EHRM, 30-03-2021, nr. 37801/16

In the meantime, in February 2014 the Gorna Oryahovitsa and Veliko Tarnovo police forces had started planning an operation to seize Mr P.P.'s firearms. Since that was thought likely to prompt a violent reaction from him, entailing a risk to the lives of any officers involved, Mr P.P.'s mother, and Mr P.P. himself, the police sought the help of the Ministry of Internal Affairs' anti-terrorist squad and the Ministry's psychology institute. The Ministry's Secretary General approved the request in late February, and on 28 February members of the anti-terrorist squad and the psychology institute met in Sofia to plan the operation. They discussed various ways of conducting the planned operation without coming to a definite conclusion. According to a memorandum not drawn up until 14 March 2014, the day of the operation, on the instructions of the psychology institute's head, the psychologists said that in view of Mr P.P.'s personality, any attempts to contact him in advance or negotiate with him would be counterproductive, and that it would be best to act swiftly and by surprise. They confirmed this in a working document they drew up a few days after the meeting, on 4 March. A second meeting took place on 7 March, this time without the participation of the psychologists, but with the participation of police officers from Veliko Tarnovo and Lyaskovets. The latter showed their Sofia colleagues photographs and plans of the house. The idea was mooted to make a video-recording of the building, so as to detect any reinforcement of the windows which could impede entry, but no final decision on that was taken. The tactical options envisaged during the meeting were either a quick attack to overawe Mr P.P. before he could barricade himself or flee or, failing that, a siege. No specific date was set for the operation.

In the meantime, between 28 February and 7 March 2014 the anti-terrorist squad carried out exercises to prepare for the operation.

The threats which Mr P.P. had made on 12 March 2014 against the pupils from the nearby school (see paragraph 12 above) spurred the authorities into action. The next day, 13 March, the Secretary General of the Ministry of Internal Affairs enquired whether the anti-terrorist squad's preparations were sufficiently advanced to carry out the operation the following day, and received a positive answer. In the afternoon the national police and the anti-terrorist squad drew up a plan for the operation. It was approved by the Ministry's Secretary General, who also issued an order for the operation to proceed, putting the commander of the anti-terrorist squad and the head of the Ministry's criminal police directorate jointly in charge of it. Meanwhile, the Gorna Oryahovitsa district prosecutor's office obtained a judicial warrant to search Mr P.P.'s flat.

Later that day, the anti-terrorist squad drew up a more detailed plan for the operation, which was fixed for 6 a.m. the following morning. The two envisaged tactical options were, again, either a quick attack with an attempt to storm Mr P.P.'s flat using special devices and stun grenades, or, failing that, a siege. The squad officers due to take part in the operation — including about thirty officers, excluding the sniper team — participated in a briefing held at 6 p.m. in Sofia, at which each of them was assigned a specific task. Decisions were also made about the firearms and equipment which would be needed. It was also decided that two psychologists from the Ministry's psychology institute would be dispatched to Lyaskovets to assist in the operation if necessary. The sniper team were briefed at 6.30 p.m.

In the meantime, in the afternoon of 13 March two plain-clothes officers from the Veliko Tarnovo police force were sent by their superior to make a video-recording of Mr P.P.'s flat. They filmed the house from a distance and then gave the camera to a uniformed officer whom they met nearby, and he filmed the flat's entrance from up-close. It appears that the officers were spotted by Mr P.P. Once back at the police station, they sent the recording to the anti-terrorist squad, but it found that its quality was too poor to be of any help.

A second briefing of the squad was held in Sofia at 1 a.m. on 14 March. Final decisions were made about each officer's task and how to coordinate the different teams. The two psychologists were not given any specific tasks. The officers were shown photographs and plans of Mr P.P.'s flat.

