Einde inhoudsopgave
Remedies for infringements of EU law in legal relationships between private parties (LBF vol. 18) 2019/6.1
6.1 An introduction to effective judicial protection
mr. I.V. Aronstein, datum 01-09-2019
- Datum
01-09-2019
- Auteur
mr. I.V. Aronstein
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS141394:1
- Vakgebied(en)
EU-recht / Algemeen
Burgerlijk procesrecht / Algemeen
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
CJ 10 April 1984, Case 14/83 (Von Colson and Kamann), para. 22. CJ 10 April 1984, Case 79/83 (Harz), para. 22. Tridimas 2003, pp. 297-299.
See for example CJ 15 October 1987, Case 222/86 (Unectef/Heylens), para. 14 and CJ 21 September 1989, Case 68/88 (Commission/Greece), paras. 23-24. Van Gerven2000, p. 521. Hartkamp2011a, pp. 244-245. Prechal 2005, p. 89 et seq. Prechal 2016. Tobler 2004 holds that the requirements also apply to other cases of discrimination.
Cf. CJ 15 May 1986, Case 222/84 (Johnston), para. 18. CJ 15 October 1987, Case 222/86 (Unectef/Heylens), para. 14. CJ 13 March 2007, Case C-432/05 (Unibet), para. 37. CJ 22 December 2010, Case C-279/09 (DEB), paras. 29-30. It should be noted that the Court also uses alternative wordings for the same principle, such as: “effective legal protection”, “adequate legal protection”, “effective judicial control”.
Cf. CJ 6 October 2015, Case C-362/14 (Schrems), para. 95. CJ 15 May 1986, Case 222/84 (Johnston), paras. 18-19. CJ 15 October 1987, Case 222/86 (Unectef/Heylens), para. 14. Prechal 2016, pp. 144-145.
Explanations on the Charter, Official Journal C 303, 14 December 2007, at pp. 29-30. See also CJ 16 July 2009, Case C-12/08 (Mono Car Styling), paras. 47-49. CJ 22 December 2010, Case C-279/09 (DEB), paras. 29-32. CJ 8 September 2010, Case C-409/06 (Winner Wetten), para. 58. CJ 24 October 2013, Case C-510/11 (Kone), paras. 20-21. CJ 16 May 2017, Case C-682/15 (Berlioz Investment Fund), para. 54. Prechal 2016. Ebers 2016, pp. 253-255. Wilman 2015, pp. 36-39.
Explanations on the Charter, Official Journal C 303, 14 December 2007, at p. 30, with reference to CJ 23 April 1986, Case 294/83 (Les Verts/European Parliament). Cf. Safjan & Düsterhaus 2014, pp. 31-32. Prechal 2016, pp. 146-148.
See for example CJ 21 December 2016, Case C-119/15 (Biuro podrózy “Partner”), paras. 22-47.
Cf. Van Gerven 2000. Micklitz 2012. Van Duin 2017, pp. 190-192.
CJ 15 April 2008, Case C-268/06 (Impact), paras. 43-48. CJ 29 October 2009, Case C-63/08 (Pontin), para. 44.
Besides concrete remedies provided by Article 101 TFEU and the Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 on passenger rights, a number of regulations and directives give a certain degree of guidance as to the sanctions that Member States may or must adopt. For example the Directive 93/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts requires that unfair terms are not binding. Yet, it is up to Member States to provide for specific measures through which that result can be achieved. Further, as regards a right to compensation for infringements of Union rights, the relevant legislation in the particular Member State applies in relation to questions of liability and the calculation of the compensation payable. See comprehensively on this topic: Ebers 2016 and Wilman 2015. Van Duin 2017 and forthcoming dissertation.
Cf. CJ 8 September 2010, Case C-409/06 (Winner Wetten), para. 58. CJ 13 March 2007, Case C-432/05 (Unibet), para. 37.
CJ 17 July 2008, Case C-94/07 (Raccanelli), para. 51. Reich 2013b, p. 306.
CJ 8 November 1990, Case C-177/88 (Dekker), paras. 22-26. Cf. Reich 2013b, p. 311. Ebers 2016, pp. 713, 726-728 and 731.
