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Corporate Social Responsibility (IVOR nr. 77) 2010/3.4.1
3.4.1 Management board and CSR
Mr. T.E. Lambooy, datum 17-11-2010
- Datum
17-11-2010
- Auteur
Mr. T.E. Lambooy
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS364574:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Ondernemingsrecht (V)
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
See e.g. M. Huse, 'Boards, Governance and Value Creation. The Human Side of Corporate Governance', (Cambridge: University Press: 2007). This book concerns the role of boards in corporate governance. How should they be structured in order to maximise value creation? It looks at the role of boards in a variety of different countries and contexts, from small and medium-sized enterprises to large corporations. It explores the working style of boards and how they can best achieve their task expectations. Board effectiveness and value creation are shown to be the results of interactions between owners, managers, board members and other actors. Board behaviour is thus seen to be a result of strategising, norms, board leadership, and the decision-making culture within the boardroom.
Articles 2:164/274 DCC also oblige the management board of certain large 'structure' companies to obtain approval of the supervisory board regarding important decisions.
Small and medium-sized companies are exempted from this obligation pursuant to Articles 2:396/397 DCC. The text and scope of application of the Frijns Code departs slightly from the DCC obligation. This provision was introduced pursuant to the Modernisation Directive (2003/51/EC), and can be found in most EU countries' corporate or accounting laws. See further Lambooy and Van Vliet supra note 16.
Kamp-Roelands and Lambooy supra note 16.
The US Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Sections 406/407-6) and the 'New York Stock Exchange, NYSE Final Corporate Governance Listing Standards, approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission on 4 November 2003 and amended on 3 November 2004 (Section 303A.10 'Corporate Governance Rules' also require companies to disclose any codes of ethics that they follow. See: www.nyse.com/pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf, visited on 7 April 2010.
According to Dutch law the task and duty of the managing board is to: 'manage the company' (article 2:129 DCC). Many books have been published about the role of the directors in managing the company. Defining the strategy, organising the business, and the creation of value are the themes that usually emerge.1 The Frijns Code stipulates in Principle II.1:
The role of the management board is to manage the company, which means, among other things, that it is responsible for achieving the company's aims, the strategy and associated risk profile, the development of results and corporate social responsibility issues that are relevant to the enterprise. The management board is accountable for this to the supervisory board and to the general meeting. In discharging its role, the management board shall be guided by the interests of the company and its affiliated enterprise, taking into consideration the interests of the company's stakeholders. [Emphasis added]
Compared to the Tabaksblat Code, the inclusion of the CSR theme is new. Principle is linked to best practice provision II.1.2, which lists the subjects the management board shall submit to the supervisory board for approval. Under (d), 'corporate social responsibility issues that are relevant to the enterprise' are mentioned. Clearly times have changed since introduction of the Tabaksblat Code: CSR issues are now considered part of management strategy and are believed to be sufficiently important to require the supervisory board's consent.2
According to the last sentence of best practice provision II.1.2, the main elements of a company's CSR strategy must also be mentioned in the annual report. This provision is in line with Dutch corporate law and accounting guidelines. Article 2:391(1) DCC requires the inclusion of extra-financial information in the annual report such as information regarding environment and employee matters.3 In addition, the Dutch Council for Annual Reporting has issued Guideline 400, which recommends providing ample information on CSR strategies, policies and results in the annual report.4 Consequently, best practice provision II.1.2, last sentence, did not introduce a new topic to Dutch corporate practice, as many listed companies already complied with the aforesaid legal requirement and Guideline. Best practice provision II.1.2 indeed records best practices rather than setting a new standard for recommended corporate conduct.
To support Principle II.1, best practice provision II.1.3(b) requires that a code of conduct be published on the company s website as an instrument of internal risk management and control systems. The Tabaksblat Code had a similar provision (II.1.3). As the Frijns Code does not elaborate on this provision, it should probably be understood as only relating to the company s risk and control systems.5 In the author s view, the Frijns Code missed an opportunity to validate the fact that many companies have, by way of best practices, endorsed an international and/or an industry CSR code of conduct. The Code could have recommended that any applicable CSR codes ofconduct be published on a company s website. This would have enhanced transparency concerning the question as to what type of conduct and what ambitions might be expected from the company in respect of putting their CSR policies into practice.