Einde inhoudsopgave
Treaty Application for Companies in a Group (FM nr. 178) 2022/5.3.3.3
5.3.3.3 Pros and cons of the Canadian system
L.C. van Hulten, datum 06-07-2022
- Datum
06-07-2022
- Auteur
L.C. van Hulten
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS659510:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Omzetbelasting / Plaats van levering en dienst
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
S. Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market, Amsterdam: IBFD 2009, par. 3.3.8.
Unfortunately, not all provinces entered into a Tax Collection Agreement with the federal government.
J. Mintz & M. Smart, ‘Income shifting, investment, and tax competition: theory and evidence from provincial taxation in Canada’, Journal of Public Economics 2004, vol. 88, no. 6, p. 1149-1168.
B. Dahlby, ‘Tax coordination and tax externalities’, Canadian Tax Journal 2000, vol. 48, no. 2, p. 399-409.
S. Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market, Amsterdam: IBFD 2009, par. 4.2.3.1.
A positive element of the Canadian system is the fact that it is relatively uniform, due to the tax base harmonization. However, it still gives flexibility to the provinces, as they have the possibility to set tax rates and credits. Furthermore, the system effectively prevents double taxation.1 Additionally, the one-stop-shop mechanism seems positive for taxpayers.2
A clear negative aspect of the system, however, is the fact that no consolidation is applied for the different legal entities within a group. This can lead to tax avoidance strategies, as a taxpayer can ‘elect’ whether or not formulary allocation is applied. The differences in tax rates can also lead to income shifting. Economic analysis shows that, because the income is not consolidated, firms may use profit shifting techniques, for example intra-group loans, with an aim to reduce corporate taxes at the subnational level.3 Moreover, it may intensify tax competition.4 Additionally, an apportionment system which – like the Canadian system – is limited to consolidating domestic income, requires the use of ‘regular’ transfer pricing methods as well as formulary apportionment.5