If Union law does provide for remedies, this does not necessarily mean that those remedies are exhaustive: Member States are allowed to adopt extra remedies, which have to be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. For example if Union law only provides for civil remedies, Member States can adopt additional criminal sanctions: see CJ 8 July 1999, Case C-186/98 (Nunes and De Matos), para. 14. Cf. Tobler 2005, pp. 13-14. In some instruments in various fields the Union legislature has explicitly left this option open. See for example Article 25 of Directive 2003/71/EC; Article 18 of Directive 2004/109/EC; Recital 59 in the Preamble to Directive 2001/29; Recital 23 in the Preamble to Directive 2004/48. CJ 19 December 2013, Case C-174/12 (Hirmann).
Cf. CJ 17 December 2015, Case C-407/14 (Camacho), para. 44. CJ 13 July 2006, Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 (Manfredi), para. 92. CJ 19 December 2013, Case C-174/12 (Hirmann), para. 40. CJ 26 September 2013, Case C-418/11 (Texdata), paras. 50. CJ 13 March 2007, Case C-432/05 (Unibet), para. 43. CJ 3 May 2005, Joined Cases C-387/02, C-391/02 and C-403/02 (Berlusconi), para. 65. CJ 6 June 2002, Case C-159/00 (Sapod Audic), para. 52. CJ 16 December 1976, Case 33/76 (Rewe). Cf. Reich 2007, pp. 708-709 and 742. Safjan & Düsterhaus 2014, pp. 10-17. Mak 2014a. Mak 2014b, p. 240. Tridimas 2003, Chapter 8. Cafaggi & Iamiceli 2017, pp. 610-617.
Reich 2007, pp. 708-709 and 742.
Reich 2013b, p. 309. Mak 2014b, pp. 240 and 253-254. Van Duin 2017, p. 191.
Cf. Reich2007, p. 708. Reich 2013b, p. 309. Aronstein 2019, §5. See further §8.6.
CJ 10 April 1984, Case 14/83 (Von Colson and Kamann), para. 23, but also see paras. 18, 24 and 28. CJ 10 April 1984, Case 79/83 (Harz), paras. 23-24 and 28.
CJ 2 August 1993, Case C-271/91 (Marshall II), paras. 24-26. CJ 22 April 1997, Case C-180/95 (Draehmpaehl), paras. 25, 27, 32, 39, 40. CJ 11 October 2007, Case C-460/06 (Paquay), paras. 45-46. CJ 27 March 2014, Case C-565/12 (LCL Le Crédit Lyonnais), para. 44. See also CJ 8 November 1990, Case C-177/88 (Dekker), paras. 22-26. CJ 10 July 2008, Case C-54/07 (Feryn), paras. 35-40. CJ 17 December 2015, Case C-407/14 (Camacho), paras. 31-40. Cf. Reich 2011c. See for a discussion on these requirements in the field of consumer law: Cafaggi & Iamiceli 2017. Extensively on remedies in European consumer law: Ebers 2016, pp. 735-963.
Cf. Safjan & Düsterhaus 2014, pp. 4-5. Ebers 2016, pp. 705-707.
See for example Article 15 of Directive 2000/43; Article 17 Directive 2000/78, which is a codification of the Court’s case law in amongst others CJ 10 April 1984, Case 14/83 (Von Colson and Kamann);CJ 22 April 1997, Case C-180/95 (Draehmpaehl). See also Art. 8d of Directive 2002/73/EC; Article 8(2) of Directive 2004/113/EC; Article 13 of Directive 2005/29. Cf. Article 31 of Regulation 2847/93.
CJ 17 December 2015, Case C-407/14 (Camacho), paras. 31-40 with reference toCJ 2 August 1993, Case C-271/91 (Marshall II), para. 26. CJ 11 October 2007, Case C-460/06 (Paquay), paras. 45-46. Opinion Mengozzi 3 September 2015, Case C-407/14 (Camacho), paras. 28-39 and 57.
See para. 13 Preamble and Article 3(3) of Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union.
Cf. 12 July 2005, Case C-304/02 (Commission/France), paras. 37 and 72.
Because civil remedies generally have a restorative rather than a punitive character. See no. 8 in Chapter 1.
See §6.3.5.1. Cf. Cafaggi & Iamiceli 2017, pp. 610-617.
CJ 2 August 1993, Case C-271/91 (Marshall II), para. 25. Tobler 2005, pp. 4, 13 and 16.
