CJ, 29-01-2026, nr. C-72/24, nr. C-73/24

Article 7 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 provides:

In 2014, in the course of his business activities in Greece, HF imported textile products from Türkiye.

Customs declarations relating to those products were lodged with the Greek customs authorities (‘the customs authorities’) in accordance with the simplified declaration procedure provided for in Article 81 of the Community Customs Code, which provided that those authorities could, at the request of the declarant, agree that import duties should be charged on the whole consignment of goods falling within different tariff classifications on the basis of the tariff classification of the goods which were subject to the highest rate of import duty.

According to the referring court, the importation of those goods into Greece was exempt from customs duties but was subject to import VAT on the basis of the customs value stated by the importing company in its import declarations.

In 2016, following a complaint of undervaluation of imported goods, the customs authorities carried out an investigation which revealed that there was well-founded evidence that the customs value indicated in a number of customs declarations lodged was incorrect and that the consignee of the goods named in those declarations was not the actual owner of those goods.

On account of their doubts, on 14 December 2016, the customs authorities carried out a post-clearance examination of all of those customs declarations, and reached the conclusion that there was a smuggling system which had given rise to 289 false import declarations. In that regard, the customs authorities found that, through a complex fraud mechanism, that system had involved the declaration of customs values which were significantly below the minimum commercially viable values.

However, the customs authorities noted that, since a physical check of the goods concerned could not be carried out post-clearance and the goods were only described in general terms in the corresponding invoices, they were unable to reconstruct the actual prices paid to the Turkish suppliers for those goods.

In those circumstances, in order to determine the customs value of the goods, the customs authorities relied on a ‘threshold price’ or ‘lowest acceptable price’ (‘LAP’) using a risk assessment tool based on EU-wide data, developed by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF).

It is apparent from the documents before the Court that that method involves, first of all, calculating a ‘cleaned average price’ (‘CAP’), also known as the ‘fair price’ or ‘fair value’. The CAP, expressed as a per kilogram price, is calculated on the basis of the monthly import prices of the relevant products from Türkiye taken from Comext, a reference database for detailed statistics on international trade in goods that is managed by Eurostat.

Next, an average is calculated for the entire European Union on an arithmetical basis, that is to say, a non-weighted average, of the CAP values of all Member States. In calculating that average, outliers, namely values that are unusually high or low, are excluded.

Lastly, a value corresponding to 50% of the CAP values is calculated, which constitutes the LAP. The LAP, also expressed as a per kilogram price, is used as a risk profile or threshold enabling the customs authorities of Member States to detect particularly low values declared on importation and, consequently, imports presenting a significant risk of undervaluation.

It is apparent from the documents before the Court that the customs authorities of all Member States have at their disposal a communication system, namely the Anti-Fraud Information System (AFIS), in which OLAF also participates. Through that system, and more specifically by using the corresponding Automated Monitoring Tool (AMT), it is possible for them to detect cases of undervaluation.

In the present case, on the basis of the LAP thus calculated, the customs authorities determined the ‘unit price’ within the meaning of Article 30(2)(c) of the Community Customs Code. The reasons given by those authorities for that choice were that it was impossible to rely, first, on the fictitious transaction value of the goods at issue in the main proceedings, which were deliberately undervalued, and, second, on the transaction value of identical or similar products, on account of the incomplete description of those products in the invoices attached to the customs declarations lodged. Furthermore, those authorities were not in a position to conduct physical checks on the goods at issue in the main proceedings at the time of their post-clearance examination, since they had escaped seizure.

In that regard, the customs authorities state that none of the participants in the smuggling scheme at issue in the main proceedings had provided, in their explanations, any evidence to suggest that the customs values used were much higher than the prices actually paid.

Those authorities thus found that the sum of VAT fraudulently evaded amounted, in respect of all the goods declared fraudulently by the smuggling scheme at issue in the main proceedings, to EUR 6 211 300.18.

As regards HF's involvement in that smuggling scheme, it is apparent from the order for reference that in 2014 he held goods which had been the subject of a false customs value declaration in the context of that scheme and is, therefore, under national law, liable for the evaded VAT due on those goods.

HF brought an action challenging the adjustment notices at issue in the main proceedings before the Dioikitiko Protodikeio Thessalonikis (Administrative Court of First Instance, Thessaloniki, Greece), which is the referring court. He argues that determining the customs value of the goods concerned on the basis of LAPs is unlawful since the latter, as statistical data on import prices, can be used only to challenge the declared value of those goods but cannot constitute a method for determining their customs value. In addition, he claims to have been definitively acquitted of the offence of smuggling by a judgment of the Trimeles Plimmeleiodikeio Grevenon (three-member criminal court, Grevena, Greece).

As a preliminary point, the referring court considers that it is bound by the acquittal delivered by the Trimeles Plimmeleiodikeio Grevenon (three-member criminal court, Grevena) only in so far as the recovery notices at issue in the main proceedings imposed on HF increased duties, which should be annulled. On the other hand, it considers that HF is still liable for the evaded import VAT.

As regards the use of ‘statistical values’ in determining the customs value of the goods concerned, the referring court notes, first of all, that those values may be used by the customs authorities to establish the existence of reasonable doubts as to the veracity of the declared transaction value. Similarly, according to that court, in accordance with the judgment of 8 March 2022, Commission v United Kingdom (Action to counter undervaluation fraud) (C-213/19, EU:C:2022:167), those values can be used to determine the losses to the European Union's own resources caused by Member States that fail to carry out effective fraud detection checks.

Next, the referring court notes that the Court of Justice held, in paragraphs 38 to 41 and 44 of the judgment of 16 June 2016, EURO 2004. Hungary (C-291/15, EU:C:2016:455), that average ‘statistical values’ may be used to demonstrate the existence of well-founded, if not reasonable, doubts on the part of the competent customs authorities of a Member State to disregard the declared transaction value and apply ‘in a hierarchical manner’ the alternative methods for determining the customs value, irrespective of the authenticity of invoices and other documents evidencing the transaction value of the imported goods, where evidence has not been produced, on request, to establish the accuracy of the declared transaction value.

Lastly, the Court of Justice held, in paragraphs 51 and 53 to 56 of the judgment of 9 June 2022, Baltic Master (C-599/20, EU:C:2022:457), that, in the context of the ‘fall-back’ method, provided for in Article 31(1) of the Community Customs Code, data appearing in a national database relating to goods ascribed to the same code of the Integrated Tariff of the European Union (‘the TARIC code’) and originating from the same seller as the goods concerned, constitute ‘data available in the Community’, within the meaning of that provision, and may be used as a basis for determining the customs value of the goods concerned.

