Einde inhoudsopgave
State aid to banks (IVOR nr. 109) 2018/Annex XII
Annex XII: Divestments
mr. drs. R.E. van Lambalgen, datum 01-12-2017
- Datum
01-12-2017
- Auteur
mr. drs. R.E. van Lambalgen
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS595425:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Mededingingsrecht / EU-mededingingsrecht
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
The recitals mentioned in the table thus refer to recitals of the Restructuring Decisions. More information on the Restructuring Decisions can be found in the table in annex III. In that table, the Restructuring Decisions are highlighted (in bold).
See however: para. 104.
The strategic assets were transferred to KA Neu, while the non-strategic assets remained at KA Finanz.
Downsizing was also aimed at viability.
NB: one divestment was specifically aimed at creating a new competitor.
NB: one divestment was specifically aimed at creating a new competitor.
Justification in para. 80, 81 and 83.
See previous footnote.
Justification in para. 80, 81 and 83.
The Commission accepted a relatively low level of downsizing. See para. 150 and 160- 163.
Measures NP1 and NP2 represented more than 50% of Proton Bank’s RWA or more than 130% of Nea Proton Bank’s RWA. Measure NP3, corresponded to around 48.7% of the RWA of Nea Proton Bank.
“FHB has taken the necessary steps to significantly reduce its involvement in the mortgage bond market.”
Justification in para. 94.
“The Bank has already implemented a wide range of restructuring measures before submitting the final version of the restructuring plan, with a view to achieving the aims of long-term viability, own contribution and burden sharing. Those measures comprise business divestments, asset deleveraging” (para. 50)
NB: one divestment was specifically aimed at creating a new competitor.
NB: one divestment was specifically aimed at creating a new competitor.
See para. 57: “the Commission finds that the restructuring process is adequate”.
NB: one divestment was specifically aimed at creating a new competitor.
“The retail banking business that will be taken over by BIC has a balance sheet of less than 35% of the balance sheet of BPN before its nationalisation.” (para. 250; see also para. 195- 198 and para. 226)
“The Bad Bank will gradually reduce its balance sheet and off- balance sheet exposure total by at least [20-30]% by […] and by additional [30-40]% by […].” (para. 79)
NB: one divestment was specifically aimed at creating a new competitor.
NB: one divestment was specifically aimed at creating a new competitor.
The following table indicates – for every bank State aid case – whether the Restructuring Decision1 mentions that the case is characterised by i) a focus on core activities, ii) a sale of activities and iii) a balance sheet reduction. Since a balance sheet reduction is often related to the aid amount, the following table also indicates the aid amount (as a percentage of the bank’s RWA).
The overarching theme is ‘divestments’. Firstly, a focus on the core activities usually entails the divestment of non-core activities. Secondly, the sale of activities entails by definition a divestment. Thirdly, the balance sheet reduction can be achieved by a divestment of activities.
Bank
Divestment of non-core activities(Pillar I)
Divestment as an own contribution (Pillar II)
Divestment as a compensatory measure (Pillar III)
Focus on core activities
Sale of activities
Aid amount (%)
Balance sheet reduction (%)
OVAGC
Para. 107
Para. 113
3,8% (para. 79, 122)
67% (balance sheet) 71% (in terms of RWA) (para. 123)
BAWAGC
Para. 84
Not mentioned *2
Capital injection amounts to 2,4% of RWA (para. 77)
Not mentioned (although divestments are mentioned in para. 104)
Hypo Tirol BankC
Para. 55
Para. 73
1,6%+4,25% (para. 12-15)
30%/39% (para. 78)
HGAAS/C/W
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
26% (para. 143)
85% (para. 152 and 58)
KA (2011)S/C/W
Not mentioned *3
Not mentioned
18,4% (para. 50, 94)
More than 60% (para. 96) *4
KA (2013)W
Not mentioned
Para. 82
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Focus on core activities
Sale of activities
Aid amount (%)
Balance sheet reduction (%)
KBCC
Para. 147-148
Para. 163-164
4,1%/5,1% (para. 114, 115)
20%/17% (para. 172) *5
EthiasC
Para. 122
Para. 132
[11-15]% (para. 104)
38% (annex point 48) *6
FortisS/C/T/C
Not mentioned
Para. 90
No percentage mentioned
Not mentioned (although para. 93 mentions the sale of Fortis Bank Nederland)
Dexia (2010)C
Para. 173
Para. 206
Para. 150, but only absolute amount, no percentage
35% (para. 62, 88, 173, 216)
Dexia (2012)S/C/T/W
Not mentioned
Para. 616
Para. 526-537, but only absolute amount, no percentage
[70-80]% (para. 76, 605) DBB/Belfius: 20% (para. 565, 585)
Focus on core activities
Sale of activities
Aid amount (%)
Balance sheet reduction (%)
FIBC
Not mentioned *7
Not mentioned *8 *9
Liquidity support; no percentage
No balance sheet reduction. Justification in para. 80, 81 and 83.