Some authors argue that the requirement that the remedy is dissuasive potentially conflicts with the requirement that the remedy is proportionate: Cohen 2004, p. 18. Tobler 2005, p. 10 with reference to further literature. European Group on Tort Law, Principles of European Tort Law: Text and Commentary 8 (2005), pp. 150-151. Koziol 2008, p. 750.
CJ 2 August 1993, Case C-271/91 (Marshall II), para. 25. See also CJ 22 April 1997, Case C-180/95 (Draehmpaehl), para. 40. CJ 27 March 2014, Case C-565/12 (LCL Le Crédit Lyonnais), paras. 50-51. CJ 26 September 2013, Case C-418/11 (Texdata), paras. 50-52. CJ 25 April 2013, Case C-81/12 (Asociaţia Accept), para. 63 and the case law cited. Cf. Mak 2014b, p. 252.
European Commission, Remedies and sanctions in EC non-discrimination law, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities: Luxembourg 2005. See on remedies in discrimination cases also Reich 2011c.
Reich 2011c.
Ibid., p. 76.
Cf. CJ 21 April 2016, Case C-377/14 (Radlinger and Radlingerová), paras. 76-79 with reference to Dominguez, para. 24.
CJ 17 April 2018, Case C‑‑414/16 (Egenberger), paras. 70-82.
Ibid., para. 78. Cf. CJ 15 January 2014, Case C-176/12 (AMS), para. 47.
Think of Article 101 TFEU that includes the remedy of nullity. Ebers 2016, pp. 544-555. Wilman 2015, pp. 304-309. Also: Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights. See on the broad scope of applicability of the remedies stipulated in the Regulation for example CJ 17 September 2015, Case C-257/14 (Corina van der Lans) and CJ 17 April 2018, Joined Cases C‑‑195/17, C‑‑197/17 to C‑‑203/17, C‑‑226/17, C‑‑228/17, C‑‑254/17, C‑‑274/17, C‑‑275/17, C‑‑278/17 to C‑‑286/17 and C‑‑290/17 to C‑‑292/17 (TUIfly).
CJ 15 January 2014, Case C-176/12 (AMS), para. 47. See §4.2.2.4.
CJ 17 April 2018, Case C‑‑414/16 (Egenberger), paras. 79 and 82.Cf. CJ 19 November 1991, Case C-6/90 (Francovich), para. 32, with reference to CJ 9 March 1978, Case 106/77 (Simmenthal II), para. 16, and CJ 19 June 1990, Case C-213/89 (Factortame I), para. 19). Tridimas 2013a, p. 375. Wilman 2015, pp. 50-53.
CJ 6 June 2002, Case C-159/00 (Sapod Audic), para. 52.
See §2.3.2.3.
266. Part I demonstrates that Union law confers rights and imposes obligations upon private parties, and that in many cases it does not provide for concrete remedies in case such rights are violated. In Von Colson and Kamann and Harz – two of the first cases on civil remedies – the Court of Justice held that “it is impossible to establish real equality of opportunity without an appropriate system of sanctions” and that victims of discrimination “have rights of which they may avail themselves before the courts”.1 Since these considerations of the Court are of a general nature, it is assumed that these requirements in principle apply to each sanction or remedy for an infringement of any right that Union law confers upon a private party.2 Later, the Court held that the right to effective judicial protection, including the right to an effective remedy, is “a general principle of EU law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States”3 and “inherent in the existence of the rule of law”4. Eventually, the right to effective judicial protection was codified in Article 47 Charter, which reads:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article.
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented.
Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources insofar as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice.”
267. Article 47 Charter is partially based on Articles 6 and 13 ECHR.5 These provisions are secured by Article 47 Charter, which has a broader scope of application as it applies to all rights and freedoms guaranteed by Union law, and not only to civil rights and obligations and criminal charges.6Everyone who derives rights from Union law has the right to effective judicial protection of those rights.7 The right to effective judicial protection is two-dimensional in the sense that it requires 1) that the applicable procedural rules do not make effective judicial protection excessively difficult or virtually impossible, and 2) that there are actual real and effective remedies for infringements of Union law.8 As regards the latter, Member States can either adopt specific remedies for infringements of Union law, or apply existing remedies in a way that is in conformity with Union law. The failure to provide for effective procedures and remedies is liable to undermine the principle of effective judicial protection.9 Building on the civil remedies and concrete outcomes of the cases discussed in Part I, Part II focuses on those remedies and concrete outcomes rather than on the procedural dimension of the right to effective judicial protection.
