Public funding of failing banks in the European Union
Einde inhoudsopgave
Public funding of failing banks in the European Union (LBF vol. 19) 2020/7.3.1.1:7.3.1.1 Competences in restructuring under the State aid regime for the banking sector
Public funding of failing banks in the European Union (LBF vol. 19) 2020/7.3.1.1
7.3.1.1 Competences in restructuring under the State aid regime for the banking sector
Documentgegevens:
M. Louisse-Read, datum 01-06-2020
- Datum
01-06-2020
- Auteur
M. Louisse-Read
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS214004:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Staatssteun (V)
Toon alle voetnoten
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
Gray and De Cecco 2017, p. 39.
Deze functie is alleen te gebruiken als je bent ingelogd.
As discussed in section 3.7, under the State aid regime, the exact nature and scope of the required restructuring under the State aid regime for the banking sector is discussed between the Commission, the Member State involved, and (unofficially) the beneficiary bank, its shareholders and its competitors.1 This is a political game that is not transparent for outsiders. The starting point is the restructuring plan (or winding up or integration plan) submitted by the Member State to the Commission. In case an integration plan has to be submitted, the buyer is also involved in preparing the plan.
It is therefore in principle the Member State that decides on the scope and nature of the measures, in consultation with the beneficiary bank and other parties involved. The Commission however has a decisive influence on the nature and scope of restructuring requested from the bank, taking into account that the Commission has the exclusive power to authorize the State aid measure.