Towards Social and Ecological Corporate Governance
Einde inhoudsopgave
Towards Social and Ecological Corporate Governance (IVOR nr. 132) 2024/194:194 Legal job description of the board.
Towards Social and Ecological Corporate Governance (IVOR nr. 132) 2024/194
194 Legal job description of the board.
Documentgegevens:
mr. R.A.G. Heesakkers, datum 23-12-2023
- Datum
23-12-2023
- Auteur
mr. R.A.G. Heesakkers
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS944539:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Ondernemingsrecht (V)
Deze functie is alleen te gebruiken als je bent ingelogd.
The first aspect of the position of the board in Dutch corporate law involves the responsibilities of the board itself. In my analysis, this board responsibility contains both a general responsibility for durable success and more specific responsibilities for compliance, risk management and due diligence.1 The general responsibility of the board in Dutch corporate law is to encourage the durable success of the corporation and its enterprise, including a duty to weigh and consider all relevant stakeholder interests. In turn, the specific responsibilities refer to specific tasks of the board involving compliance with legal rules, the establishment of an internal risk management system capable of identifying and monitoring risks related to the current and continued performance of the corporate enterprise, and the management of due diligence processes concerning the corporation’s actual and potential adverse impact on human rights or the natural environment.
In relation to social and ecological interests, I identified four issues meriting further research.2 The first issue involves the definition of durable success (bestendig succes), and the extent to which social and ecological interests should be considered as a part of this. The second issue involves the weighing of interests, and particularly the standards according to which corporate boards should weigh social and ecological interests. The third issue involves the assessment of systemic risks, and the standards according to which boards should determine the legitimate level of systemic risk-taking. Finally, the fourth issue involves the boundaries of due diligence, and particularly how boards should determine the legitimate boundaries of supply chain due diligence. Below I will reflect on these issues by drawing upon the propositions developed from each perspective and articulate a recommendation to integrate those insights into a solution for each issue.3