Focus on core activities
Sale of activities
Aid amount (%)
Balance sheet reduction (%)
CCB/CCI (2014)C
Para. 59
Para. 149-150
13% (para. 150, 153)
10-12% *10 (para. 156)
CCB/CCI (2015)C
Para. 50
Para. 109
2% (para. 113)
Not mentioned
Focus on core activities
Sale of activities
Aid amount (%)
Balance sheet reduction (%)
Amager-bankenS/T/W
Not mentioned
Para. 127
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Eik bankiS/T/ W
Not mentioned
Para. 57
Para. 21, but only absolute amount, no percentage
Not mentioned
Fionia Bank /T/W
Not mentioned
Para. 103-104
Not mentioned
“reduction of the economic activity to less than 40% of its former size” (para. 85)
Roskilde Bank S/T/W
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
FIH HoldingC
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Para. 103, but only absolute amount, no percentage
44% (para. 140)
Focus on core activities
Sale of activities
Aid amount (%)
Balance sheet reduction (%)
CIFW
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Focus on core activities
Sale of activities
Aid amount (%)
Balance sheet reduction (%)
BayernLBC
Para. 51
Para. 196
Capital assistance equivalent to 8% (para. 205)
51% (para. 206)
Commerzbank C
Para. 94-95
Para. 106
Not mentioned
45% (para. 46, 69, 112)
HREC
Para. 95
Para. 118 and 120
20% (para. 88)
85% (para. 63, 127)
HSH NordbankC
Para. 224
Para. 239
[2-10]%
61% (para. 58, 266)
IKBC
Para. 44, 62, 98
Para. 104-107
Para. 92, but only absolute amount, no percentage
47,2% para. 49, 111)
LBBWC
Para. 74
Para. 96
Para. 100, but only absolute amount, no percentage
41% (para. 102)
NordLBC
Para. 138
Para. 152
3,9% (para. 110)
15% (para. 165)
SachsenLBT
Para. 107-108
Para. 119
Not mentioned
51% (para. 119)
Sparkasse KolnBonnC
Para. 76
Para. 89
3,3% (para. 98)
[15-20]% (in terms of RWA) (para. 30, 97)
WestLB (2009) C
Para. 74
Para. 76-79
Para. 60, but only absolute amount, no percentage
50% (para. 84)
WestLB (2011) W
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
[24,4-27,6]% (para. 140-h)
“will disappear from the market” (para. 188)
Focus on core activities
Sale of activities
Aid amount (%)
Balance sheet reduction (%)
Alpha BankC
Para. 277-281
Para. 288-290
12% (para. 298)
No percentage mentioned (para. 299, 301)
EurobankC
Para. 375-378
Para. 385-386
23,7% (para. 413)
No percentage mentioned (para. 414, 416)
Pireaus Bank C
Para. 334-337
Para. 344
23,7% / 19,4% (para. 352, ootnote 118)
No percentage mentioned (para. 353, 355)
National Bank of GreeceC
Para. 384-388
Para. 394-395
17,3% / 15,6% (para. 403)
No percentage mentioned (para. 404, 406)
TT Hellenic PostbankS/T/W
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Para. 260
“New TT Bank ceases to exist as an autonomous competitor that determines its policy on a stand-alone basis” (para. 262)
Nea Proton BankS/T/W
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Para. 22311
“Nea Proton Bank will not continue to exist as a stand-alone competitor” (para. 226)
ATE (2011)C
Not mentioned
Para. 80
8,3% (para. 55, 85)
25,7% (para. 86)
ATE (2013)S/T/W
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
“ATE Bank will disappear in its prevailing form from the market” (para. 75)
Panellinia BankS/T/W
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Para. 36, but only absolute amount, no percentage
“will cease to exist as a stand-alone competitor” (para. 88)
Focus on core activities
Sale of activities
Aid amount (%)
Balance sheet reduction (%)
FHBC
Para. 76 *12
*13
Not mentioned
No structural measures (para. 91). Justification in para. 94.
