Einde inhoudsopgave
EU Equity pre- and post-trade transparency regulation (LBF vol. 21) 2021/16.II.1
16.II.1 General
mr. J.E.C. Gulyás, datum 01-02-2021
- Datum
01-02-2021
- Auteur
mr. J.E.C. Gulyás
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS267146:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Bank- en effectenrecht
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Financiële dienstverlening / Financieel toezicht
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
See G. Ferrarini and F. Recine, ‘The MiFID and Internalisation’, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 242.
CESR, Technical Advice in the context of the MiFID Review – Equity Markets, 29 July 2010(CESR/10-802) (CESR/10-802), p. 6-7. For the sake of completeness, under MiFID I investment firms, when executing orders, needed to take all reasonable steps to obtain the best possible result (best execution) for their clients, taking into account price, costs, speed, likelihood of execution and settlement, size, nature or any other consideration relevant to the execution of the order (art. 21(1) MiFID I). Equity pre- and post-trade data consumption was not a de iure requirement to achieve and monitor best execution (art. 21(1) MiFID I), but the CESR statement shows that de facto equity pre- and post-trade data was important to facilitate the application of best execution obligations (CESR, Technical Advice in the context of the MiFID Review – Equity Markets, 29 July 2010(CESR/10-802), p. 6-7).
MiFID I required RMs, MTFs, investment firms (including SIs), and data vendors to publish MiFID I equity pre- and post-trade data on a ‘reasonable commercial basis’. The rationale behind this requirement is best understood against the broader MiFID I framework. MiFID I aimed for competition amongst both trade execution and data publication services. The competitive MiFID I approach towards trade execution services implied the risk of fragmented markets. In addition, the competition aimed for in data publication services, combined with fragmented markets, could result in the situation where data would be published in several places. Data fragmentation would make it difficult to obtain a trading activity overview.1 For this reason, MiFID I introduced the concept of a reasonable commercial basis. Consolidation of market data is in practice only available if accessible at a reasonable price (cost). The consolidated market overview would in turn support all sorts of MiFID I objectives, such as price formation, a level playing field between trading platforms, reduced information asymmetries, reduced search costs, and the facilitation and monitoring of best execution-obligations.2