However, the referring court expresses doubts as to whether it is possible to use average statistical values, in particular LAPs, to determine the customs value of the goods concerned in the context of the methods laid down in Articles 29 and 30 of the Community Customs Code and, more specifically, in the context of the secondary method laid down in Article 30(2)(c) of that code, which is the method used in the present case. First, the customs authorities used that method for determining the customs value even though that provision refers to identical or similar goods and, second, it does not appear that that LAP was calculated in accordance with the time limit referred to in Article 152(1)(b) of Implementing Regulation No 2454/93.

Furthermore, that court considers that the use of the LAP in order to determine the customs value of imported goods amounts to using minimum values, which are, by definition, ‘fictitious’, which would run counter to the methods normally used in international trade or commerce.

That court is also uncertain whether the use of the LAP is appropriate in the context of the procedure provided for in Article 81 of the Community Customs Code.

In addition, that court expresses doubts as to whether the national provisions determining the person or persons designated or recognised as liable for payment of VAT are sufficiently clear and precise for HF, in his capacity as holder of the goods, to be held jointly and severally liable for payment of the evaded import VAT.

In those circumstances, the Dioikitiko Protodikeio Thessalonikis (Administrative Court of First Instance, Thessaloniki) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

The facts referred to and the statement of reasons set out in the order for reference in Case C-73/24 are similar to those mentioned in the order for reference in Case C-72/24, apart from the fact that, first, the referring court has been seised of an action brought by WI, who is an employee of an undertaking engaged in the wholesale trade in textile products from Türkiye who was deemed to have been aware of the smuggling scheme at issue in the main proceedings, given that she was responsible for most of the management of that undertaking and, second, the customs declarations at issue in the main proceedings were lodged between March 2014 and December 2016.

In those circumstances, the Dioikitiko Protodikeio Thessalonikis (Administrative Court of First Instance, Thessaloniki) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, worded in terms similar to those of the questions referred for a preliminary ruling in Case C-72/24:

By decision of the President of the Court of 25 March 2024, Cases C-72/24 and C-73/24 were joined for the purposes of the written and oral parts of the procedure and the judgment.

By document lodged at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 3 July 2025, the applicants in the main proceedings, HF and WI, applied for an order for the reopening of the oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 83 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice. In support of their application, they claim, in essence, first, that, in his Opinion, the Advocate General relied on facts which depart from those relied on by the referring court and, second, that they disagree with some of the assessments set out in the Advocate General's Opinion. In particular, HF and WI dispute the assessments relating to the examination of the threshold values in the context of the method for determining the customs value provided for in Article 31(1) of the Community Customs Code and Article 74(3) of the Union Customs Code.

It should be noted that, under the second paragraph of Article 252 TFEU, it is the duty of the Advocate General, acting with complete impartiality and independence, to make, in open court, reasoned submissions on cases which, in accordance with the Statute of the Court of Justice, require his involvement. The Court is not bound either by the Advocate General's Opinion or by the reasoning on which it is based (judgment of 19 March 2020, Sánchez Ruiz and Others, C-103/18 and C-429/18, EU:C:2020:219, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

It should also be noted, in that context, that the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Rules of Procedure make no provision for the parties or the interested persons referred to in Article 23 of that statute to submit observations in response to the Advocate General's Opinion. The fact that a party or such an interested person disagrees with the Advocate General's Opinion, irrespective of the questions examined in the Opinion, cannot therefore in itself constitute grounds justifying the reopening of the oral procedure (judgment of 19 March 2020, Sánchez Ruiz and Others, C-103/18 and C-429/18, EU:C:2020:219, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).

It follows that, in so far as the request of HF and WI to have the oral part of the procedure reopened, first, is intended to enable them to respond to the position taken by the Advocate General in his Opinion and, second, concerns certain alleged corrections which contradict the information contained in the order for reference in Case C-72/24, that request cannot be granted.

That being said, pursuant to Article 83 of the Rules of Procedure, the Court may, at any time after hearing the Advocate General, order that the oral part of the procedure be reopened, in particular if it considers that it lacks sufficient information or where a party has, after the close of that part of the procedure, submitted a new fact which is of such a nature as to be a decisive factor for the decision of the Court, or where the case must be decided on the basis of an argument which has not been debated between the parties or the interested persons referred to in Article 23 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

In the present case, the Court has all the information necessary to answer the questions referred by the national court. In addition, the request that the oral part of the procedure be reopened does not disclose any new fact which is of such a nature as to be capable of being a decisive factor for the decision which the Court is called upon to make in the present cases.

In those circumstances, the Court considers, after hearing the Advocate General, that there is no need to order the reopening of the oral part of the procedure.

By its first to third questions in Case C-72/24 and its first to third questions in Case C-73/24, which it is appropriate to examine together, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 30 and Article 31(1) and (2)(f) and (g) of the Community Customs Code and Article 74 of the Union Customs Code must be interpreted as precluding, where, in the course of a post-clearance examination during which, first, it is not possible to physically check the imported goods and, second, the description of the goods in the documents accompanying the import declaration is general and vague, so that the customs value cannot be determined on the basis of the transaction value of those goods in accordance with Article 29 of the Community Customs Code and Article 70 of the Union Customs Code, the determination of that value on the basis of the LAP, which is calculated on the basis of aggregated statistical values established at EU level.

It should be borne in mind at the outset that EU law on customs valuation seeks to introduce a fair, uniform and neutral system excluding the use of arbitrary or fictitious customs values. The customs value must thus reflect the real economic value of an imported product and, therefore, take into account all of the elements of that product that have economic value (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 May 2025, Tauritus, C-782/23, EU:C:2025:353, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).

Moreover, the correct determination of the customs value of goods is a vital task to ensure the effective and comprehensive collection of traditional own resources, namely customs duties and VAT. Accordingly, in so far as there is a direct link between the collection of revenue deriving, inter alia, from VAT and the availability to the Commission of the corresponding resources, it is for the Member States, in accordance with the obligations imposed on them under Article 325(1) TFEU to protect the financial interests of the European Union against fraud or any other illegal activities affecting those interests, to adopt the measures necessary to guarantee the effective and comprehensive collection of that tax and, therefore, of those resources (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 March 2022, Commission v United Kingdom (Action to counter undervaluation fraud), C-213/19, EU:C:2022:167, paragraph 346).