A final briefing was held at 4.30 a.m. on 14 March in Veliko Tarnovo. The anti-terrorist squad discussed the operation with the Veliko Tarnovo and Gorna Oryahovitsa police forces, as well as with prosecutors from the Veliko Tarnovo and the Gorna Oryahovitsa prosecutor's offices and the investigator in charge of the criminal case against Mr P.P. The local police were entrusted with securing the outside perimeter and with ensuring the presence of emergency medical and firefighting teams. After the briefing, the members of the anti-terrorist squad assigned to carry out the operation and the two psychologists drove from Sofia to Veliko Tarnovo, where they held another briefing with the local police and prosecuting authorities, and then to Lyaskovets.

The members of the anti-terrorist squad and the two psychologists arrived in Lyaskovets at about 5.30 or 5.45 a.m. on 14 March, parking their vehicles a few hundred metres from Mr P.P.'s house. The two psychologists remained near the vehicles. The assault party, which only comprised squad members, checked their equipment and approached the house, accompanied by officers from the Veliko Tarnovo and Lyaskovets police forces. The squad's commander, another officer in charge of tactics, and a liaison officer remained about twenty metres from the house, as the five assault teams approached it. The first team, consisting of eight officers, equipped with a heavy ballistic shield and a hydraulic door breacher, entered the staircase corridor and stood in front of the flat's entrance door. The second and third teams, consisting of, respectively, six and five officers, positioned themselves around two balconies, and some of the officers climbed onto the balconies. Mr Sharkov was the second team's leader. Two smaller teams, consisting of two officers each, stood in front of the flat's windows. It is unclear what kind of firearms they had with them. The four-member sniper team were positioned a bit further afield, on all sides of the house.

The assault began at about 6 a.m. The two smaller teams fired blanks to distract Mr P.P., while the team at the flat's front door tried to force it open with a door breacher. They were unsuccessful, as it had been reinforced from the inside. The commander then ordered the assault party to regroup, and only three officers remained in front of the flat's front door, while the remaining officers went to the first balcony to assist the second team.

While the first team was continuing to try to break the front door, an officer from the second team (the one standing around the first balcony) climbed up, shouted ‘Police!’, and tried to open the balcony door, which had been blocked from the inside with a ladder. He forced it open and two other officers entered the flat's dining room. It was dark and empty. The officers saw Mr P.P. and his mother move from the adjoining room, which was lit by an electric bulb, into a corridor. Mr P.P. was carrying a long-barrelled firearm. The officers shouted ‘Stop, police! Drop the weapon!’ but Mr P.P. did not stop and opened fire. One of the officers was hit in the left arm. He took cover and returned fire. Mr P.P. kept on shooting, and the two officers retreated to the balcony. The other officer was hit in his bullet-proof vest. They were able to move out and the wounded officer was sent for medical treatment. The three remaining members of the team, including Mr Sharkov, remained on the balcony.

Meanwhile, one of the five officers from the third team (located near the second balcony) climbed up and broke open the balcony door, which had been blocked with a big box containing a television set. Three other officers from the same team then entered through the balcony in one of the flat's bedrooms. The three officers made a visual sweep of the bedroom, and then one of them stepped into a corridor, holding his firearm extended in front of him. Mr P.P. shot him in the right arm, just above the wrist. The officer dropped his firearm and tried to throw a stun grenade towards Mr P.P. One of the other two officers, who were still inside the bedroom, helped him withdraw. After returning to the bedroom, the officer who had been shot started to put a dressing on his arm, while the two others, as well as the team leader, who had meanwhile also entered into the bedroom through the balcony, fired at Mr P.P. and shouted at him to surrender. Mr P.P. fired back at them from the corridor. The wounded officer was able to move back to the second balcony and was also sent for medical treatment.

After finding out that two officers had been wounded, the squad's commander ordered a partial disengagement, and the other officers took position on the two balconies, hiding behind the corners of walls and their ballistic shields. They continued exchanging shots with Mr P.P.

