Einde inhoudsopgave
Remedies for infringements of EU law in legal relationships between private parties (LBF vol. 18) 2019/2.3.1
2.3.1 Consistent interpretation of national law with Union law
mr. I.V. Aronstein, datum 01-09-2019
- Datum
01-09-2019
- Auteur
mr. I.V. Aronstein
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS141351:1
- Vakgebied(en)
EU-recht / Algemeen
Burgerlijk procesrecht / Algemeen
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
Adelener, para. 108 et seq. CJ 5 October 2004, Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 (Pfeiffer). CJ 16 June 2005, Case C-105/03 (Pupino), para. 47. CJ 24 January 2012, Case C-282/10 (Dominguez), para. 27. CJ 16 July 1998, Case C-264/96 (ICI), para. 31 et seq. CJ 19 April 2016, Case C-441/14 (Dansk Industri), para. 31. CJ 6 November 2018, Joined Cases C-569/16 and C-570/16 (Bauerand Broûonn), paras. 65-67. CJ 17 October 2018, Case C-167/17 (Klohn), para. 59. Hartkamp 2016/181-190.
CJ 5 October 2004, Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 (Pfeiffer), para. 114.
Schütze 2018, pp. 290-293. Lenaerts & Van Nuffel 2017/678 and 784-786. Hartkamp 2016/18, 92-100, 181 et seq., 226 et seq. Herresthal 2014, pp. 259-260. CJ 10 April 1984, Case 14/83 (Von Colson and Kamann). CJ 5 October 2004, Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 (Pfeiffer).
Cf. CJ 4 February 1988, Case 157/86 (Murphy), para. 11. CJ 13 November 1990, Case C-106/89 (Marleasing), para. 8. Dominguez, para. 24.
CJ 4 July 2006, Case C-212/04 (Adeneler), paras. 113-115. CJ 17 October 2018, Case C-167/17 (Klohn), paras. 34-45. Still, however, on the basis of the concept of Vorwirkung, Member States must refrain from interpreting national law in a way that would seriously jeopardise the objective pursued by the respective Directive. See CJ 18 December 1997, Case C-129/96 (Inter-Environnement Wallonie), para. 43.
CJ 4 July 2006, Case C-212/04 (Adeneler), para. 111. CJ 5 October 2004, Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 (Pfeiffer), paras. 115-119. CJ 17 April 2018, Case C‑‑414/16 (Egenberger), paras. 71-72. CJ 7 August 2018, Case C-122/17 (Smith), para. 39. Hartkamp 2016/18 and 226.
CJ 19 April 2016, Case C-441/14 (Dansk Industri), paras. 33-34.CJ 17 April 2018, Case C‑‑414/16 (Egenberger), paras. 72-73. CJ 6 November 2018, Joined Cases C-569/16 and C-570/16 (Bauerand Broûonn), para. 68. CJ 11 September 2018, Case C-68/18 (IR/JQ), paras. 63-64.
CJ 4 July 2006, Case C-212/04 (Adeneler), para. 111. CJ 5 October 2004, Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 (Pfeiffer), paras. 115-119. CJ 17 April 2018, Case C‑‑414/16 (Egenberger), para. 71. CJ 11 September 2018, Case C-68/18 (IR/JQ), para. 63.
CJ 13 November 1990, Case C-106/89 (Marleasing), para. 8. CJ 19 April 2016, Case C-441/14 (Dansk Industri), para. 31. Dominguez, para. 24.
CJ 4 July 2006, Case C-212/04 (Adeneler), para. 110. CJ 17 October 2018, Case C-167/17 (Klohn), paras. 48 and 61-71. See §5.3.1.
Centrosteel, para. 17. CJ 19 April 2016, Case C-441/14 (Dansk Industri), para. 33.