Articles 29 to 31 of that Community Customs Code and Articles 70 to 74 of the Union Customs Code expressly establish a hierarchy between the various methods for determining the customs value provided for in those codes, so that an importer is not free to choose the method he or she will use (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 May 2025, Tauritus, C-782/23, EU:C:2025:353, paragraph 53).

Accordingly, the customs value of imported goods must be determined, as a matter of priority, using the transaction value method provided for in Article 29 of the Community Customs Code and in Article 70 of the Union Customs Code, that method being assumed to be the most appropriate, whereas the methods referred to in Articles 30 and 31 of the Community Customs Code and Article 74 of the Union Customs Code must be regarded as subsidiary methods to be used only where the customs value of the goods cannot be determined under Article 29 or Article 70. That is particularly true of the residual method referred to in Article 31 of that Community Customs Code and Article 74(3) of the Union Customs Code, which is applicable only if the customs value cannot be determined either by means of the transaction value method or by means of one of the subsidiary methods referred to in Article 30 of the Community Customs Code and Article 74(2) of the Union Customs Code (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 June 2016, EURO 2004. Hungary, C-291/15, EU:C:2016:455, paragraphs 28 and the case-law cited, and of 15 May 2025, Tauritus, C-782/23, EU:C:2025:353, paragraphs 52 and 54).

Furthermore, under Article 181a of Implementing Regulation No 2454/93 and Article 140 of Implementing Regulation 2015/2447, where the customs authorities have reasonable doubts as to whether the declared value of the imported goods represents the total amount paid or payable for those goods, they need not necessarily determine the customs value of those goods on the basis of the transaction value method. They may, therefore, refuse to accept the declared price if those doubts continue after they have asked for additional information or documents and have provided the person concerned with a reasonable opportunity to respond to the grounds for those doubts (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 June 2016, EURO 2004. Hungary, C-291/15, EU:C:2016:455, paragraph 31).

In the present case, it is apparent from the information provided to the Court that the customs value of the goods cannot be determined, pursuant to Article 29(1) of the Community Customs Code and Article 70(1) of the Union Customs Code, by the transaction value of the imported goods, which it will be for the referring court to ascertain. In that regard, that court noted, first, that the customs authorities could not rely on the transaction value of the goods concerned since, at the time of the post-clearance examination, they had concluded that those goods had been deliberately undervalued. Second, none of the participants in the smuggling scheme at issue in the main proceedings had provided, in their explanations, any evidence to suggest that the customs values used by the customs authorities were much higher than the prices actually paid.

In such circumstances, the customs valuation is, as stated in paragraph 75 above, carried out in accordance with the provisions of Article 30 of the Community Customs Code or Article 74(1) and (2) of the Union Customs Code, by applying, successively, the methods provided for in those provisions (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 June 2019, Oribalt Rīga, C-1/18, EU:C:2019:519, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).

In that regard, it should be recalled that, where the customs authorities undertake to determine the customs value pursuant to Article 30(2)(a) and (b) of the Community Customs Code and Article 74(2)(a) and (b) of the Union Customs Code, they must base their assessment on information concerning identical or similar goods. Accordingly, that determination requires the examination of factors such as the physical characteristics, quality, reputation and interchangeability of the goods, as well as the commercial level of the sales taken into account (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 June 2022, FAWKES, C-187/21, EU:C:2022:458, paragraph 48).

However, as the referring court points out, those methods for determining the customs value of the goods could not be used, in the present case, due to the incomplete description of the goods in the invoices attached to the customs declarations lodged and the customs authorities’ inability to physically check the goods concerned at the time of their post-clearance examination, those goods having escaped seizure.

The method of customs valuation provided for in Article 30(2)(c) of the Community Customs Code and Article 74(2)(c) of the Union Customs Code, used in the present case, relies on the value based on the unit price at which the imported goods, or identical or similar imported goods, are sold within the customs territory of the European Union.

It should be noted that, in so far as, according to the referring court, the customs authorities could not physically check the imported goods in order to determine whether they were identical or similar to those which they had to use in order to establish the customs value and in so far as the description of those goods in the invoices attached to the customs declarations was incomplete, those authorities did not have the information necessary to apply the method laid down in Article 30(2)(c) of the Community Customs Code and Article 74(2)(c) of the Union Customs Code, which it will be for that court to verify.

In addition, in order to apply the customs valuation method laid down in Article 30(2)(d) of the Community Customs Code and Article 74(2)(d) of the Union Customs Code, the customs value may be based on a computed value equal to the sum of various elements, including an amount for profit and general expenses which must be equal to that generally reflected in sales of goods of the same class or kind as the goods being valued, which are made by producers in the country of export for export to the European Union.

However, in the light of the information provided by the referring court referred to in paragraph 80 above, the customs authorities were, in the present case, also unable to carry out the customs valuation on the basis of Article 30(2)(d) of the Community Customs Code and Article 74(2)(d) of the Union Customs Code, which it will nevertheless be for that court to verify.

In the light of the foregoing findings, it should be borne in mind that, if it is no longer possible to determine the customs value of the imported goods on the basis of Article 30 of the Community Customs Code and Article 74(1) and (2) of the Union Customs Code, the customs valuation is to be carried out in accordance with the provisions of Article 31 of the Community Customs Code and Article 74(3) of the Union Customs Code (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 June 2016, EURO 2004. Hungary, C-291/15, EU:C:2016:455, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).

In the present case, the referring court asks whether it is possible to use an LAP calculated on the basis of aggregate statistical values established at EU level for the calculation of the customs value of the goods concerned where those goods can no longer be recalled for physical checks and their general description in the corresponding invoices does not provide sufficient data as to their actual value.

It is important, as a preliminary point, to note that such statistical data cannot remedy the abovementioned obstacles to the use of one of the evaluation methods provided for in Article 30 of the Community Customs Code and Article 70 of the Union Customs Code. It should be noted that statistical data collected at EU level, such as the LAP, do not contain information capable of being used for the purposes of determining the customs value pursuant to Article 30(2)(a) and (b) of the Community Customs Code and Article 74(2)(a) and (b) of the Union Customs Code, on account of their aggregated nature and their confidential nature (see, by analogy, judgment of 9 June 2022, FAWKES, C-187/21, EU:C:2022:458, paragraphs 53 to 55).