Mr Sharkov was among the officers positioned around the first balcony (the second team). When he learned that two officers had been wounded, he asked another officer to pass him a heavy ballistic shield, and one was fetched for him. He and two other officers knelt behind the shield, while Mr P.P. shot at them from inside the flat. Two of his shots hit the shield. One of the other officers returned fire. During a short lull Mr Sharkov and the other officer switched places. Throughout that time they shouted at Mr P.P. to come out and surrender. Mr P.P. said that he would, and the officers assured him that they would not shoot at him if he did. At that point Mr Sharkov raised his head above the shield. Mr P.P. opened fire and shot him above the left eyebrow, just under his helmet. Mr Sharkov fell back on the balcony and his helmet twisted to one side, covering the entry wound. Two officers fired at Mr P.P. to enable the others to move Mr Sharkov's body. An officer tried to find a pulse or a pupillary reflex, but there was none. Mr Sharkov's body was then stripped of its protective gear, put in an ambulance, and driven to a hospital in Veliko Tarnovo. The subsequent autopsy showed that the entry wound was just above the left eyebrow, three centimetres from the end, and that the exit wound, which measured six centimetres by four, was four centimetres behind the left ear. The medical experts said that the shot had caused immediate brain death and that the ensuing terminal state had lasted another ten to fifteen minutes. It would not have been possible to resuscitate Mr Sharkov even if he had had immediate specialist medical care.

After the shooting, a police officer carrying a ballistic shield moved into the room from the second balcony to help two other officers withdraw onto the balcony. The three hid behind a shield, exchanging fire with Mr P.P. One of them was hit in the right arm, which he had extended in front of the shield to be able to fire from a better position.

Mr P.P. then took position in a corridor, exchanging fire with the officers who had remained standing on the balconies and who had made no further attempt to enter the flat. The Ministry's Secretary General, informed of the way in which the operation was unfolding, arrived from Sofia at about 8.30 a.m. and took charge of it. The squad also asked for backup with better equipment and firearms.

At about 10 a.m., after several telephone conversations with the police, Mr P.P.'s mother came out of the flat. She told the officers that Mr P.P. was wounded, and that he had known that the authorities would come for him and had been waiting for them. Shortly after that, at about 10.25 a.m., Mr P.P. shouted from inside the flat that he was wounded and could not move, and asked for medical assistance. After some hesitation, at about 11 a.m. he crawled out of the flat onto the first balcony, at which point he was arrested and taken to a hospital. Specially equipped officers then searched the flat for explosive devices.

In the afternoon, the police again searched the flat, seizing, among other things, the four hunting firearms kept by Mr P.P., a revolver, and a considerable amount of ammunition for each of those firearms, all spread at various locations around the flat. Further searches of the flat were made on 15 and 21 March and 9 April 2014. The ensuing criminal proceedings (see paragraphs 32 to 37 below), found that during the operation against him Mr P.P. had used two of his four firearms (the second hunting rifle and the smooth-bore semi-automatic shotgun — see paragraph 8 above), and had fired at least twenty-four shots against the officers; six of those had been direct hits.

On the day of the operation, 14 March 2014, the Minister of Internal Affairs ordered an internal investigation by the Ministry's inspectorate. It was conducted by two inspectors, who were assisted by an officer from the arms-control and licensing division of the National Police. They interviewed and obtained written statements from a number of officials and civilians involved in the operation and the events leading up to it, including twenty-three officers of the anti-terrorist squad who had taken part in the operation (all of whom were guaranteed anonymity), and various other materials.

The investigation report, which became ready three weeks later, on 4 April 2104, and ran to thirty-two pages, covered four points: (a) Mr P.P.'s firearms permits; (b) the aborted operation against him in March 2012 (see paragraph 10 above); (c) the actions of the police with respect to Mr P.P. between March 2012 and the planning of the operation on 14 March 2014; and (d) the planning and execution of the operation on 14 March 2014.

