Einde inhoudsopgave
EU Equity pre- and post-trade transparency regulation (LBF vol. 21) 2021/17.V.3.3
17.V.3.3 Interim conclusion
mr. J.E.C. Gulyás, datum 01-02-2021
- Datum
01-02-2021
- Auteur
mr. J.E.C. Gulyás
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS266561:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Bank- en effectenrecht
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Financiële dienstverlening / Financieel toezicht
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
See German Ministry of Finance, Position Paper: Necessary amendments and revisions to secondary market provisions in MiFID and MiFIR, p. 3 (available through: https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Gesetzestexte/Gesetze_Gesetzesvorhaben/Abteilungen/Abteilung_VII/19_Legislaturperiode/Position-paper-MiFID-and-MiFIR.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3).
For the sake of clarity, ESMA does not recommend to abolish all types of price discrimination. For example, ESMA does not seem too willing to restrict price discrimination based on, for example, volume discounts (lower prices where more data is purchased). For an examination of price discrimination, reference is made to chapter 14.
See German Ministry of Finance, Position Paper: Necessary amendments and revisions to secondary market provisions in MiFID and MiFIR, p. 3 (available through: https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Gesetzestexte/Gesetze_Gesetzesvorhaben/Abteilungen/Abteilung_VII/19_Legislaturperiode/Position-paper-MiFID-and-MiFIR.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3).
See German Ministry of Finance, Position Paper: Necessary amendments and revisions to secondary market provisions in MiFID and MiFIR, p. 3 (available through: https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Gesetzestexte/Gesetze_Gesetzesvorhaben/Abteilungen/Abteilung_VII/19_Legislaturperiode/Position-paper-MiFID-and-MiFIR.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3).
The ESMA proposals in the ESMA MiFID II Review are a mix of legislative changes and supervisory guidance. Reflecting the mixed feedback received on the MiFID II provisions of a reasonable commercial basis, ESMA tries to find a balance between (a) avoiding inappropriate pricing structures for equity pre- and post-trade data and (b) giving MiFID II Data Suppliers (e.g. RMs and MTFs) an incentive to develop innovative data services.1 ESMA stays close to the concept of a free market for equity pre- and post-trade data based on competition. A ‘free market’, since ESMA does not propose price controls or price regulation. ‘Based on competition’, because ESMA proposes to ensure market data prices and policies can be better compared among investors, as well as among NCAs for enforcement (i.e. through more transparent market data policies).
ESMA suggests to remove the MiFID II reference to the ‘value data represents’, whilst focusing on the production and dissemination costs of equity pre- and post-trade data. In doing so, ESMA suggests to remove the possibility of price discrimination based on the value the data represents to data users.2 Last, but not least, it should be mentioned what ESMA does not recommend. ESMA does not assess whether competition authorities, rather than ESMA or NCAs (financial supervisory authorities), are better suited for ensuring pricing policies are set up on a ‘reasonable commercial basis’.3 Pricing policies in essence constitute competition law (e.g. potential monopolies or oligopolies). Given the relative inexperience of ESMA and the NCAs with pricing policy matters, it could also be a suggestion to let competition authorities address the matter. Such an argument has been raised by the German Ministry of Finance. The German Ministry of Finance recommends assessing the possibility of using a competition authority rather than a financial supervisory authority.4 Whatever the case may be, ESMA does not propose to let competition authorities ensure pricing policies are set up on a ‘reasonable commercial basis’.