9.3 Challenging the case for states to aim for well-being through taxation

Chapter 3 revisits and critically scrutinises the case for states to aim for well-being through taxation under plural reasoning and argues that, in concretisation, the concepts of well-being, taxation, and their purposeful combination by states, raise many intricate and important issues that may often not be resolvable if one is looking for broad support. While it is ultimately concluded that these issues and challenges do not nullify the case for states to aim for well-being through taxation, it is argued that they do call for serious consideration. The reasoning applied can be summarised as follows.

Under plural reasoning, the normative force (or importance) of well-being seems more limited than initially thought. Individuals seem to have little need for a concept of well-being with regard to their own lives, and what matters to an individual may well, and typically does, transcend well-being. It is difficult to convincingly argue that well-being is the ultimately consequence, right/duty, or virtue that matters.

And while reasoning may allow, under certain conceptions, for states to aim for well-being, this initially considered case does not find a broad basis of support in reasoning from a consequential, deontological, and virtue ethics perspective. Rather, such plural reasoning calls attention to the many intricate questions and difficult issues that arise if states aim for well-being. From a consequential perspective, and beyond the provision of basic goods and the avoidance of great evils, there is considerable legitimate variation in what people consider a good life, and measurability of well-being quickly turns complex. From a deontological perspective, efforts to try and comprise well-being into a single concept raise concern for neglect of the diversity and incommensurability of people’s values. And from a virtue ethics perspective, well-being may be too self-centred or self-interested to properly reflect the virtues held dear, and a focus on well-being may result in harmful competition.

The above however does not mean that well-being should necessarily be dismissed as a state aim altogether. For one thing, the consideration of well-being as an aim for states seems valuable in that it obliges states to consider in a broad way what is good for people, and thus calls for further discussion of the more traditional emphasis from states on, for instance, economic production or income, or other money-oriented measurement items. In addition, use of a concept such as well-being obliges states to consider the effects of their policies not in isolation (for instance only with regard to income, or only with regard to health), but in integration, taking into account how different government policies affect each other and ultimately, how such policies impact the way life is going for the individuals concerned. Well-being as a state aim can therefore have its relevance and practical use. This notwithstanding the findings that the importance of well-being as such may be more limited than initially thought, and that states aiming for well-being best exercise caution and restraint considering the relatively weak normative foundations and the accompanying intricate questions and difficult issues that may often not be resolvable if one is looking for broad support.

A recommendation that arises is for states to exercise restraint when considering whether taxation should be aligned with states’ well-being aims. Namely, from a consequential perspective, tax policy is just one of the alternatives available to governments, and the question whether taxes should be aligned with states’ well-being aims boils down to the question whether taxation is the most efficient and effective instrument to achieve those aims. From a deontological perspective, moreover, the assessment of whether taxation is just seems neutral towards the question of alignment of taxation with states’ well-being aims. Deontological reasoning predominantly considers the alignment of taxation with well-being aims as an exercise of public policy that is extrinsic to, rather than inherent in, the norms, principles, and procedures that should govern taxation. And from a virtue ethics perspective, aligning taxation with states’ well-being aims might not result in honouring or cultivating virtuous behaviour, and may actually stimulate vicious behaviour.

Finally, plural reasoning prescribes caution for states aiming for well-being through taxation. From a consequential normative perspective, taxation often will not be the most effective or efficient instrument available to states to achieve their well-being aims. Furthermore, deontological reasoning warns us that aiming for well-being through taxation increases the risk of injustice in taxation. Finally, when viewed from the perspective of virtue ethics reasoning, aiming for well-being through taxation may conflict with the core idea of virtue ethics that there is a shared common good to be pursued, in the form of virtues or excellence or human flourishing. Aiming for well-being through taxation may undermine people’s faith in and respect for tax law, and thus might detract from virtuous behaviour.

Thus, and in answer to the first main research question of whether states should aim for well-being through taxation, it is concluded that, while there is a case to be made for states to aim for well-being through taxation, such a case cannot find a broad basis of normative support and brings with it many intricate and important issues to which states need to be very sensitive.

Therefore, if states choose to aim for well-being through taxation, it is argued that they should do so within a framework of assessment that instils caution and restraint, as proposed and explained in chapter 4.