In relation to point (a), the report noted that in 2006 and 2009 there had been no grounds to reject Mr P.P.'s applications for firearms permits. It found that in mid-2012 the police officer from the firearms-control unit of the Gorna Oryahovitsa police force who had tried in vain to contact Mr P.P. with a view to persuading him to surrender his firearms after the expiry of the permits to keep them (see paragraph 10 above) had then failed to inform his superiors with a view to the information being passed to the prosecuting authorities. The officer had thus neglected his duties, and was to be reprimanded. That was, however, impossible, since in 2013 his employment with the police had ended. The report went on to say that the officer's superior had failed to investigate the matter and relay the information that Mr P.P. was continuing to keep firearms in spite of the expiry of his permits to the prosecuting authorities, in breach of his duties. He likewise deserved to be warned in writing, but the statutory time-limit for doing so had already expired. But his failure had also amounted to the criminal offence of misconduct in public office (see paragraph 84 below). The report further found that the prosecuting authorities had first learned that Mr P.P. was continuing to keep firearms despite the expiry of his permits — which was a serious criminal offence — in October 2013, when investigating complaints by his neighbours about his making threats against them. The failure to inform those authorities of Mr P.P.'s continuing to keep firearms in spite of the expiry of his permits for about a year and a quarter was also the fault of the head of the Gorna Oryahovitsa police force (who was also director ad interim of the Veliko Tarnovo regional police directorate). He thus deserved to be reprimanded for neglecting his general duty to oversee firearms in his area.

In relation to point (b), the report found that all steps relating to the aborted operation in March 2012 had been lawful.

In relation to point (c), the report found that for more than a year, between March 2012 and the planning of the operation on 14 March 2014, the Gorna Oryahovitsa police force had not made any serious efforts to get Mr P.P. to leave his flat or hand over his firearms. The only officer who had taken any initiatives in that regard had been the local constable. The heads of the Gorna Oryahovitsa police force and of the Veliko Tarnovo criminal police branch had thus neglected their duties, and had to be reprimanded and temporarily barred from promotion.

Lastly, in relation to point (d), the report found that the decisions to hold the operation on 14 March 2014 and involve the anti-terrorist squad had been in line with the applicable regulations. So had been its planning and preparation. The report then set out in some detail the operation's preparation and execution, and noted that there had been two elements which had not gone according to plan. The first had been the failure to break the front door of Mr P.P.'s flat. This failure had been caused by the absence of reconnaissance by the squad itself and to the lack of a properly equipped door breacher — since the one purchased for the squad had not come equipped with all the required accessories. The available door breacher had, however, been deemed fit for purpose. There had moreover been a fall-back option: to attempt entry through the flat's balconies. For its part, the squad's omission to do its own reconnaissance could reasonably be explained by the unavailability of properly trained officers, the risk of their being easily spotted in a small town like Lyaskovets, and the need to act urgently, within a day. The second aspect which had not gone to plan — and which had been the main reason for the operation's failure — had been the lack of surprise: the fact that Mr P.P. had become aware that the operation would take place, which had enabled him to prepare to repel it. The report laid the blame for that on the two officers from Veliko Tarnovo police force who had video-recorded Mr P.P.'s flat the previous day (see paragraph 17 above). The report found that they and their immediate superior had acted on their own initiative and had then not brought to the attention of their superiors that Mr P.P. had spotted them. The report therefore suggested that they be dismissed, noting that disciplinary proceedings had already been opened against all three.