MKBC
Para. 61, 67
Para. 119
2,8% (para. 123)
Absolute amount, no percentage (para. 69, 124)
Focus on core activities
Sale of activities
Aid amount (%)
Balance sheet reduction (%)
Anglo/INBSW
Not mentioned
Para. 162
Anglo : 43,9% INBS : 59% (para. 118) See also para. 173
“the institutions will almost completely exit all the markets where they were present” (para. 174)
AIB/EBSC
Para. 107
Para. 123
Para. 98, but only absolute amount, no percentage
14% (para. 59 in the context of viability; see also para. 5014)
Bank of Ireland (2010)C
Para. 184
Para. 214
[4-5]% (para. 176)
[20-30]% (para. 248) *15
Bank of Ireland (2011)C
Para. 130
Para. 166
4-5% RWA (para. 100)
[…]% (para. 178)
IL&P (PTSB)C
Para. 69
Para. 86
18% (para. 60)
Not mentioned
Quinn InsuranceS/T/W
Not mentioned
Para. 145
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Focus on core activities
Sale of activities
Aid amount (%)
Balance sheet reduction (%)
MPSC
Not mentioned
Para. 144
3,7% (para. 152)
20% (para. 155)
BRCS/T/W
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
29% of total assets (para. 65)
“BRC will cease to exist entirely as a stand-alone competitor” (para. 68)
Focus on core activities
Sale of activities
Aid amount (%)
Balance sheet reduction (%)
Parex banka S/C/W
Para. 134
Para. 145
Para. 111, but only absolute amount, no percentage
60% (para. 152) *16
MLBS/T/W
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Focus on core activities
Sale of activities
Aid amount (%)
Balance sheet reduction (%)
LCCUC
*
*17
Para. 61, but only absolute amount, no percentage
No restructuring, but there is a justification in para. 69
AB Ukio BankasS/T/W
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
71% of RWA of legacy business (para. 89)
80% (para. 93)
Focus on core activities
Sale of activities
Aid amount (%)
Balance sheet reduction (%)
INGC
Not mentioned
Para. 135
5% (para. 141)
45% (para. 54, 82, 143) *18
ABN AMROC
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Para. 280
Not mentioned (although para. 323 mentions the divestment of new HBU)
SNS REAAL (2010)C
Para. 70
Not mentioned
Less than 2% (para. 67, 79)
20-25% of RWA (para. 80)
SNS REAAL (2013)C
Para. 79-80
Para. 94
7,8%/9,4% (para. 62)
Not explicitly mentioned in the compatibility- assessment
AegonC
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
3,8% (para. 94)
6% (para. 121)
Focus on core activities
Sale of activities
Aid amount (%)
Balance sheet reduction (%)
CGDC
Para. 22, 65
Para. 79
2,3% (para. 89)
[10-20]% (para. 22, 65)
BPIC
Para. 29-36
Not mentioned
6% (para. 92)
[20-30]% (para. 70)
BCPC
Para. 38-46
Para. 109
5,4% (para. 113)
[15-30]% (para. 45) [20-40]% including sale BCP Poland (para. 57)
BPNT
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Para. 182, but only absolute amount, no percentage
Not really mentioned19
BESS/C/W
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not really mentioned20
BanifS/T/W
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Para. 115, but only absolute amount, no percentage
Not mentioned
Focus on core activities
Sale of activities
Aid amount (%)
Balance sheet reduction (%)
