Einde inhoudsopgave
The EU VAT Treatment of Vouchers (FM nr. 157) 2019/2.6.1
2.6.1 The principle of prohibition of abuse of law
Dr. J.B.O. Bijl, datum 01-05-2019
- Datum
01-05-2019
- Auteur
Dr. J.B.O. Bijl
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS601723:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Omzetbelasting / Levering van goederen en diensten
Omzetbelasting / Bijzondere OB-regelingen
Omzetbelasting / Vergoeding
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
See, for example, CJEU cases C-110/99, Emsland-Stärke GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas, ECLI:EU:C:2000:695, paragraph 51 and joined cases C-487/01 and C-7/02, Gemeente Leusden (C-487/01) and Holin Groep BV cs (C-7/02) v Staatssecretaris van Financiën, ECLI:EU:C:2004:263, paragraph 78.
See, for example, Articles 11, 19, 80, 131, 158 and 343 of the EU VAT Directive.
Literally from: A.J. van Doesum, H.W.M. van Kesteren, G.J. van Norden, Fundamentals of EU VAT law, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2016, p. 39.
See, for example, CJEU cases C-162/07, Ampliscientifica Srl and Amplifin SpA v Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze and Agenzia delle Entrate, ECLI:EU:C:2008:301, paragraph 28, C-103/09, The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v Weald Leasing Ltd, ECLI:EU:C:2010:804, paragraph 39, C-277/09, The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs v RBS Deutschland Holdings GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2010:810, paragraph 51, C-504/10, Tanoarch s.r.o. v Daňové riaditeľstvo Slovenskej republiky, ECLI:EU:C:2011:707, paragraph 51, C-33/11, A Oy, ECLI:EU:C:2012:482, paragraph 63, C-326/11, J.J. Komen en Zonen Beheer Heerhugowaard BV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën, ECLI:EU:C:2012:461, paragraph 35, C‑653/11, Her Majesty’s Commissioners of Revenue and Customs v Paul Newey, ECLI:EU:C:2013:409, C-419/14, WebMindLicenses kft v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Kiemelt Adó- és Vám Főigazgatóság, ECLI:EU:C:2015:832, paragraph 35, C-263/15, Lajvér Meliorációs Nonprofit Kft. and Lajvér Csapadékvízrendezési Nonprofit Kft. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Dél-dunántúli Regionális Adó Főigazgatósága (NAV), ECLI:EU:C:2016:392, paragraph 50 and C-251/16, Edward Cussens and Others v T. G. Brosman, ECLI:EU:C:2017:881, paragraph 61.
CJEU case C-251/16, Edward Cussens and Others v T. G. Brosman, ECLI:EU:C:2017:881, paragraph 61.
CJEU case C‑653/11, Her Majesty’s Commissioners of Revenue and Customs v Paul Newey, ECLI:EU:C:2013:409.
See, for example, CJEU case C-255/02, Halifax plc, Leeds Permanent Development Services Ltd and County Wide Property Investments Ltd v Commissioners of Customs & Excise, ECLI:EU:C:2006:121, paragraph 94.
The principle of prohibition of abuse of (Union) law is an integral part of the EU VAT system.1 It is also included in some of the provisions of the EU VAT Directive.2 The purpose and effect of the principle that the abuse of rights is prohibited is to bar wholly artificial arrangements which do not reflect economic reality and are set up with the sole (or principal) aim of obtaining a tax advantage.3 The CJEU has, in cases where abuse of law (‘fraus legis’) could be an issue, used ‘economic reality’ as a test for determining whether the setup of the parties involved constituted an abusive practice.4 The principle prohibiting the abuse of rights is intended to ensure, particularly in the field of VAT, that Union legislation is not extended to cover abusive practices by economic operators, that is to say transactions carried out not in the context of normal commercial operations, but solely for the purpose of wrongfully obtaining advantages provided for by Union law. The effect of that principle is therefore to prohibit wholly artificial arrangements which do not reflect economic reality and are set up with the sole aim of obtaining a tax advantage. This means that ‘economic reality’ is a reflection of ‘transaction carried out in the context of normal commercial operations’. Where transactions that are carried out, do not reflect economic reality, this could be an indication that the transaction could possibly be an abusive practice. In most of its cases on this issue, the CJEU uses the term ‘economic reality’, in one case it only uses ‘commercial reality’5 and in one case it uses both terms for the same test.6
This leads me to the conclusion that for the purpose of determining whether a certain practice qualifies as abuse of law, which is therefore in breach of the principle that prohibits the abuse of law, ‘economic reality’ and ‘commercial’ reality mean the same. These realities are reflections of the actual, factual, transaction(s) in question. They provide an objective view of the transaction. Wholly artificial arrangements do not reflect economic reality. This also follows from the fact that the CJEU requires that the transactions between parties that are found to be involved in an abusive practice, must be redefined so as to re-establish the situation that would have prevailed in the absence of the transactions constituting that abusive practice.7 In my view, that situation is what economic and/or commercial reality would or should have been without in absence of the ‘abusive transactions’. This means that, in cases where the CJEU tests whether the transactions of the case qualify as an abusive practice, economic and/or commercial reality is a reflection of the way independent businesses would normally do business and design or set up their transactions.