State aid to banks
Einde inhoudsopgave
State aid to banks (IVOR nr. 109) 2018/3.8:3.8 Conclusion
State aid to banks (IVOR nr. 109) 2018/3.8
3.8 Conclusion
Documentgegevens:
mr. drs. R.E. van Lambalgen, datum 01-12-2017
- Datum
01-12-2017
- Auteur
mr. drs. R.E. van Lambalgen
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS590552:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Mededingingsrecht / EU-mededingingsrecht
Deze functie is alleen te gebruiken als je bent ingelogd.
While the previous chapter focussed on State aid in general, this chapter specifically focussed on State aid to banks. The reason for this special focus on banks was explained in section 3.2. This section explored the two specific features of the banking sector: banks are essential to the economy and banks are special. These two specific features of the banking sector explain why State aid to banks might be justified. This was recognised by the Commission. As set out in section 3.4, the Commission adopted the so-called Crisis Framework, in which the Commission deviated from the strict and rigid approach of the R&R- guidelines. Notwithstanding this flexible approach towards banks, the restructuring measures that the Commission required from beneficiary banks attracteda lot of criticism, as explained in section 3.7.
State aid is one way of dealing with ailing banks. When the financial crisis broke out in 2008, Member States had no alternative for granting State aid (other than allowing banks to fail). However, in 2014, a bank recovery and resolution framework was adopted. This framework provides for an alternative way of dealing with ailing banks (i.e. by putting them into resolution). How this framework affects State aid (and State aid control) will be discussed in the next chapter.