9.4.2 Distribution of oil proceeds: "negotiations" between the Nigerian Government and the Niger Delta People and further concerns

According to Human Rights Watch, former President Obasango rejected the idea of negotiation surrounding further reallocation of oil revenue generated in the Niger Delta.1 Rather, he opted in 2000 for the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission. This Commission aimed to reorganise management and administrative structure for a more effective use of the sums received from the federation account for tackling environmental pollution and other related problems arising from oil operations in the area.2 Its mandate is also to implement the Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan in consultation with stakeholders, such as local government, State government, oil companies (including SPDC), the National Planning Commission and

NGOs.3

Unfortunately, critics say that there is little evidence that the Niger Delta Development Commission is succeeding in fairly distributing the oil proceeds to the population.4 They consider that corruption is likely to affect its functioning. MOSOP representatives considered that it has failed to solve the region's problems.5 The rising tide of violence in the Niger Delta can be perceived as a direct sign that the actual redistribution of oil revenues is not satisfactory to all parties. In place of the non-violent manifestations as previously promoted by MOSOP, violence and hostage-taking are now employed by militants to draw international attention to the Delta crisis. In particular, a group of activists, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), has orchestrated attacks on oil installations and hostage-taking of foreign oil workers since 20 06.6 In particular, MEND demands that the Government grants oil revenue concessions to Delta groups. Nonetheless, there is hope that the situation will improve following the election in May 2007 of President Umaru Yar'Adua, who has begun dialogue with militants groups and some ethnic organisations.7

The question of the distribution of oil proceeds was examined by Shell. In response, the company publishes data in its annual reports on the sharing of oil revenues between the private joint venture partners, including SPDC, together with the paid royalties, Petroleum Profit Tax and other levies.8 This initiative is in line with its commitment to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which represents a multi-stakeholders initiative to improve transparency and accountability in the extractives sector. Among the main principles stated for revenue transparency, the EITI encourages an independent verification and publishing of payments by extractive companies and receipts by governments.9

At this point, the real issue seems to be defining the extent of responsibility of oil companies. This appears to raise difficult legal and ethical questions. For instance; to what extent should a multinational company be held to ascertain that its contractual partner deals legitimately with the interests of the inhabitants it represents and whether it has indeed been granted the authority by the representatives of the Indigenous People. The field of CSR and its connection to sustainable development definitely contain complex research questions worthy of further exploration.