Einde inhoudsopgave
State aid to banks (IVOR nr. 109) 2018/13.10.4
13.10.4 How are the other pricing restrictions elaborated in the decisions?
mr. drs. R.E. van Lambalgen, datum 01-12-2017
- Datum
01-12-2017
- Auteur
mr. drs. R.E. van Lambalgen
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS593002:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Mededingingsrecht / EU-mededingingsrecht
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
Dexia, 26 February 2010, para. 212; KA, 31 March 2011, para. 34; HRE, 18 July 2011, para. 129.
Nova Ljubljanska banka (NLB), 18 December 2013, para. 167; Abanka, 13 August 2014, para. 153; Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor (NKBM), 18 December 2013, para. 147 (and 104).
For instance, Factor Banka and Probanka are two Slovenian banks that were wound-down. In accordance with point 75 of the 2013 Banking Communication, they committed that their prices would be aimed at encouraging customers to find more attractive alternatives. This was specified as follows: “(i) the level of the interest rate/fee paid by the Bank to customers should be below the average of the market and (ii) the level of the interest rate/ fee paid by customers to the Bank should be above the average of the market. Not more than 10% of products offered by the Bank (in nominal amount) will deviate from this rule.”
SA.33757, 9 December 2011, para. 72. This was specified as follows: the interest rates on loans should be within the top 10% band of the interest rates charged by the 30 largest Danish banks, while the interest rates on deposits should be within the bottom 10% ban of the rates offered by the 30 largest Danish banks. In the decision of 28 June 2011 (SA.33001), this is formulated as follows: the interest rates for loans should be placed above the 90%-quantile and the interest rates on deposits should be below the 10%- quantile. In the case of Fionia Bank and Amagerbanken, the Rump Bank respectively the New Bank had to comply with this pricing policy. Fionia Bank, N560/2009, 25 October 2010, para. 31-34; Amagerbanken, SA.33485, 25 January 2012, para. 59. See also: Roskilde Bank, NN52/2010, 24 May 2011 (amendment decision), para. 44.
ATE, N429/2010, 23 May 2011, para. 87.
Banco Espírito Santo (BES), SA.39250, 3 August 2014, para. 46; CCB, SA.35334, 24 February 2014, para. 166 and annex point 38.
The price leadership ban was imposed in only 13 cases. However, most of the other bank State aid cases are characterised by other pricing restrictions. For instance, Dexia, KA Neu and HRE committed that they would not issue new loans with a risk-adjusted return on capital (RAROC) of less than 10%.1 This minimum pricing on new loans prevented those banks from applying rates which were below market rates.
In the same vein, the Slovenian banks Abanka, NKBM and NLB also committed to pricing restrictions. These banks committed to price their loans in such a way that they would achieve a return on equity (RoE) of at least […]% on each client relationship. As a result, Abanka, NKBM and NLB would refrain from providing excessively advantageous conditions to their clients. The Commission noted that this pricing commitment would not only contribute to the restoration of viability, but also to limiting competition distortions.2
Not only beneficiary banks that continue as a standalone entity (C-context) have to respect some behavioural constraints, also banks that are in the process of being wound-down (W-context) sometimes have to comply with certain behavioural restrictions. In that regard, point 75 of the 2013 Banking Communication stipulates that the pricing policy of banks to be wound-down must be designed to encourage customers to find more attractive alternatives.3 The pricing restrictions can also be found in decisions taken before the adoption of the 2013 Banking Communication. For instance, under the Danish winding-up scheme, the bank would have to pursue a pricing policy designed to encourage customers to find more attractive alternatives.4
A key observation is that these pricing restrictions are formulated differently. Some decisions refer to the RAROC, whilst others refer to the RoE. Sometimes, the pricing restrictions are formulated as a commitment to lend at sufficiently high margins5 or as a commitment not to price deposits above market average or to grant loans below market average.6