The report went on to say that, according to the statements of the squad members, neither they nor their commanders had underestimated the situation. Planning and control had been adequate, without panic and a clear chain of command, even though that had been the first time in the squad's history that it had had to face such heavy fire. The level of training for such operations had also been satisfactory. The officers had, however, told the inspectors that they did not have modern training simulators and suitable firing ranges, that their video-acquisition equipment was scant and with limited technical capabilities, that they lacked thermal-imaging and night-vision devices, that all of their breaking-in equipment (battering rams, pickaxes and ladders) had been hand-built by themselves, and that they did not have tactical dogs, which could be particularly useful for situations as the one at hand. The gas grenades available to the squad were chiefly suited for crowd control, and their stun grenades were ill-suited for special operations, especially operations involving children below six years of age and elderly people. Nearly all squad officers had also complained of their handgun holsters, which did not permit them to carry their handguns with the torchlights fitted. The report also pointed out that two of the assault teams had been given ballistic shields only during the course of the operation rather than from the outset. Lastly, the report noted that there were no regulations specifically governing special operations of the squad; the existing ones, dating from November 2012, only covered anti-terrorist operations, the defence of strategic installations, and the prevention and stopping of serious offences. The report accordingly recommended that the regulations governing the squad's operations be updated to encompass also special operations such as these, and that the need for additional equipment and firearms be considered.

The inspectors' report was immediately classified. After the proposals in it were approved by the Minister of Internal Affairs, full copies of the report were sent to the Ministry's Secretary General and to Parliament's Standing Committee on Domestic Security and Public Order; various excerpts were also sent to the Ministry's human resources department and the heads of the units in which the officers proposed for disciplinary punishments worked, the head of the anti-terrorist squad, and the Gorna Oryahovitsa prosecutor's office (in connection with the proposal to open criminal proceedings for misconduct in public office — see paragraph 40 above).

In May 2014 the heads of the Gorna Oryahovitsa and Veliko Tarnovo police forces were temporarily barred from promotion, as recommended by the report (see paragraph 42 above). Both sought judicial review, and in March 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed their disciplinary punishments, finding that the disciplinary proceedings in the latter's case had been tainted by irregularities and that the disciplinary offences charged against both officers had not been made out (see реш. № 3287 от 25.03.2015 г. по адм. д. № 7621/2014 г., BAC, V о., and реш. № 3284 от 25.03.2015 г. по адм. д. № 8879/2014 г., BAC, V о.).

On 27 October 2014 the Gorna Oryahovitsa prosecutor's office refused to open criminal proceedings for misconduct in public office in connection with the failure to take action in relation to Mr P.P.'s firearms after July 2012 (see paragraph 40 above). It noted that, according to its inquiries, the officer alleged to have neglected his duties in that respect had not been duly tasked with doing anything in connection with that matter.

The inspectors' report was declassified on 11 September 2019, a little over five months after the expiry of the applicable five-year statutory period during which it had to remain classified. Following an enquiry from this Court, dated 13 December 2019, whether the report was still classified, it was provided to the Court on 29 June 2020 following a further check by the State Agency for National Security that it had been proper to declassify it. Up until that date, the Government were categorically opposed to any disclosure of the report, or even excerpts from it, to the applicants. Before disclosure of the report to the Court, the Minister of Internal Affairs nevertheless decided that the identities of all officers of the anti-terrorist squad mentioned in the report should remain secret, in order to protect their safety, and ordered that all passages capable of identifying them be redacted from the copy sent to the Court. The redacted report was forwarded to the applicants on 2 July 2020. More than six years and three months after the report had been drawn up, this was the first time the applicants became aware of its content.

On 23 September 2014, in response to separate complaints made by Mr Sharkov's mother, Ms Ribcheva (the applicant in the first application), both to the prosecuting authorities (on 8 September — see paragraph 69 below) as well as to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Minister ordered a second internal investigation into the operation on 14 March 2014. The investigation was be carried out by two inspectors from the Ministry's inspectorate, the head of the Ministry's vice offences unit, and a senior officer from its anti-abduction unit. They were assisted by an expert from the Ministry's information technology division. The investigators interviewed and obtained written statements from a number of officials and civilians, including eighteen of the officers of the anti-terrorist squad who had taken part in the operation. It also gathered a significant amount of written evidence, and inspected Mr P.P.'s flat.