Furthermore, in the light of the circumstances referred to in paragraph 80 above, such data cannot be used in the context of a customs valuation on the basis of Article 30(2)(c) of the Community Customs Code and Article 74(2)(c) of the Union Customs Code either.

The same is true of the method for determining the customs value laid down in Article 30(2)(d) of the Community Customs Code and Article 74(2)(d) of the Union Customs Code, since it is not apparent from the explanations provided in the documents before the Court that the specific information necessary for the purposes of that determination, as set out in paragraph 83 above, is taken into account in the LAP.

Accordingly, it is necessary to ascertain whether an LAP, calculated on the basis of aggregated statistical values established at EU level, can be used for determining the customs value of the goods concerned, in accordance with Article 31 of the Community Customs Code and Article 74(3) of the Union Customs Code.

To that end, it should be borne in mind that, under Article 31(1) of the Community Customs Code and Article 74(3) of the Union Customs Code, where the customs value of imported goods cannot be determined under, respectively, Articles 29 and 30 of the Community Customs Code, on the one hand, and Article 74(1) and (2) of the Union Customs Code, on the other, it is to be determined, on the basis of data available in the European Union, using reasonable means consistent with the principles and general provisions of international agreements and Chapter 3 of those codes.

As regards, in the first place, the question whether Article 31(1) of the Community Customs Code does not preclude the use of an LAP, it should be noted that point 2 of the interpretative note on customs value relating to that provision, set out in Annex 23 to Implementing Regulation No 2454/93, states that the valuation methods to be used under that provision should be those defined in Article 29 to Article 30(2) of that code, but that ‘reasonable flexibility’ in the application of those methods is consistent with the objectives and provisions of Article 31(2) of that code.

It is apparent from the order for reference that the imported goods at issue in the main proceedings, in respect of which the customs authorities consider that the transaction value has been undervalued, are described in the customs declarations, in general terms, as textile products.

In that regard, it should be recalled that, first, the Court referred to the concept of ‘reasonable flexibility’ in the case which gave rise to the judgment of 9 June 2022, Baltic Master (C-599/20, EU:C:2022:457), in which the referring court was uncertain whether, in view of the heterogeneity of the items at issue ascribed to the TARIC code used and the absence of a detailed description of the imported goods, a determination of the customs value of those imported goods under Article 31(1) of the Community Customs Code on the basis of the transaction value of similar goods was possible in the dispute before it, whereas the term ‘similar goods’, defined in Article 142(1)(d) of Implementing Regulation No 2454/93, presupposes a homogeneity of the imported goods, which is difficult to reconcile with the range of goods classified under the TARIC code in question.

In that case, the Court emphasised that the definition of the concept of ‘similar goods’ in Article 142(1)(d) of Implementing Regulation No 2454/93 relates to the determination of the customs value under Article 30(2)(b) of the Community Customs Code. While it is apparent from point 2 of the interpretative note, referred to in paragraph 92 above, that the valuation methods to be used under Article 31 of that code should be those defined in Article 29 to Article 30(2) thereof, that point of the note states that those methods must be applied with reasonable flexibility, in particular as regards the assessment of the term ‘similar goods’ (judgment of 9 June 2022, Baltic Master, C-599/20, EU:C:2022:457, paragraph 52). Accordingly, the Court has accepted that data in a national database relating to goods ascribed to the same TARIC code and originating from the same seller as the goods concerned constitute ‘data available in the [European Union]’, within the meaning of Article 31(1) of the Community Customs Code, which may be used as a basis for the purposes of determining the customs value of the goods concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 June 2022, Baltic Master, C-599/20, EU:C:2022:457, paragraphs 52 and 54).

Second, it should also be noted that, as is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 73 above, it is for the Member States, in accordance with the obligations imposed on them under Article 325(1) TFEU, to protect the financial interests of the European Union against fraud or any other illegal activities affecting those interests and to adopt the measures necessary to guarantee the effective and comprehensive collection of those duties and, therefore, of those resources. It follows that the customs authorities must establish a customs value in cases where the declarant does not provide sufficiently accurate or reliable information concerning the customs value of the goods concerned.

In view of that requirement and the ‘reasonable flexibility’ with which, in accordance with point 2 of the interpretative note referred to in paragraph 92 above, the methods for determining the customs value defined in Article 29 to Article 30(2) of the Community Customs Code must be applied in the context of Article 31(1) of the Community Customs Code, it must be accepted that data such as an LAP calculated on the basis of aggregated statistical values established at EU level and included in a database established at EU level constitute ‘data available in the Community’ within the meaning of Article 31(1) of the Community Customs Code, and appear to be capable of being taken into account for the purposes of determining the customs value of the goods concerned.

However, that finding applies only if, as required by Article 31(2) of the Community Customs Code, the customs value thus determined, pursuant to Article 31(1) thereof, is not based on the factors referred to in Article 31(2)(f) and (g).

In that regard, under Article 31(2)(f) and (g) of the Community Customs Code, no customs value is to be determined on the basis of minimum customs values or arbitrary or fictitious values, respectively.

First, as is apparent from paragraphs 40 to 43 above, LAPs are set on the basis of CAPs, calculated on the basis of the monthly import prices of the products concerned from Türkiye extracted from Comext. Therefore, they do not appear to be arbitrary, but rather based on objective and neutral criteria (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 March 2022, Commission v United Kingdom (Action to counter undervaluation fraud), C-213/19, EU:C:2022:167, paragraph 294).

Second, as regards the prohibition on determining the customs value on the basis of minimum values, referred to in paragraph 99 above, it must be held, as the Advocate General observed, in essence, in point 79 of his Opinion, that the possible use of LAPs could infringe that prohibition if that administrative practice were to be systematic in nature and if the economic operator concerned were not allowed to justify the lower prices indicated in its customs declaration. In the latter situation, the refusal to take account of transaction values below such a threshold would entail an upward adjustment of the declared values up to that threshold and would constitute a system of minimum values.

By contrast, it must be held that the possible use, as a last resort, of LAPs calculated on the basis of aggregated statistical values established at EU level, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, on the basis of Article 31(1) of the Community Customs Code, must not be regarded as constituting a system of minimum values if the economic operator concerned has had the opportunity to justify the declared value to the customs authorities.

