The Importance of Board Independence - a Multidisciplinary Approach
Einde inhoudsopgave
The Importance of Board Independence (IVOR nr. 90) 2012/9.3.3.6:9.3.3.6 Enforcement
The Importance of Board Independence (IVOR nr. 90) 2012/9.3.3.6
9.3.3.6 Enforcement
Documentgegevens:
N.J.M. van Zijl, datum 05-10-2012
- Datum
05-10-2012
- Auteur
N.J.M. van Zijl
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS597209:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Ondernemingsrecht / Algemeen
Ondernemingsrecht / Corporate governance
Deze functie is alleen te gebruiken als je bent ingelogd.
The enforcement of the corporate governance requirements of independence is well developed in Sweden. A corporate governance chapter of the annual report or a separate corporate report must state whether the company has complied with the corporate governance principles and rules in accordance with the comply or explain principle. This is required by law and by the listing rules. The auditor must make a statement regarding whether or not a corporate governance chapter or report has been prepared, but does not need to give his opinion about the content. The Exchange can impose penalties, such as warnings and fines, if the company fails to comply with the SCCG. In extreme cases the Exchange can decide to delist the company. The enforcement is a strong element of the preconditions building block in Sweden.
Table 9-4: The recommendations and views regarding independence of the Corporate Governance Policy and the Swedish Codes of Corporate Governance of 2005, 2008 and 2010.
Corporate Governance Policy 2001
Swedish Code of Corporate Governance 2005
Swedish Code of Corporate Governance 2008
Swedish Code of Corporate Governance 2010
1. CEO duality
It is not suitable to appoint a so-called working Chairman, nor that the board Chairman be appointed group managing director. (3.1)
If the chair of the board is employed in the company or in addition to his or her responsibilities as chair, has duties assigned by the company, these may not involve tasks that are part of the managing director’s responsibilities in the day-to-day management of the company. In such cases, the division of work between the chair and the managing director is to be clearly stated in the formal work plan of the board of directors and in the board’s instruction to the managing director. (3.4.3)
If the chair of the board is an employee of the company or has duties assigned by the company in addition to his or her responsibilities as chair, the division of work and responsibilities between the chair and the managing director is to be clearly stated in the formal work plan of the board of directors and in its instructions to the managing director. (6.2)
If the chair of the board is an employee of the company or has duties assigned by the company in addition to his or her responsibilities as chair, the division of work and responsibilities between the chair and the managing director is to be clearly stated in the board’s statutory Rules of Procedure and its Instruction to the managing director. (6.2)
2. Senior director
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
3. Number of NED s on the board
The board should normally consist of 6-9 people. (3.1)
The board is not to exceed the size that will allow it to employ simple and effective working methods. There are to be no deputies to the directors chosen by the shareholders’ meeting. (3.2.2)
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
4. Percentage of board independence
The board members should be self-governed and independent in respect of the company’s management. No employees apart from the Managing Director should sit on the board. (3.1)
No more than one person from senior management may be a member of the board. (3.2.3) The majority of the directors elected by the shareholders’ meeting are to be independent of the company and its management. (3.2.4)At least two of the directors who are independent of the company and its management are also to be independent of the company’s major shareholders. A director who represents a major owner or is employed or a member of the board in a company that is a major shareholder is not considered independent. (3.2.5)
No more than one member of the board may be a member of the executive management of the company or a subsidiary. (4.3)The majority of the directors elected by the shareholders’ meeting are to be independent of the company and its executive management. At least two of these directors are also to be independent of the company’s major shareholders. (4.4)
No more than one member of the board may be a member of the executive management of the company or a subsidiary. (4.3)The majority of the directors elected by the shareholders’ meeting are to be independent of the company and its executive management. (4.4)At least two of the members of the board who are independent of the company and its executive management are also to be independent in relation to the company’s major shareholders. (4.5)
5. Definition of independence
Not mentioned
A director is not to be considered independent if he or she. [The SCCG 2005 included eight relationships or circumstances.] (3.2.4)
Major shareholders are defined as those who control at least ten per cent of the shares or votes in a company. The first part of this rule is contained in the regulations governing the markets run by O M X N o r d i c E x c h a n g e Stockholm and NGM, respectively, and already applies to companies whose shares are traded there. These regulations also contain criteria for defining independence. (Footnote of rule 4.4)
A director’s independence is to be determined by a general assessment of all factors that may give cause to question the individual’s independence of the company or its executive management. Factors that should be considered include. [The SCCG 2010 included seven relationships or circumstances.] (4.4)In order to determine a board member’s independence, the extent of the mem- ber’s direct and indirect relationships with major shareholders is to be taken into consideration6. A member of the board who is employed by or is a board member of a company which is a major shareholder is not to be regarded as independent.. (4.5)
6. Maximum tenure
Not mentioned
Members of the board are to be appointed for one year at a time. (3.2.6)
Members of the board are to be appointed for a period extending no longer than to the end of the next annual general meeting. (4.5)
Members of the board are to be appointed for a period extending no longer than to the end of the next annual general meeting. (4.7)
7. Audit committee
The board should appoint an audit committee from among board members who are not employees of the company. The committee should consist of at least three members and can co-opt further suitable persons. (5.1)
The board is to establish an audit committee consisting of at least three directors. The majority of the audit committee members are to be independent of the company and senior management. At least one member of the committee is to be independent of the company’s major shareholders. A board member who is part of senior management may not be a member of the committee.In companies with smaller boards, the entire board may perform the audit committee’s tasks, provided that a director who is part of the senior management does not participate in the work. (3.8.2)