The report of this investigation was completed a month and a half later, on 7 November 2014, and ran to thirty-eight pages. It exhaustively set out Ms Ribcheva's allegations in relation to the operation (see paragraph 69 below), and then proceeded to examine whether each of those allegations had been confirmed by the evidence obtained during the investigation. It also described in detail both the planning and execution of the operation on 14 March 2014 and the events leading up to it.

The report first found that the officials of the psychology institute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs who had taken part in the meeting on 28 February 2014 (see paragraph 13 above) had subsequently failed to draw up a proper psychological portrait of Mr P.P., as required by the relevant internal rules, and had given their opinion based on outdated intelligence. It hence recommended that they be reprimanded. The report went on to find that the institute's head had then put undue pressure on her subordinates to write in the memorandum describing that meeting that they had stated that swift action against Mr P.P. would be the most feasible option (see paragraph 13 above), whereas that had not, in fact, been their advice. The institute's head had therefore abused her office and deserved to be dismissed.

Like the first report (see paragraph 43 above), that second report also found that the operation had been lawfully ordered. However, it noted that it was unclear why it had been carried out urgently rather than prepared more carefully, which would probably have prevented casualties. The report went on to say that not all units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs involved in the operation had been given clear enough tasks; the only unit provided with a concrete plan had been the anti-terrorist squad. The officer who had drawn up the first plan (see paragraph 15 above) (the head of the Ministry's criminal police directorate) had apparently not familiarised himself well enough with the specificities of the situation and the layout of Mr P.P.'s flat. That called for a reprimand. He had moreover stated in the plan that the psychology institute had drawn up a proper psychological portrait of Mr P.P., which had not been true, and had thus misled the Ministry's Secretary General into ordering, in error, that the primary tactic be an attempt quickly to subdue Mr P.P. That warranted dismissal. Moreover, the plan drawn up by the anti-terrorist squad (see paragraph 16 above) and the order of the squad's commander which had confirmed that plan had not set out in enough detail the equipment and firearms to be used in the operation. The officer who had drawn up the plan (the head of a unit in the squad) thus deserved a written warning, and the squad's commander — a reprimand.

The report also considered whether the primary tactic attempted with respect to Mr P.P. — to overawe him and then arrest him quickly — had been ill-suited to his personality. It noted that this had been a tactical choice of the operation's planners, and that it could be accepted that the manner in which the operation had been carried out had been consistent with the regulations. Yet, not all elements had been properly assessed, in particular the intelligence from the local police officers posted to observe Mr P.P.'s flat during the night preceding the operation that the lights in some rooms had been switched on.

Unlike the first report (see paragraph 43 above), the second report found that the absence of prior reconnaissance by the squad itself had not been justified. It noted that the last briefing relating to the operation had been held seven days earlier, on 7 March 2014, which had given the squad enough time to scout the location. They could have done so covertly with help from the local police. It had not been necessary to go ahead with the operation within a few hours; the information from the headmaster of the nearby school (see paragraph 12 above) had not justified such urgency, especially since Mr P.P. had made similar threats before and since the posting of a police patrol to prevent pupils from going close to his flat had been sufficient to avert any immediate risk to them. As a result, the squad had not been aware of the full extent of the modifications which Mr P.P. had made to his flat, in particular to its front door, with a view to being able to repel an attack.

Another oversight had been the failure to prepare a proper psychological portrait of Mr P.P. and obtain enough information about his and his mother's lifestyle. The local police's warning during the meeting on 7 March 2014 that he had barricaded himself inside his flat and was ready to defend himself had not been heeded.

A third mistake had been the delay in attempting to enter through the two balconies after the initial failure to breach the flat's front door, and the ensuing loss of initiative.

The report also found, like the first report (see paragraph 43 above), that the main problem had been the lack of surprise, which was essential in that type of operation. That had been due to the inept video-recording of Mr P.P.'s flat the previous day, but also to his constant vigilance and preparations, which had been going on for years.