In the present case, it will therefore be for the referring court to ascertain whether, in the context of the use of the statistical data compiled by the LAPs, the customs authorities offered the applicants in the main proceedings the opportunity to justify the lower prices indicated in their customs declarations and to provide additional information in the context of the administrative procedure before those authorities.

In the second place, as regards the question whether the LAP may be used under Article 74(3) of the Union Customs Code, it should be noted that that provision must be read in conjunction with Article 144 of Implementing Regulation 2015/2447, which provides in paragraph 1 thereof that, when determining the customs value under Article 74(3), ‘reasonable flexibility’ may be used in the application of the methods provided for in Article 70 and Article 74(2) of the Union Customs Code.

It follows that, in view of the fact that those terms are identical to those of the interpretative note referred to in paragraph 92 above, the considerations set out in paragraphs 94 to 97 above also apply to the Union Customs Code.

It should be noted that, in the context of the Union Customs Code, that finding is further supported by the fact that, under Article 144(2) of Implementing Regulation 2015/2447, where the customs value cannot be determined under paragraph 1 of that article, ‘other appropriate methods’ are to be used. In that regard, it should also be noted that that provision reiterates that the use of those methods is possible on condition that, in that situation, the customs value cannot be determined on the basis of, inter alia, one of the factors referred to in points (f) and (g) of paragraph 2, which refer, respectively, to minimum customs values and arbitrary or fictitious values.

In that regard, in view of the fact that the terms are identical to those referred to in paragraph 99 above, it should be noted that the arguments set out in paragraphs 98 to 103 above also apply to Article 144(2) of Implementing Regulation 2015/2447.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, it must be held that data such as the LAPs calculated on the basis of aggregated statistical values established at EU level constitute data available in the customs territory of the European Union, within the meaning of Article 74(3) of the Union Customs Code, which may, a priori, be used for determining the customs value of the goods concerned. Where imports have been released for free circulation, since those goods cannot now be recalled for checks to establish their real value, and the documents accompanying the customs declarations are drafted in general and imprecise terms, only a statistical method may be used to estimate the value of those goods.

However, it remains to be determined whether statistical values such as the LAPs, used for determining the customs value of the goods concerned, are data that may form part of the grounds for the decisions of the customs authorities required by Article 6(3) of the Community Customs Code and Article 22(6) of the Union Customs Code.

In that regard, it should be noted that the right to good administration, in so far as it reflects a general principle of EU law, has requirements that must be met by the Member States when they implement EU law (judgment of 9 November 2017, LS Customs Services, C-46/16, EU:C:2017:839, paragraph 39).

Among those requirements, the obligation to state reasons for decisions adopted by the national authorities is particularly important, since it puts their addressee in a position to defend its rights under the best possible conditions and decide in full knowledge of the circumstances whether it is worthwhile to bring an action against those decisions. It is also necessary in order to enable the courts to review the legality of those decisions (judgment of 9 November 2017, LS Customs Services, C-46/16, EU:C:2017:839, paragraph 40).

As regards, in particular, the decisions taken by the customs authorities, Article 6(3) of the Community Customs Code and Article 22(6) of the Union Customs Code recall the obligation to state reasons incumbent on those authorities when they adopt decisions in writing which are detrimental to the persons to whom they are addressed.

In accordance with Article 221(1) of the Customs Code, notification of the amount of duties must ensure that the debtor receives adequate information and enable him, with full knowledge of the facts, to defend his or her rights (judgment of 9 November 2017, LS Customs Services, C-46/16, EU:C:2017:839, paragraph 42).

In addition, as is apparent from paragraphs 74 and 75 above, the methods for determining customs value set out in Articles 29 to 31 of the Community Customs Code and Articles 70 and 74 of the Union Customs Code are subordinately linked to each other (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 November 2017, LS Customs Services, C-46/16, EU:C:2017:839, paragraph 43).

In those circumstances, the obligation to state reasons incumbent on the customs authorities in the course of implementing those provisions must, first, make it possible to disclose clearly and unequivocally the reasons which led them to set aside one or more methods for determining customs value (judgment of 9 November 2017, LS Customs Services, C-46/16, EU:C:2017:839, paragraph 44).

Second, that obligation means that those authorities are required to set out, in their decision fixing the amount of import duties due, the data on the basis of which the customs value of the goods concerned was calculated, both to enable the recipient of that value to defend its rights under the best possible conditions and decide in full knowledge of the circumstances whether it is worthwhile to bring an action against it, and to enable the courts to review the legality of that decision (judgment of 9 November 2017, LS Customs Services, C-46/16, EU:C:2017:839, paragraph 45).

However, the Court has held that confidential information from a database which seeks, by means of statistical exploration methods, to detect commercial models capable of constituting cases of fraud cannot form part of the statement of reasons required in Article 6(3) of the Community Customs Code and Article 22(6) of the Union Customs Code. Consequently, the database from which that information derives cannot be regarded as being at the disposal of the customs authorities for the purposes of determining the customs value, within the meaning of Article 30(2)(a) and (b) of the Community Customs Code and Article 74(2)(a) and (b) of the Union Customs Code (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 June 2022, FAWKES, C-187/21, EU:C:2022:458, paragraph 55).

LAPs are calculated by the Member States on the basis of a percentage of statistical values appearing in the AMT and are applied as a risk profile, with the result that they cannot therefore, in principle, be communicated to economic operators.

However, as the Advocate General observed in point 89 of his Opinion, the requirement to state reasons must be adapted to the nature of each customs decision, which must, consequently, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, reflect the use of the method for determining the customs value laid down in Article 31 of the Community Customs Code and Article 74(3) of the Union Customs Code.

Furthermore, in so far as LAPs must be used only as a last resort, their ad hoc transmission and within the strict limits of what is necessary to economic operators remains conceivable, exceptionally, in order to enable the Member States to fulfil the obligations which, as is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 73 above, are imposed on them, under Article 325(1) TFEU, to protect the financial interests of the European Union against fraud or any other illegal activities affecting those interests, by taking the necessary measures to ensure the effective and comprehensive collection of customs duties and VAT.

Consequently, it must be accepted that data such as the LAPs calculated on the basis of aggregated statistical values established at EU level constitute ‘data available in the Community’, within the meaning of Article 31(1) of the Community Customs Code and Article 74(3) of the Union Customs Code, which may be used as a basis for determining the customs value of the goods concerned (see, by analogy, judgment of 9 June 2022, Baltic Master, C-599/20, EU:C:2022:457, paragraph 54).