AbankaC
Para. 120-126
Not mentioned
[30-40]% (para. 150)
[…] (para. 150)
Abanka/ Banka CeljeC
Para. 149-154
Not mentioned
18,3% (para. 177)
[20-30]% balance sheet [10-20]% RWA (para. 179)
NKBMC
Para. 113-119
Para. 138
[30-40]% (para. 144)
[…] (para. 119)
NLBC
Para. 136-138
Para. 157
20% (para. 92, 163)
[…] (para. 55)
ProbankaW
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Gradual reduction of balance sheet (para. 24, 60)
Factor Banka W
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Gradual reduction of balance sheet (para. 23, 59)
Focus on core activities
Sale of activities
Aid amount (%)
Balance sheet reduction (%)
Catalunya BancC
Para. 167-168
Para. 174e
32,3% (para. 123, 178)
[60-70]% in terms of RWA (para. 63, 180)
NCG BancoC
Para. 161-162
Para. 173
22,27% (para. 177)
[30-40]% (para. 181)
BFAC
Para. 191-192
Para. 201v
[20-30]%, para. 205 22%, para. 140
[40-50]% (para. 210)
BMNC
Para. 135-136
Para. 149
9,4% (para. 93, 153)
[40-50]% (para. 51, 155)
LiberbankC
Para. 123
Para. 131
4,06% (para. 82, 135)
[20-30]% (para. 137)
Banco de ValenciaT
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
64,4% (para. 116, 189)
“disappearance of BVA as a standalone entity” (para. 190)
Banco CAMT
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
30-33% (para. 162)
“disappearance of CAM as a standalone entity” (para. 163)
UNNIM Banc T
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
24,8% (para. 120)
“disappearance of UNNIM Banc as a standalone entity” (para. 179)
CajatresT
Not mentioned
Para. 154
8,6% (para. 94, 160)
Para. 164
Banco Galleco T
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
43,4% (para. 136)
“disappearance of Banco Gallego as a standalone entity” (para. 137)
CajaSurT
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
[…]% of CajaSur’s RWA. (para. 99)
“exit of a failed entity” (para. 100)
Caja Castilla- La Mancha (CCM)T
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
51,7% (para. 197 and 136)
“exit of a failed entity” (para. 199) “significant downsizing of the banking activities transferred to Banco Liberta” (para. 203)
Banco CEISS(2012)C
Para. 143
Para. 154
7,8% (para. 101, 159)
[20-30]% (para. 163)
Banco CEISS (2013)T
Para. 101
Para. 112
7,8%/8,65%n (para. 118)
more than [20 – 30]% (para. 122)
Banco CEISS (2014)T
Para. 93
Para. 109
0,75% (para. 103, 115)
additional [10 – 20]% reduction in the balance sheet (para. 117)
Focus on core activities
Sale of activities
Aid amount (%)
Balance sheet reduction (%)
LBGC
Para. 70-71
Para. 161
3%/4,1% (para. 178)
25% (para. 191) *21
RBSC
Para. 58
Para. 215
Between 11,3 and 19,6% (para. 234)
[above 20]% of total balance sheet and [above 40]% of funded balance sheet (para. 59, 250; see also footnote 37) *22
Northern RockS/C/W
Not mentioned
Para. 144-145
Para. 40, 99-101
“The balance sheet will be less than [30-35]% of the original size of NR in 2007” (para. 156)
B&BS/T/W
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Dunfermline S/T/W
Not mentioned
Para. 121
Not mentioned
“break-up of the former Dunfermline and the subsequent wind-down of 50% of its business” (para. 124-125)