See for instance CJ 15 April 2008, Case C268/06 (Impact), para. 100; CJ 24 January 2012, Case C-282/10 (Dominguez), para. 25; CJ 15 January 2014, Case C-176/12 (AMS), para. 39; CJ 19 April 2016, Case C-441/14 (Dansk Industri), para. 32. CJ 7 August 2018, Case C-122/17 (Smith), para. 40.
Hartkamp 2016/182. Wissink 2001, pp. 175 et seq.
Article 6:2(2)BW and Article 6:248(2) BW. This – exceptional – mechanism is called the restrictive effect of reasonableness and fairness, and basically has the same effect as contra legem interpretation. Another example could be the German Verfassungsbeschwerde in relation to which the German Verfassungsgericht can set aside mandatory legislation in a concrete case. Cf. Neuner 2005. Terhechte 2008. Hartkamp, Sieburgh & Devroe (eds.), Casebook 2017, pp. 380-384.
For an example of such a conclusion see Gerechtshof Amsterdam 10 November 2009, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2009:BK4648, especially paras. 3.9-3.9.6, discussed in §5.3.3. See for an English translation of this consideration: Hartkamp, Sieburgh & Devroe (eds.), Casebook 2017, pp. 838-384.
21. Both in vertical and horizontal cases that fall within the scope of Union law, for the sake of the effet utile of Union law Member States – and particularly national courts – are obliged to interpret national law as a whole in harmony with Union law.1 This obligation follows from Article 4(3) TEU in conjunction with Article 288 TFEU and is “inherent in the system of the Treaty”.2 By interpreting national law in harmony with Union law, the respective rule of Union law has effect in horizontal legal relationships. Although the obligation upon Member States to interpret national law in line with Union law applies to all sources of Union law, the obligation flourishes in the realm of directives and other rules of Union law that lack direct horizontal effect, like certain Treaty provisions and the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights.3 By interpreting national law in harmony with these type of provisions of Union law, it is assured that as much effect as possible is given to them via the application of the respective national provisions that apply to the legal relationship in question.
22. In terms of the content and scope of the obligation, the Court of Justice has held that national courts must interpret national law consistently with Union law as far as possible whenever they can possibly do so.4 In relation to directives the duty of consistent interpretation exists from the expiry of the implementation period.5 Not only implementation measures should be interpreted consistently with Union law, but the whole body of domestic law, including open norms in for example the law of obligations or civil liability law.6 Moreover, the Court of Justice held that the obligation to interpret national law in conformity with Union law includes the obligation for national courts to change their national settled case law insofar as it is based on an interpretation of national law that is incompatible with Union law.7 Further, when interpreting national law with Union law, national courts must use all the interpretation methods that are at their disposal in the law of their Member State.8 National courts are thus required to interpret national law, “as far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose” of Union law.9
23. Notwithstanding this, the duty of consistent interpretation is restricted by general principles of law, in particular the principle of legal certainty, the prohibition of retroactive effect and the principle of res judicata.10 Also, although the obligation entails the duty of national courts to change their established case law11, the obligation does not reach so far that it requires an interpretation of national law contra legem.12 Nonetheless, if their domestic procedural law allows interpretation contra legem, national courts are held to apply this interpretation all the same.13 In other words; Union law does not oblige – nor prohibit – national courts to interpret national law contra legem; this is a matter governed by national law. In this context it should be noted that national systems may have methods or instruments that in their effect are equal to contra legem interpretation without being labelled as such. For example, in Dutch law a provision of mandatory law can be disapplied if application of that provision would be unacceptable in view of the concrete circumstances of the case.14In the context of their obligation to interpret national law in conformity with Union law, national courts are obliged to explore if such contra legem-alike methods or instruments can indeed be applied. In Member States where interpretation contra legem is not allowed, a national court must conclude that when national law cannot be interpreted in conformity with Union law, the obligation of consistent interpretation does not bring solace to the case.15 Sometimes, however, the national court will have another tool at its disposal: under certain conditions, the national court is obliged to set aside national law as a result of a compatibility review against Union law.