The board is to establish an audit committee consisting of at least three directors. The majority of the audit committee members are to be independent of the company and its executive management. At least one member of the committee is to be independent of the company’s major shareholders. No board member who holds an executive management position is to be a member of the audit committee.If the board of directors feels it is appropriate, the entire board may perform the audit committee’s tasks, providing that no director who is a member of the executive management participates in this work. (10.1)
An audit committee is to comprise no fewer than three board members. The majority of the members of the committee are to be independent of the company and its executive management. At least one of the committee members who are independent of the company and its executive man-a g e m e n t i s a l s o t o b e independent of the company’s major shareholders. (7.3)
8. Nomination committee
To help ensure there is a sound selection process and to guarantee quality and openness in the nomination process leading to the election of the board, the Swedish Shareholders’ Association recommends that every company quoted on the stockmarket should set up a nomination committee.The nomination committee should comprise 3-5 members and be appointed by the company’s owners at the shareholders’ meeting. The members of the nomination committee should reflect the company’s different categories of owners. At least one member should be linked with the smaller owners. The Chairman of the board should also be on the committee. Members should not be employees of the company. (3.1.1)
The company is to have a nomination committee that represents the company’s shareholders. The shareholders’ meeting is to appoint members of the nomination committee or to specify how they are to be appointed. (2.1.1)The nomination committee is to have at least three members. The majority of the members of the nomination committee are not to be members of the board of directors. The managing director or other company managers are not to be members of the nomination committee. The chair of the board of directors or another board member is not to chair the nomination committee. (2.1.2)
The shareholders’ meeting is to appoint members of the nomination committee or to specify how they are to be appointed. This decision is to include procedures for replacing members of the nomination committee who leave before its work is concluded. (2.2)The nomination committee is to have at least three members, one of whom is to be appointed committee chair. The majority of the members of the nomination committee are to be independent of the company and its executive management. Neither the managing director nor other members of the executive management are to be members of the nomination committee. At least one member of the nomination committee is to be independent of the company’s largest shareholder
The shareholders’ meeting is to appoint members of the nomination committee or to specify how they are to be appointed. This decision is to include procedures for replacing members of the nomination committee who leave before its work is concluded. (2.2)The nomination committee is to have at least three members, one of whom is to be appointed committee chair. The majority of the members of the nomination committee are to be independent of the company and its executive management. Neither the managing director nor other members of the executive management are to be members of the nomination committee. At least one member of the nomination committee is to be independent of the company’s largest shareholder in
in terms of votes or any group of shareholders that act in concert in the governance of the company. (2.3)Members of the board of directors may be members of the nomination committee but may not constitute a majority thereof. The chair of the company may not chair the nomination committee. If more than one member of the board is on the nomination committee, no more than one of these may be dependent of a major shareholder in the company. (2.4)
terms of votes or any group of shareholders that act in concert in the governance of the company. (2.3)Members of the board of directors may be members of the nomination committee but may not constitute a majority thereof. Neither the company chair nor any other member of the board may chair the nomination committee. If more than one member of the board is on the nomination committee, no more than one of these may be dependent of a major shareholder in the company. (2.4)
9.Remuneration committee
The board should appoint a remuneration committee consisting of three representatives from the board. (4.1.2)
The board is to establish a remuneration committee with the task of preparing proposals on remuneration and other terms of employment for senior management. The chair of the board may chair the remuneration committee. The other members of the committee are to be independent of the company and senior management. In companies with smaller boards, the entire board may perform the remuneration committee’s tasks, provided that a director who is also part of the senior management does not participate in the work. (4.2.1)
The board is to establish a remuneration committee with the task of preparing proposals on remuneration and other terms of employment for the executive management.The chair of the board may chair the remuneration committee. The other members of the committee are to be independent of the company and its executive management.If the board of directors feels it is more appropriate, the entire board may perform the remuneration committee’s tasks, on condition that no director who is also a member of the executive management participates in this work. (9.1)
The chair of the board may chair the remuneration committee. The other shareholders’ meeting-elected members of the committee are to be independent of the company and its executive management. Appropriate knowledge and experience of executive remuneration issues is to exist among the members of the committee. If the board considers it is more appropriate, the entire board may per-f o r m t h e r e m u n e r a t i o n committee’s tasks, on condition that no board member who is also a member of the executive management participates in this work. (9.2)
References
Aktiespararna (2001). Corporate Governance Policy - guidelines for better control and transparency for owners of companies quoted on the Swedish stockmarket. Stockholm, Sveriges Aktiesparares Riksförbund.
Code Group (2004a). Swedish Code of Corporate Governance - A Proposal by the Code Group. Stockholm, Code Group.
Code Group (2004b). Swedish Code of Corporate Governance - Report of the Code Group. Stockholm, Code Group.
Code Group (2005). Swedish Code of Corporate Governance. Stockholm, Code Group.
Lekvall, P. (2009). The Swedish Corporate Governance Model. The Handbook of International Corporate Governance – a country by country guide. The Institute of Directors. London, Kogan Page.
NASDAQ OMX Stochholm (2011). Rulebook for Issuers - 1 July 2011. Stockholm, NASDAQ OMX Stockholm.
Spencer Stuart (2010). The 2010 Nordic Board Index. Stockholm, Spencer Stuart.
Swedish Corporate Governance Board (2008a). Comparison between the revised Swedish Corporate Governance Code and the previous Code. Stockholm.
Swedish Corporate Governance Board (2008b). The Swedish Code of Corporate Governance Stockholm, Kollegiet För Svensk Bolagsstyrning.
Swedish Corporate Governance Board (2010). The Swedish Code of Corporate Governance Stockholm, Kollegiet För Svensk Bolagsstyrning.
TransLegal (2006). The Swedish Companies Act 2005 - in translation. Stockholm, Norstedts Juridik.
Unger, S. (2006). Special Features of Swedish Corporate Governance. Stockholm, Kollegiet För Svensk Bolagsstyrning.