Furthermore, it should also be noted that the use of the LAP under Article 31(1) of the Community Customs Code and Article 74(3) of the Union Customs Code does not appear to be incompatible with the principles, general provisions of international agreements and other provisions to which those provisions refer. It therefore constitutes an ‘appropriate method’ under Article 144(2) of Implementing Regulation 2015/2447.

In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first to third questions in Case C-72/24 and the first to third questions in Case C-73/24 is that Article 31(1) and (2)(f) and (g) of the Community Customs Code and Article 74(3) of the Union Customs Code, read in conjunction with Article 144(1) and (2)(f) and (g) of Implementing Regulation 2015/2447, must be interpreted as not precluding, where, in the course of a post-clearance examination during which, first, it is not possible to physically check the imported goods and, second, the description of the goods in the documents accompanying the import declaration is general and vague, so that the customs value of the imported goods cannot be determined in accordance with Articles 29 and 30 of the Community Customs Code and Article 70 and Article 74(2) of the Union Customs Code, the determination of that value on the basis of an LAP, which is calculated on the basis of aggregate statistical values established at EU level, provided that the economic operator concerned has the opportunity to justify the lower prices indicated in the customs declaration.

By its fourth question in Case C-72/24, the referring court asks, in essence, whether the exclusion of the application of minimum values and the reservation in favour of the principles and general provisions of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, provided for in Article 31(1) and (2) of the Community Customs Code, are also applicable in the context of the methods for determining customs value laid down in Article 30 of that code.

In view of the answer given to the first to third questions in Case C-72/24 and the first to third questions in Case C-73/24, there is no need to answer the fourth question in Case C-72/24. Since it follows that the determination of the customs value on the basis of an LAP can be carried out, under certain conditions, only in accordance with the method for determining customs value laid down in Article 31 of the Community Customs Code, there is no need to examine whether the exclusion from the application of minimum values and the reservation in favour of the principles and general provisions of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, laid down in Article 31(1) and (2) of that code, are also applicable in the context of Article 30 of that code.

By its fourth question in Case C-73/24, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 31(1) of the Community Customs Code and Article 74(3) of the Union Customs Code must be interpreted as meaning that, where they do not preclude the use of an LAP, calculated on the basis of aggregated statistical values established at EU level for the determination of the customs value of the imported goods, the imports used to obtain those data must be imports carried out at or about the same time as those subject to the post-clearance examination and, where appropriate, whether the maximum period which must be used between the imports subject to that check and those to which the LAP relates may, by analogy, be the 90-day time limit provided for in Article 152(1)(b) of Implementing Regulation No 2454/93 and Article 142(2) of Implementing Regulation 2015/2447.

As set out in paragraph 72 above, the objective of the provisions of EU law relating to the customs valuation of imported goods is to introduce a fair, uniform and neutral system excluding the use of arbitrary or fictitious customs values. The customs value of imported goods must therefore reflect the real economic value of those goods and, consequently, take into account all of the elements of those goods that have economic value.

In that context, customs authorities are required to consult all the information sources and databases available to them in order to establish the customs value of those goods in the manner that is most accurate and closest to the actual value (judgment of 9 June 2022, FAWKES, C-187/21, EU:C:2022:458, paragraph 68).

With regard to Article 30(2)(a) and (b) of the Community Customs Code and Article 74(2)(a) and (b) of the Union Customs Code, the Court has held that the requirement of taking into account the transaction value of goods exported ‘at or about the same time’ as the goods to be valued is intended to ensure that transactions taking place at a sufficiently close date to the date of export are taken account of, so as to avoid the risk of a substantial change in commercial practices and market conditions affecting the prices of the goods to be valued (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 June 2022, FAWKES, C-187/21, EU:C:2022:458, paragraph 70).

Accordingly, when determining the customs value in accordance with those provisions, the customs authority may confine itself to using data relating to transaction values covering a 90-day time limit, including 45 days before and 45 days after the customs clearance of the goods being valued. That period appears to be sufficiently close to the date of export that the risk of a substantial change in commercial practices and market conditions affecting the prices of the goods to be valued is avoided (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 June 2022, FAWKES, C-187/21, EU:C:2022:458, paragraphs 71 and 73).

Furthermore, it should be recalled that Article 152(1)(a) of Implementing Regulation No 2454/93 and Article 142(1) of Implementing Regulation 2015/2447 set out the principle that, in order to determine the unit price of imported goods or of identical or similar imported goods, sold in the European Union in the condition in which they were imported, with a view to determining the customs value of the imported goods referred to in Article 30(2)(c) of that Community Customs Code and Article 74(2)(c) of the Union Customs Code, reliance must be placed on the unit price at which the imported goods or identical or similar imported goods are so sold in the greatest aggregate quantity, at or about the time of the importation of the goods being valued, to persons who are not related to the persons from whom they buy such goods, subject to deductions for the factors referred to in Article 152(1)(a)(i) to (iii) of Implementing Regulation No 2454/93 (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 June 2019, Oribalt Rīga, C-1/18, EU:C:2019:519, paragraph 31).

By way of exception to that principle, Article 152(1)(b) of Implementing Regulation No 2454/93 and Article 142(2) of Implementing Regulation 2015/2447 provide that, in cases where neither the imported goods nor identical or similar imported goods are sold at or about the time of importation of the goods being valued, the customs value of the imported goods is to be based on the unit price at which those goods or identical or similar imported goods are sold in the European Union in the condition in which they were imported at the earliest date after the importation of the goods being valued but before the expiration of 90 days after such importation (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 June 2019, Oribalt Rīga, C-1/18, EU:C:2019:519, paragraph 32).

Accordingly, in order to determine the customs value in the manner that is most accurate and closest to the actual value, in accordance with the method laid down in Article 30(2)(c) of the Community Customs Code and Article 74(2)(c) of the Union Customs Code, the customs value of the goods concerned must be determined at the time closest to their importation. The time limit of 90 days laid down in Article 152(1)(b) of Implementing Regulation No 2454/93 and in Article 142(2) of Implementing Regulation 2015/2447 therefore constitutes an exception to the principle set down in Article 152(1)(a) of Implementing Regulation No 2454/93 and in Article 142(1) of Implementing Regulation No 2015/2447, and must, on that basis, be interpreted strictly (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 June 2019, Oribalt Rīga, C-1/18, EU:C:2019:519, paragraph 33).

