EHRM, 13-04-2006, nr. 45963/99

The applicant submitted that the right to associate and form political parties was guaranteed by the Constitution and the Political Parties Act of 1990. The only precondition for that was the observance of the formalities set out in the Act.

In the applicant's view, the party whose registration had been refused could not reapply for registration after rectifying the alleged formal deficiencies in its documents. The refusal to enter it in the relevant register had in fact been a complete ban on the existence of a political party of persons having communist ideas and progressive aims.

In the applicant's submission, the courts which refused to register the party had been biased and had conducted the proceedings unfairly, as evidenced by the fluctuating reasons on which they had relied to do so, as well as by the fact that in 2000 they had registered another party with the same name. According to the applicant, the courts were in fact politically motivated. Their finding that the party's constitution had certain formal deficiencies was not supported by the facts of the case. Quite the contrary, the party's constitution had clearly set out the party's organs, their powers and the manner of terminating membership in the party.

The applicant maintained that the real reason why the courts had refused registration had been the party's name — Communist Party of Bulgaria. While there were a number of parties whose name included the word ‘communist’ in some form, its name did not coincide with that of any other party. Moreover, in 2000 the Sofia City Court had registered a party with exactly the same name. It was therefore unnecessary to put forward any arguments indicating that this name did not in fact coincide with that of the former ruling Bulgarian Communist Party.

The applicant further maintained that the Sofia City Court's holding that the party's aims had been an impediment to registration because they had coincided with those of other parties had been indicative of the lack of political pluralism in Bulgaria. The Supreme Court's holding that the aims —‘revolutionary change of Bulgarian society’ and ‘support for the idea of a revolutionary socio-political order’— were contrary to the Constitution and the law, was unfounded. The mere fact that the party wished to be registered was indicative of its desire to participate in the democratic political process and use democratic and non-violent means. The word ‘revolutionary’ did not mean that the party wished to resort to violence to achieve its goals. If interpreted properly and in context, it rather had a historical connotation, meaning ‘progressive’. The order towards which the applicant's party strived was one in which ‘the vehicle of development [was to] be the Man — a universally developed and harmonious personality’. It was illogical to consider that a revolutionary socio-political order would be an order of political violence. In the applicant's submission, the Government failed to differentiate between aims and means to achieve these aims. The party's constitution did not contain even a hint at violence. The other party of which the applicant was chairman — the Bulgarian Revolutionary Youth Party — also used the word ‘revolutionary’ both in its name and in its manifesto. Yet it had been registered without any hindrances, had participated in all elections since 1990, had never resorted to violence to achieve its aims and had never been considered as unlawful or having aims which were contrary to the Constitution.

The Government submitted that the interference with the applicant's freedom of association had been prescribed by law, namely Article 44 of the Constitution and the Political Parties Act of 1990.

They further submitted that the legitimate aims sought to be achieved had been the national security and public safety and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

Concerning the necessity of the interference, the Government were of the view that the refusal to register the party had corresponded to a pressing social need and had been proportionate to the aim sought to be achieved. The interference did not go as far as an outright ban, but consisted only in a refusal to register the party. This refusal had been necessary because the party's founders had failed to comply with the formal requirements for its formation, as found by all three levels of court.

Firstly, by section 8(1) of the Political Parties Act of 1990, the name of a political party had to set it apart from other parties. The only difference between the name of the applicant's party and that of the already registered Bulgarian Communist Party was the word order. Secondly, the party's constitution did not indicate the manner of terminating membership in the party, which fell short of the requirements of section 8(1) of the Political Parties Act of 1990. Thirdly, the powers of the party's organs were scattered throughout its constitution and were not clearly defined. It was precisely because of these formal omissions, which the courts had pointed out and had allowed the party's founders to rectify, that registration had been refused.

Aside from these formal omissions, the courts had had regard to the contents of the party's constitution and programme. More specifically, the courts had found the aims of the party — the revolutionary change of Bulgarian society and the support for the idea of a revolutionary socio-political order — problematic and contrary to section 3(2) of the Political Parties Act of 1990. These aims indicated that the party would not seek to come to power through peaceful means, but in a revolutionary manner.

The proceedings in which a party sought registration were intended to safeguard a number of public interests: to control the legality of political parties, to bring clarity in their relations with third parties, etc. On the other hand, the rulings of the courts in these proceedings did not have res judicata and thus did not prevent the applicant and the other founders to reapply for registration of the party after having remedied the deficiencies noted by the courts.

In sum, the Government were of the view that the interference with the applicant's freedom of association had been the result of his having failed to conform with the requirements prescribed by law for the registration of political parties.

The Court considers that the domestic courts' refusal to register the Communist Party of Bulgaria, whose chairman the applicant is, amounts to an interference by the authorities with the exercise of his right to freedom of association (see, mutatis mutandis, Sidiropoulos and Others v. Greece, judgment of 10 July 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-IV, p. 1612, § 31; Gorzelik and Others v. Poland[GC], no. 44158/98, § 52, ECHR 2004-I; Partidul Comunistilor (Nepeceristi) and Ungureanu v. Romania, no. 46626/99, § 27, 3 February 2005; and United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 30 January 1998, Reports 1998-I, p. 19, § 36).

This interference will not be justified under the terms of Article 11 unless it was ‘prescribed by law’, pursued one or more of the legitimate aims set out in paragraph 2 of that Article and was ‘necessary in a democratic society’ for achieving those aims.

The Court notes that the reasons given by the domestic courts for refusing registration in the proceedings at issue fluctuated. It observes, however, that their decisions were based on the provisions of the Constitution of 1991 and the Political Parties Act of 1990. In these circumstances, and recalling that it is primarily for the national courts to interpret and apply domestic law, the Court is prepared to accept that the interference in question was prescribed by law (see Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, no. 45701/99, §§ 107–10, ECHR 2001-XII; and, mutatis mutandis, Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria, nos. 29221/95 and 29225/95, §§ 81 and 82, ECHR 2001-IX). Insofar as the applicant challenged the soundness of the courts' assessment of the relevant facts and the quality of their reasoning, these issues fall to be examined in the context of the question whether or not the interference with his freedom of association was necessary in a democratic society, which appears to be the central aspect of the case (see Partidul Comunistilor (Nepeceristi) and Ungureanu, cited above, § 34).

The Court recalls that exceptions to freedom of association must be narrowly interpreted. Their enumeration therefore is strictly exhaustive and their definition is necessarily restrictive (see Sidiropoulos and Others, cited above, pp. 1613–14, § 38).

It nevertheless notes that the reasons invoked by the domestic courts for refusing registration were the party's founders failure to comply with certain formal requirements of the law, and the party's aim to bring about a revolutionary change of Bulgarian society. That being so, the Court is prepared to accept that the interference was intended, as argued by the Government, to safeguard the rights and freedoms of others and national security.