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Exit rights of minority shareholders in a private limited company (IVOR nr. 72) 2010/3.5
3.5 Debate about additional appraisal rights and exit right at will
mr. dr. P.P. de Vries, datum 03-05-2010
- Datum
03-05-2010
- Auteur
mr. dr. P.P. de Vries
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS402958:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Ondernemingsrecht (V)
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
Law Commission (1996), at 18.10 and Part 19.
The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 apply to all companies incorporating on or after the lst of October 2009. Schedule 1 applies to Ltds.
The letter means, according to the Law Commission, that a member is considered to be bound by the terms of the constitution of the company, on which he agreed when he became a member. See Law Commission (1996), at 14.11.
Law Commission (1997), at 3.65-3.68.
Law Commission (1997), at 3.66.
Law Commission (1997), at 5.2.
Law Commission (1997), Part 5; Appendix C, draft regulation 119.
O'Neill v. Phillips [1999] 2 BCLC 1.
O'Neill v. Phillips [1999] 2 BCLC 1.
Larvin v Phoenix Office Supplies Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1740. The facts of this case are exposed supra in § 3.8. Further on this case: De Vries (2003). See also: Re Jayflex Construction Ltd, [2004] 2 BCLC 145; Grace v Biagioli [2005] EWCA Civ 1222.
Davies (2002), p. 228-229.
Davies (2002), p. 228.
Gower/Davies (2008), p. 707.
In England and Wales, there has been debate about whether the available range of appraisal rights needs to be extended. The Law Commission started this debate with its consultation paper Shareholder Remedies. In this consultation paper, several no fault situations are described in which an appraisal right or an exit rights at will could be introduced. These are:
an exit right at will;
an exit right when parties have agreed that a member will leave the company, but an agreement on the terras of department cannot be reached;
an exit right when a member has acquired shares by transmission or operation of law and wants to dispose of the shares.1
The Law Commission raised the question whether the aforementioned appraisal rights should be adopted and, if so, whether these should be adopted in statute or should be implemented in Table A. Table A was a statutory model for articles of association applying in default. These articles constituted the articles of association of a company if not expressly excluded. Currently, comparable model articles of association that apply to private limited companies are found in the Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 as Schedule 1.2
As a starting point, the Law Commission acknowledged that introducing the aforementioned appraisal rights would contravene one of the guiding principles for the law considering shareholder remedies, namely the sanctity of the contract.3 From this perspective, adding the exit rights to Table A would be more desirable than adopting the appraisal rights in statute. The implementation of the apprasail rights into Table A would not breach the sanctity of contract, while members may choose not to adopt Table A.
As described in the Report Shareholder Remedies of the Law Commission, the responses of the consulteer showed that there are only a few adherents of adding the aforementioned appraisal rights to statute.4 The implementation of the appraisal right mentioned in (a) in statute was rejected by using the subsequent argument:
"In our view, there are strong economie arguments against allowing shareholders to exit at will. Also, as a matter of principle, such a right would fundamentally contravene the sanctity of the contract, binding the members and the company which we considered should guide our approach to shareholders remedies. This guiding principle was strongly supported by a large majority of respondents."5
With regard to the exit rights in (b) and (c), the Law Commission submitted that it would be most appropriate to deal with these matters in Table A and not in statute.6 As appears from the consultation, a large majority of respondents supported this view. The appraisal rights at (b) and (c) were further elaborated in a draft exit regulation.7 As described in § 3.3.13 the CLR eventually rejected the proposal of the Law Commission for an exit regulation in Table A. Neither the old Table A nor the new Schedule 1 includes an exit regulation.
In addition, there was debate about the question whether a no faalt exit right already exists onder the unfür prejudice remedy, when there is merely a breakdown of the confidence and trust between the members. This no-fault exit right is comparable to the exit right at will. In 0 'Neill v Phillips, the House of Lords, per Lord Hoffmann, addressed this question.8 Lord Hoffmann admitted that in the common situation of breakdown of mutual trust, it is usually a waste of time to examine which of the two parties is the most to blame. However, Lord Hoffmann refused to accept that in a no faalt situation, a member has the unilateral right to exit the company. A buy-out order can be requested when a petitioning member is excluded from the board and a quasi-partnership is present. Lord Hoffmann referred to the view of the Law Commission that the unfür prejudice remedy does not offer a no faalt exit. Lord Hoffmann held:
"The Law Commission plainly did not consider that section 459 already provided a right to exit at will and I do not think so either."9
Some years later, a similar view was taken by the Court of Appeal in Larvin v Phoenix Office Supplies.10
The view that an exit right at will does not fit in with English law, is also expressed in English legal literature. One of opponents of an exit right at will is Davies, who is in favour of dealing with these matters by using the unfür prejudice remedy.11 He put forward that one of the fundamental rules of company law is that share capital is in principle a permanent contribution to the company. He submits that the regular way to exit is to sell the shares to a new investor.
"The principle is obviously functional: a unilateral exit right might undermine the company's business activities by requiring it to pay out cash from the business (to the minority shareholder) at an inappropriate time (...). Alternatively, it might threaten the interests of the company's creditors by reducing the company's legal capital." @@12
Davies further contends that requiring a buy-out by the majority shareholder is not a favourable alternative either. Majority shareholders might be less willing to invite minority shareholders if there is a risk that they exit at an inappropriate time. More recently, Davies has stated:
"Part 30 of the Act does not provide, and on no conceivable interpretation could provide, a unilateral exit right for minority shareholders (...). Indeed it might be thought that such a right would be inconsistent with the nature of shareholding in companies. The shareholder is locked into the investment in the company unless he or she is able to find someone else to purchase the shares and thus stand in the shareholder's shoes in relation to the company. Compulsory purchase appears onder Part 30, not as a right for the minority, but as a remedy — and not even a remedy the minority can insist upon, though it is the most common — in respect of unfür prejudice committed by the company's controllers. (...) Of course, members may bargain for rights of unilateral exit to be incorporated in the articles of particular companies: but they are rare, since a general right for minority shareholders to withdraw their capital when they will would seem likely wholly to undermine the financing function of shares."13
In conclusion, I have not found any English legal literature in which an exit right at will is promoted.