In that regard, it should be noted that such considerations are also applicable where the customs value is assessed under Article 31(1) of the Community Customs Code and Article 74(3) of the Union Customs Code, that value having, in all cases, to reflect the real economic value of the imported goods. It follows that, as regards the determination of the customs value of the goods concerned on the basis of an LAP, that value must be determined in the manner that is most accurate and closest to the actual value. Accordingly, the data used must, in principle, relate to the time closest to when the goods being valued were imported.

Furthermore, as recalled in paragraph 92 above, point 2 of the interpretative note on customs value relating to Article 31(1) of the Community Customs Code, set out in Annex 23 to Implementing Regulation No 2454/93, states that the valuation methods to be used under that provision should be those defined in Article 29 to Article 30(2) of that code, but that reasonable flexibility in the application of those methods is consistent with the objectives and provisions of Article 31 of that code. As an example of what is meant by ‘reasonable flexibility’, point 3 of that interpretative note provides that, with regard to the method of determining the customs value provided for in Article 30(2)(c) of the Community Customs Code, the 90-day time limit laid down in Article 152(1)(b) of Implementing Regulation No 2454/93 could be ‘administered flexibly’.

It follows that such a time limit may also be used, by analogy, where the customs value is determined, under Article 31(1) of the Community Customs Code, on the basis of aggregated statistical values established at EU level, but may be flexibly adjusted.

As regards the reasonable flexibility with which the 90-day time limit could be adjusted in that context, it should be noted that the Court has ruled, in relation to Article 30(2)(a) and (b) of the Community Customs Code, that, in the absence of exports of goods which are identical or similar during that 90-day time limit, it is for the customs authority to examine whether such exports have been made over a longer period, but not too far removed from the date of export of the goods being valued, provided that, during that longer period, the commercial practices and market conditions affecting the prices of those goods have remained substantially the same (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 June 2022, FAWKES, C-187/21, EU:C:2022:458, paragraph 72). Such considerations may therefore also apply where the customs value of the goods is assessed on the basis of Article 31(1) of the Community Customs Code and Article 74(3) of the Union Customs Code.

In the present case, it is apparent from the documents before the Court that the statistical data in the AMT refer to a period of 48 months. However, the Commission stated at the hearing that those data now referred to a period of one month instead of 48 months, which it is for the referring court to verify.

That said, in principle, the application of a 48-month time limit is liable to undermine the objective of enabling the customs value of the goods concerned to be determined in the manner that is most accurate and closest to the actual value, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 128 above.

However, as the Advocate General noted, in essence, in point 96 of his Opinion, the setting of such a long time limit can be justified exceptionally and as a last resort where more reliable information is not available and, as is apparent from paragraph 73 above, the objective of protecting the financial interests of the European Union, as recognised in Article 325 TFEU, cannot otherwise be achieved, especially in a matter involving ensuring the effective and comprehensive collection of traditional own resources, namely customs duties and VAT.

Finally, the foregoing considerations can also be applied where the customs value of the goods is assessed under Article 74(3) of the Union Customs Code. In that regard, it should be noted that, although the interpretative note on customs value concerning Article 31(1) of the Community Customs Code, set out in Annex 23 to Implementing Regulation No 2454/93, has no equivalent in Implementing Regulation 2015/2447, Article 144(1) of Implementing Regulation 2015/2447 also provides that, when determining the customs value under Article 74(3) of the Union Customs Code, there may be ‘reasonable flexibility’ in the application of the methods provided for in Article 70 and Article 74(2) of that code. Accordingly, a 90-day time limit also appears appropriate when applying Article 144(2) of Implementing Regulation 2015/2447, subject to the considerations set out in paragraphs 132, 134 and 135 above.

In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the fourth question in Case C-73/24 is that Article 31(1) of the Community Customs Code and Article 74(3) of the Union Customs Code must be interpreted as meaning that, where the customs value is assessed in the light of an LAP calculated on the basis of aggregated statistical values established at EU level, first, the imports used to obtain that data must be imports carried out at or about the same time as those subject to the post-clearance examination and, second, the 90-day time limit referred to in Article 152(1)(b) of Implementing Regulation No 2454/93 and Article 142(2) of Implementing Regulation 2015/2447 is also applicable, by analogy, since that period may be varied with reasonable flexibility.

By its fifth question in Case C-72/24 and its fifth question in Case C-73/24, which it is appropriate to examine together, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 81 of the Community Customs Code and Article 177 of the Union Customs Code must be interpreted as precluding the customs authorities from reassessing the customs value of the goods concerned following a post-clearance examination in accordance with the method of simplifying customs declarations laid down in those articles which was used at the time of the importation of those goods at the request of the declarant.

In order to determine the scope of a provision of EU law, its wording, context and objectives must all be taken into account (judgment of 29 September 2015, Gmina Wrocław, C-276/14, EU:C:2015:635, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).

With regard to the wording, it should be recalled that, under Article 81 of the Community Customs Code, reproduced, in essence, in Article 177 of the Union Customs Code, where a single consignment is made up of goods falling within different tariff classifications, and dealing with each of those goods in accordance with its tariff classification for the purpose of drawing up the declaration would entail a burden of work and expense disproportionate to the import duties chargeable, the customs authorities may, at the request of the declarant, agree that import duties be charged on the whole consignment on the basis of the tariff classification of the goods which are subject to the highest rate of import duty.

In that regard, it must be held that, as the French Government maintains in its observations submitted to the Court, it is not apparent from that wording that the use of the procedure for the simplification of customs declarations by means of the tariff grouping of goods provided for therein would have an impact on the methods and data that customs authorities may use to assess the customs value of imported goods post-clearance, in the event of doubt as to the declared value.

In addition, it is apparent from Article 81 of the Community Customs Code and Article 177 of the Union Customs Code that the procedure for the simplification of customs declarations is initiated at the request of the declarant, with the result that the declarant, by that express request, seeks, when he or she submits his or her customs declaration, to have import duties charged on the whole consignment of goods falling within different tariff classifications on the basis of the tariff classification of the goods which were subject to the highest rate of import duty. That presupposes that the declarant’s request is valid for the entire procedure for determining the customs value of those goods, including in the case of a post-clearance examination.

Consequently, it is not apparent from the wording of Article 81 of the Community Customs Code and Article 177 of the Union Customs Code that the procedure for simplifying customs declarations by means of tariff grouping is limited to the stage of the importation of the goods concerned and that its application is excluded in the context of the reassessment of the customs value of those goods following an examination carried out post-clearance.