268. As regards the obligation upon Member States, including national courts, to provide for effective judicial protection of Union law, it is recalled that in most cases neither Union legislation nor case law of the Court of Justice stipulates the specific remedy for an infringement of Union law.10 As a result, remedies for infringements of Union law have to be sought in the law of the Member States, which on the basis of the principle of sincere cooperation and Article 19 TEU “shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law”.11 In relation to an infringement of the free movement of workers by a private party, the Court of Justice for example held in Raccanelli that “it is for the referring court to assess, in light of the national legislation applicable in relation to non-contractual liability, the nature of the compensation which the applicant in the main proceedings would be entitled to claim”.12 Yet, in Dekker the Court clarified that liabiliy for infringements of Union law cannot be made dependent upon a fault-requirement, and that the grounds for exemption and grounds of justification in national law do not apply – at least, not to infringements of the right to non-discrimination.13
269. Further, when Union law does regulate remedies for infringements of Union rights, Member States are still allowed to adopt additional remedies.14 Member States are in principle free to adopt specific remedies for infringements of – specific rules of – Union law. However, as demonstrated in Part I, it is also possible that the existent repertoire of civil remedies applies to particular infringements of Union law. Any sanction or combination of sanctions that a Member State within its margin of discretion chooses to remedy violations of Union law, must comply with the principles of effectiveness and equivalence and with the standards of effective judicial protection laid down by the Court.15 The fact that remedies are in principle based on national law and subsequently are, if necessary, moulded or reshaped in a way that complies with the standards for effective judicial protection on the basis of Union law, results in ‘hybrid remedies’.16 A hybrid remedy for an infringement of Union law requires three steps to be taken. Firstly, the appropriate national remedy must be found for a particular infringement of Union law. Secondly, the national remedy must be measured: it must be assessed whether the remedy respects the principles of effectiveness and equivalence, and whether it complies with the requirements of the right to an effective remedy (discussed below). Thirdly, insofar as needed the national remedy must be adjusted or upgraded17 to the requirements for effective judicial protection as provided in Union law – this last step is what eventually leads to the hybrid nature of a remedy.18
270. In Von Colson and Kamann and in Harz the Court held that
“although […] the directive does not require any specific form of sanction for unlawful discrimination, it does entail that that sanction be such as to guarantee real and effective judicial protection [effectiveness]. Moreover it must also have a real deterrent effect on the employer [dissuasiveness]. It follows that where a Member State chooses to penalize the breach of the prohibition of discrimination by the award of compensation, that compensation must in any event be adequate in relation to the damage sustained [proportionality]”.19 [Edited: I.A.]
In subsequent cases, like Marshall II, Draehmpaehl and Paquay the Court confirmed that the right to effective judicial protection includes the right to a remedy that is effective, proportionate and dissuasive.20 By formulating these elements of effective judicial protection, the Court of Justice has infused a common standard for effective judicial protection, in relation to which the Union and the Member States have shared responsibility.21
271. Following in the footsteps of the Court of Justice, the European legislature has, in a number of directives, adopted the obligation that “Member States shall lay down the rules on sanctions applicable to infringements of the national provisions adopted pursuant to [the] directive and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are applied. The sanctions, which may comprise the payment of compensation to the victim, must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive”.22 Nevertheless, it should be noted that the requirement that a remedy must have a deterrent effect is toned down in the sense that in horizontal proceedings Union law does not require that Member States impose punitive damages that go beyond full compensation for the loss and damage actually sustained: in that context compensatory damages suffice.23 Even, in the realm of antitrust infringements, Directive 2014/104 prohibits overcompensation and punitive damages.24 This prohibition may be explained by the well-developed fine-system in European competition law. The infringing company is likely to be sanctioned with a fine that already has a punitive character. Therefore, it may be excessive to add the possibility of being confronted with punitive damages in horizontal proceedings. It is uncertain whether the prohibition of punitive damages will spread to fields of Union law that are not subject to regulatory enforcement and sanctions in the way that competition law and unfair trade practices are. In general, the requirement that sanctions are dissuasive is more relevant in relation to administrative measures such as fines, which must be high enough to have a deterrent effect.25 In relation to remedies in private law the focus lies – or should lie26 – on the effectiveness and the proportionality of the remedies. Should the civil remedies not be sufficiently deterrent, a Member State may be encouraged to adopt additional administrative or criminal sanctions for the same infringement.27
272. Whether a sanction or a remedy is effective, proportionate and deterrent has to be determined on a case by case basis, in light of the specific circumstances at hand.28 The remedy should reflect a fair balance between each of the separate elements. For example, if a private party has to pay an exceptionally high amount of damages that exceeds the compensation of the damages actually suffered, that remedy may be effective and dissuasive, but it is likely to be at odds with the proportionality principle.29 Hence, the requirements necessarily entail that the particular circumstances of each breach of Union law are taken into account.30 In the same vein, in 2005 the European Commission published a thematic report on remedies and sanctions in non-discrimination law31 followed by a “handbook” in 2011 on how to present a discrimination claim.32 The European Commission notes that “the meaning of effective, proportionate and deterrent remedies must be determined in each specific case in light of the individual circumstances”.33 In my view, there are no reasons not to apply the requirements of the Court and the European Commission mutatis mutandis to other remedies of infringements of Union law in the context of a horizontal legal relationship, also outside the scope of non-discrimination.
