Einde inhoudsopgave
Prudential regulation of investment firms in the European Union (ZIFO nr. 32) 2021/8
8 Other topics and applicable requirements
mr. drs. B.J. Nieuwenhuijzen, datum 01-02-2021
- Datum
01-02-2021
- Auteur
mr. drs. B.J. Nieuwenhuijzen
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS262301:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Bank- en effectenrecht
Financieel recht / Financieel toezicht (juridisch)
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, pp. 190–348.
See section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
298. The CRD 2013 and the CRR are not the only pieces of European legislation applicable to investment firms that contain prudential requirements. The Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive1 (BRRD) is also applicable to certain investment firms. This Chapter will discuss the BRRD, but will also discuss the merits of a separation between client activities and own account activities of the investment firm, similar to that found in the Volcker Rule2 in the USA. This Chapter will also discuss the differences in a going-concern or gone-concern approach and the implications this should have for the supervisory (prudential) approach.
299. As the conclusions on the going- vs gone-concern approach and the usability of the Volcker rule will affect the possible benefit of the BRRD regime, this Chapter will start with an analysis of the going- vs gone-concern approaches. Subsequently, the Volcker rule will be discussed and the usability of a similar separation of client-related activity and own-account activities for an investment firm prudential regime. This Chapter will end with an analysis of the BRRD regime for certain investment firms and will set the current BRRD regime against the conclusions of the other sections in this Chapter. The Chapter will end with a discussion on the possible methods for assessing the systemic relevance of investment firms.
8.1 Going-concern versus gone-concern regulation8.2 Volcker rule for investment firms?8.3 Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive8.4 Assessing systemic relevance of investment firms8.5 Conclusions