of trading in the situation where liquidity is fragmented5 across multiple venues.6
A high degree of equity pre- and post-trade transparency ‘can’ support liquidity, because too much transparency can also harm liquidity provision. The description of the Commission shows why the degree of equity pre- and post-trade transparency differs depending on the liquidity available in a given market. An order has more so-called market impact in a less liquid market,7 whereas the costs of market impact reduce in a highly liquid market.8 For example, the publication of potential trading interest of a large equity order (equity pre-trade data) will result in more volatility - and accordingly more market impact (price shocks).9 Another example where the degree of equity pre- and post-trade transparency adapts to the liquidity available, is where liquidity is mainly provided by investment firms that take temporary risk positions. Too high equity pre- and post-trade transparency might discourage the provision of such liquidity, since the investment firm wants to rebalance its position in the near future. Too high equity post-trade transparency could especially harm such liquidity provision. This is because - based on the equity post-trade data published - other market participants can take harmful trading positions relative to the investment firm wanting to balance the temporary risks (inventory risk).10
The challenge is ensuring a degree of equity pre- and post-trade transparency that supports an optimal amount of liquidity. Relevant aspects are the (1) the liquidity of the financial instrument and (2) the type of market participants involved. Generally speaking, liquid markets (e.g. ‘blue-chip’ shares) are associated with a higher degree of equity pre- and post-trade transparency.11 Where liquidity drops, investment firms providing liquidity, including so-called liquidity providers,12 become more important. As a generalisation, liquidity providers prefer not disclose their own position in light of inventory risk/keep their informational advantage, but still want to observe pre- and post-trade data of others.13