A fifth mistake had been that Mr Sharkov's assault team had positioned themselves under the balcony in a way enabling Mr P.P. both to see them better and to fire at all of them at once.

A sixth omission had been that Mr P.P.'s neighbours had not been evacuated in due time, and that not enough effort had been made to evacuate his mother.

A seventh shortcoming, already noted in the first report (see paragraph 44 above), had been the lack of suitable breaking-in and imaging equipment and grenades.

The report went on to reiterate the first report's observations in relation to the late provision of ballistic shields and the absence of regulations specifically governing special operations of the squad (see paragraph 44 above).

According to the report, responsibility for all those mistakes lay with the squad's commander, who had had overall control over the operation. It was therefore appropriate to reprimand him and to refer him to the prosecuting authorities for an assessment whether he should be charged with neglecting his duties and thus causing deaths and injuries among his subordinates.

The report accordingly concluded that Ms Ribcheva's allegations of negligent errors in the preparation and conduct of the operation were well-founded.

Like the report from the first internal investigation (see paragraph 45 above), this report was immediately classified. On 19 November 2014 the Minister of Internal Affairs approved the report.

While it appears that all recommendations of the report for disciplinary action were followed (see paragraph 68 below), the Government did not provide any details in that respect. It is also unclear whether any of the disciplined officials challenged their disciplinary punishments.

The report was declassified on 8 November 2019, a day after the expiry of the applicable five-year statutory period during which it had to remain classified. Following an enquiry from this Court, dated 13 December 2019, whether the report was still classified, it was provided to the Court on 29 June 2020 following a further check by the State Agency for National Security that it had been proper to declassify it. Up until that date, the Government were categorically opposed to any disclosure of the report, or even excerpts from it, to the applicants. Before disclosure of the report to the Court, the Minister of Internal Affairs nevertheless decided, as he had done in relation to the report from the first investigation (see paragraph 45 above), that the identities of all officers of the anti-terrorist squad mentioned in the report should remain secret, in order to protect their safety, and ordered that all passages capable of identifying them be redacted from the copy sent to the Court. The redacted report was forwarded to the applicants on 2 July 2020. More than five years and eight months after the report had been drawn up, this was the first time the applicants became aware of its content.

In December 2014 the Ministry of Internal Affairs told Ms Ribcheva that her September 2014 complaint (see paragraph 69 below) had led to a second internal investigation which had revealed shortcomings in the planning and execution of the operation against Mr P.P., that all officials responsible for those would be disciplined, and that the prosecuting authorities would investigate whether criminal offences had been committed by some of those officials.

In February and April 2015 Ms Ribcheva urged the Minister of Internal Affairs to revive the investigations, reiterating her allegations that higher officials, including the Ministry's Secretary General, had acted negligently in relation to the operation. She also asked to be informed of the names of the officials who had been disciplined, the punishment imposed on each of them, and the reasons for it. In September 2015 she renewed her request for information on that point, and asked for copies of the reports of all internal investigations. In response, in November 2015 the Ministry told Ms Ribcheva that the report of the (second) investigation spurred by her September 2014 contained classified information and could not be released to her. It was only possible to inform her that in total twelve officials had been disciplined in connection with the operation: the director of the Veliko Tarnovo regional police directorate; the head of the Veliko Tarnovo criminal police branch; a unit head in the Veliko Tarnovo anti-crime branch and an officer in that branch; a junior police inspector in Veliko Tarnovo; the anti-terrorist squad's commander and the head of a unit in the squad; the head of the Ministry's psychology institute and the head and two specialists of the institute's criminal psychology unit; and the head of the Ministry's criminal police directorate. The punishments had been dismissal, one-year bans on the possibility of promotion, reprimands, and written warnings. The officials' names were protected under personal data rules and could not be released.

The Government's objections that the complaints are inadmissible because the applicants no longer have the status of victims and because they failed to exhaust domestic remedies were joined to the merits. The complaints are, moreover, neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.