Public funding of failing banks in the European Union
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Public funding of failing banks in the European Union (LBF vol. 19) 2020/2.5.1.1:2.5.1.1 MREL approach of the SRB
Public funding of failing banks in the European Union (LBF vol. 19) 2020/2.5.1.1
2.5.1.1 MREL approach of the SRB
Documentgegevens:
mr. M. Louisse-Read, datum 01-06-2020
- Datum
01-06-2020
- Auteur
mr. M. Louisse-Read
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS213991:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Staatssteun (V)
Toon alle voetnoten
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
SRB 2017 MREL Policy, p. 9-11.
In the SRB 2017 MREL Policy, the SRB calculated the consolidated MREL targets for all banks under bail-in strategy, be it the preferred or the variant resolution strategy.
SRB 2018 First Wave MREL Policy, p. 6.
SRB 2018 First Wave MREL Policy, p. 11.
SRB 2018 Second Wave MREL Policy, p. 22.
Appeal Panel, 16 October 2018, case 8/18 (Appelant v SRB), par. 30.
Appeal Panel, 16 October 2018, case 8/18 (Appelant v SRB), par. 36.
Deze functie is alleen te gebruiken als je bent ingelogd.
In 2017, the SRB set bank-specific binding consolidated MREL targets for the majority of the largest and most complex banks including all G-SIIs and banks with resolution colleges under its remit. For these banks, the SRB calculated the loss absorption amount based on the Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 capital requirements as determined by the competent authority and the capital buffer requirement for a bank or the amount required to meet the Basel 1 floor. The calculation of the recapitalisation amount was based on the Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 capital requirements as determined by the competent authority or the amount required to meet the Basel 1 floor, complemented with a market confidence charge at the level of the fully-loaded capital buffer requirement less 125 basis points.1
At the end of 2018, the SRB published guidance for the first wave of resolution plans for the banks that did not have binding targets in 2017. For these banks, the MREL approach for 2017 was updated by catering for all resolution tools2 and by removing the reference to the Basel 1 floor in the MREL formula.3 The SRB also stated that it expects from banks a minimum level of subordinated instruments, depending on the size and systemic importance of banks.4
At the beginning of 2019, the SRB published guidance for the second wave of resolution plans which are those of the most complex groups. This guidance refines the MREL approach of 2017 and introduces a series of new elements strengthening the function of MREL as a key tool to achieve resolvability. It introduces a reduced perimeter of eligible liabilities for consolidated targets, binding subordination requirements at increased levels, binding targets at individual level and an additional step to tailor MREL to transfer strategies.5
On 16 October 2018, the Appeal Panel of the SRB rendered its decision on a case in which a decision taken by the SRB on the determination of the MREL at consolidated level for a banking group was contested. The SRB had adopted for the relevant banking group an MREL target below 8% departing from its 8% benchmark. The appeal against the decision was rejected. The Appeal Panel assesses that in the calibration of MREL requirements, the SRB enjoys a margin of technical discretion, because this calibration implies by its very nature a technical assessment of all specific factual circumstances and a balancing of interests.6 In addition, the Appeal Panel considered that the MREL determination duly followed the principle of proportionality.7