That reading is supported by the interpretation of the context of those articles and by the objectives which they pursue.

As regards, first, that context, it must be borne in mind that, under Article 198(1) of Implementing Regulation No 2454/93 and Article 222(1) of Implementing Regulation 2015/2447, where a customs declaration covers two or more items of goods, the particulars stated in that declaration relating to each item are to be regarded as constituting a separate customs declaration. However, Article 222(2) of Implementing Regulation 2015/2447 provides that the goods included in a consignment are to be regarded as constituting a single article where, inter alia, they are the subject of a request for simplification in accordance with Article 177 of the Union Customs Code.

Second, as regards the purpose of Article 81 of the Community Customs Code and Article 177 of the Union Customs Code, it should be noted that, as those articles provide, in essence, the objective of the simplification procedure is to avoid a burden of work and expense disproportionate to the import duties chargeable. Consequently, it would be contrary to that objective to require the customs authorities to take each of the goods into account separately, in the course of a post-clearance examination, where the declarant requested the use of the procedure for simplifying customs declarations.

Furthermore, as is apparent from the Commission's observations before the Court, it should be noted that, if the economic operator concerned has expressly requested that customs duties be charged to it on the whole consignment of goods concerned under the tariff heading of the goods which are subject to the highest rate of duty, it is reasonable to assume that it has also consented to the redetermination of the customs value of those goods following the same simplification rules.

In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the fifth question in Case C-72/24 and the fifth question in Case C-73/24 is that Article 81 of the Community Customs Code and Article 177 of the Union Customs Code must be interpreted as not precluding the customs authorities from reassessing the customs value of the goods concerned following a post-clearance examination in accordance with the method of simplifying customs declarations laid down in those articles which was used at the time of the importation of those goods at the request of the declarant.

According to settled case-law, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to decide the case before it. To that end, the Court should, where necessary, reformulate the questions referred to it. The Court may also find it necessary to consider provisions of EU law which the national court has not referred to in its questions. The fact that a national court has, formally speaking, worded a question referred for a preliminary ruling with reference to certain provisions of EU law does not prevent the Court from providing the national court with all the points of interpretation which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case pending before it, whether or not that court has referred to them in its questions. In that regard, it is for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the decision referring the questions, the points of EU law which require interpretation, having regard to the subject matter of the dispute (judgment of 22 December 2022, Ministre de la Transition écologique and Premier ministre (Liability of the State for air pollution), C-61/21, EU:C:2022:1015, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

It is apparent from the order for reference that, in order to be able to resolve the dispute before it, the referring court seeks to ascertain whether, as provided for by the national legislation, HF, as the natural person who owns the goods, may be held liable for payment of import VAT.

In addition, it should be noted that Article 201 of Directive 2006/112 provides that, on importation, VAT is payable by the person or persons designated or accepted as liable by the Member State of importation.

In those circumstances, it must be held that, by its sixth question in Case C-72/24, the referring court seeks, in essence, to determine whether Article 201 of Directive 2006/112 must be interpreted as meaning that the person deemed to be the owner of the imported goods by way of payment of import VAT may be liable for that tax if national provisions expressly designate or recognise that to be the case.

As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that import VAT and customs duties display comparable essential features since they arise from the fact of importation of goods into the European Union and the subsequent distribution of those goods through the economic channels of the Member States. This parallel nature is confirmed by the fact that the second subparagraph of Article 71(1) of Directive 2006/112 authorises Member States to link the chargeable event and the date on which the VAT on importation becomes chargeable with those laid down for customs duties (judgment of 12 May 2022, U.I. (Indirect customs representative), C-714/20, EU:C:2022:374, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).

According to the wording of Article 201 of Directive 2006/112, whereby import VAT ‘shall be payable by any person or persons designated or recognised as liable by the Member State of importation’, that article leaves discretion to the Member States to designate the persons liable for payment of that tax. That is confirmed by recital 43 of that directive, which states that the Member States should be entirely free to designate the person liable for payment of VAT on importation (judgment of 12 May 2022, U.I. (Indirect customs representative), C-714/20, EU:C:2022:374, paragraph 55).

Thus, while it follows from that article that Member States must designate at least one person as the person liable for payment of that tax, they are free to designate more than one. That is also apparent from recital 44 of that directive, whereby Member States should be able to provide that someone other than the person liable for payment of VAT is to be held jointly and severally liable for its payment (judgment of 12 May 2022, U.I. (Indirect customs representative), C-714/20, EU:C:2022:374, paragraph 56).

Consequently, in view of the discretion granted to Member States by Article 201 of Directive 2006/112, it is indeed open to them to provide, for the purpose of implementing that article, that the persons liable for customs duties will also be liable for import VAT (judgment of 12 May 2022, U.I. (Indirect customs representative), C-714/20, EU:C:2022:374, paragraph 57).

However, it is essential that the legal situation resulting from national implementing measures is sufficiently precise and clear to enable the individuals concerned to know the extent of their rights and obligations (judgment of 12 May 2022, U.I. (Indirect customs representative), C-714/20, EU:C:2022:374, paragraph 60).

Furthermore, the principle of legal certainty requires, in particular, that rules of law be clear, precise and predictable in their effect, especially where they may have negative consequences for individuals and undertakings (judgment of 12 May 2022, U.I. (Indirect customs representative), C-714/20, EU:C:2022:374, paragraph 61).

In those circumstances it is for Member States, for the purpose of implementing Article 201 of Directive 2006/112, to designate or recognise the person or persons liable for payment of import VAT using national provisions that are sufficiently clear and precise, in accordance with the principle of legal certainty (judgment of 12 May 2022, U.I. (Indirect customs representative), C-714/20, EU:C:2022:374, paragraph 62).

It follows that any designation of the person deemed to be the owner of the imported goods by way of payment of import VAT provided for by a Member State must be established, explicitly and unequivocally, by such national provisions.

In the present case, it will be for the referring court, which alone has jurisdiction to interpret its national law, to assess, in the light of Greek law, whether that law explicitly and unequivocally designates or recognises the owner of the imported goods as the person liable for payment of the import VAT.

In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the sixth question in Case C-72/24 is that Article 201 of Directive 2006/112 must be interpreted as meaning that the person deemed to be the owner of the imported goods by way of payment of import VAT may be liable for that tax if national provisions expressly designate or recognise that to be the case.