Public funding of failing banks in the European Union
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Public funding of failing banks in the European Union (LBF vol. 19) 2020/6.1:6.1 Introduction
Public funding of failing banks in the European Union (LBF vol. 19) 2020/6.1
6.1 Introduction
Documentgegevens:
M. Louisse-Read, datum 01-06-2020
- Datum
01-06-2020
- Auteur
M. Louisse-Read
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS213922:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Staatssteun (V)
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Voetnoten
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FT, Tighter EU curbs urged on winding down banks, 8 August 2017.
According to Lannoo, these decisions are however certainly taken into consideration by the EU Courts in exercising their judicial review function (Lannoo 2010, p. 31). See also GC, 1 March 2017, T-454/13, ECLI:EU:T:2017:134 (SNCM v Commission), par. 99.
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The State aid regime for the banking sector, as described in Chapter 3, has not changed as a result of the introduction of the resolution framework. The Commission still assesses State aid awards to failing banks on the basis of the 2013 Banking Communication. Although Ms König, the Chair of the SRB, believes that the 2013 Banking Communication is, in effect, out of date as the EU has taken further steps since the introduction of the 2013 Banking Communication to make sure failed banks can be wound up without sparking a broader crisis, the Commission has not – yet – changed the State aid regime for the banking sector.1 This does not, however, mean that the resolution framework has not had an impact on the exercise of State aid control by the Commission. Since the introduction of the resolution framework, the Commission has to assess State aid granted in the banking sector, not only on compatibility with the internal market, but also on compatibility with the resolution framework (procedural impact). In addition, it has acquired the new role of co-resolution authority since the introduction of the resolution framework (institutional impact).
This chapter first assesses the institutional impact by discussing the different roles of the Commission as a result of the introduction of the resolution framework in section 6.2. It subsequently assesses the procedural impact. Section 6.3 introduces the term ‘resolution aid’ for State aid that is granted in relation to the resolution of banks and discusses what is meant by compliance with ‘intrinsically linked provisions’ of the resolution framework. Section 6.4 discusses the assessment by the Commission of this resolution aid. Section 6.5 discusses the assessment of State aid outside resolution. Section 6.6 further analyses the impact that the resolution framework has on State aid control by the Commission and identifies any challenges in the exercise thereof after the introduction of the resolution framework. Section 6.7 concludes this chapter.
This chapter is based to a large extent on the State aid decisions taken by the Commission following the introduction of the resolution framework. It should be noted that the number of State aid decisions taken by the Commission since the introduction of the resolution framework is still modest at the time of writing this dissertation. In addition, as set out in section 3.5.2, the Commission is not bound by its earlier decisional practice in the application of Article 107(3) TFEU.2 It is against that background, that the following sections assess the Commission’s decisions in order to shed light on the impact of the resolution framework on the exercise of State aid control by the Commission.