273. National courts are obliged to interpret statutory remedies available at the national level in conformity with Union law, including the right to effective judicial protection.34 In Egenberger the Court of Justice held that insofar as consistent interpretation is impossible and national legislation is incompatible with the right to effective judicial protection as laid down in Article 47 Charter, the national court must set aside that legislation, also in proceedings between private parties.35 Article 47 Charter complies with the AMS-criterion, meaning that this right is sufficient in itself and does not need to be made more specific by provisions of Union law or national law to confer upon private parties a right upon which they may rely as such in cases governed by Union law.36
274. To recapitulate, national courts must provide for effective judicial protection of rights that Union law confers upon private parties, by ticking off the following steps – insofar as applicable to the case in question:
applying provisions of Union law that have direct horizontal effect;37
interpreting national law in conformity with Union law;
setting aside national legislation that is incompatible with provisions of Union law that comply with the AMS-criterion38 – including Article 47 Charter39;
applying and determining remedies for the infringement and/or the disapplication of national legislation. Remedies or a combination of sanctions must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
275. In the context of the study at hand, the right to an effective remedy comes into play when a private party infringes or restricts a right that Union law confers upon another private party. Typically this occurs in cases in which a private party infringed directly horizontally effective Union law – e.g. Angonese and Laval, Courage/Crehan – or when a private party infringed national legislation that correctly implemented a directive – e.g. adopting unfair terms in consumer contracts or carrying out unfair commercial practices. Yet, in cases like Mangold, Kücükdeveci, Dansk Industri, CIA Security and Unilever Italia it turned out that private parties had acted in conflict with Union law by relying on national legislation that was incompatible with rules of Union law. In those cases the national courts were obliged to, in the horizontal proceedings, set aside the legislation that was incompatible with Union law. Article 47(1) Charter states that “everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy” and does not specify the nature of the violation. It follows that this right applies also to those private parties whose rights were infringed as a result of another private party relying on national legislation that was incompatible with Union law and that has to be set aside.
276. As demonstrated in Part I, the legal consequences of the disapplication of a national rule in horizontal proceedings have to be sought in national law. In Sapod Audic the Court of Justice stated:
“It should, however, be observed that the question of the conclusions to be drawn in the main proceedings from theinapplicability of the [provision in national law] as regards the severity of the sanction under the applicable national law, such as nullity or unenforceability of the contract between [private parties], is a question governed by national law, in particular as regards the rules and principles of contract law which limit or adjust that sanction in order to render its severity proportionate to the particular defect found. However, those rules and principles may not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and may not be framed in such a way as to render impossible in practice the exercise of rights conferred by [Union] law (principle of effectiveness)”40 [Edited and emphasis added: I.A.]
Although the Court’s consideration does not explicitly refer to the right to effective judicial protection as discussed above, it surely reflects its elements, especially the fact that the sanction must be effective and that it must be proportionate to the defect found. Sapod Audic concerned a procedural compatibility review.41 However, in my view this consideration applies also to the disapplication of a national provision following from a substantive compatibility review.
277. Having set out the basic foundations of the right to effective judicial protection, the following sections concentrate primarily on civil remedies and the requirement that remedies must be proportionate in view of the remedy chosen and the seriousness or gravity of the infringement at hand. The effectiveness and dissuasiveness of civil remedies are discussed only where relevant.