Public funding of failing banks in the European Union
Einde inhoudsopgave
Public funding of failing banks in the European Union (LBF vol. 19) 2020/6.4.7.2:6.4.7.2 Resolution schemes
Public funding of failing banks in the European Union (LBF vol. 19) 2020/6.4.7.2
6.4.7.2 Resolution schemes
Documentgegevens:
M. Louisse-Read, datum 01-06-2020
- Datum
01-06-2020
- Auteur
M. Louisse-Read
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS213866:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Staatssteun (V)
Toon alle voetnoten
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
EC, 20 December 2016, C(2016) 8780 final (SA.46575 – Poland), par. 89. EC, 2 August 2017, C(2017) 5458 final (SA.44031 – Denmark), par. 77.
EC, 20 December 2016, C(2016) 8780 final (SA.46575 – Poland), par. 89. EC, 2 August 2017, C(2017) 5458 final (SA.44031 – Denmark), par. 77.
EC, 13 April 2018, C(2018) 2295 final (SA.50640 – Italy), par. 101-103.
Deze functie is alleen te gebruiken als je bent ingelogd.
It can be read in the decisions taken by the Commission since the introduction of the resolution framework in respect of resolution schemes, that it has considered the following provisions to be intrinsically linked provisions of the resolution framework in relation to resolution schemes:
The requirement to write down and convert capital instruments pursuant to Article 59(3) BRRD;1
The requirements under which a national resolution fund may make a contribution where a resolution authority decides to exclude eligible liabilities from the scope of the bail-in tool pursuant to Article 44(5) BRRD.2
In relation to the Italian liquidation scheme, the Commission considered that the notified State support would be granted under national insolvency law following the determination that there is no public interest in resolution and that it therefore does not circumvent Article 18(1) SRMR and Article 32(1) BRRD.
The Commission also considered whether the use of the deposit guarantee scheme did not violate intrinsically linked provisions of the DGS Directive.3