Public funding of failing banks in the European Union (LBF vol. 19) 2020/3.8.2.1:3.8.2.1 Compatibility with the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle

Public funding of failing banks in the European Union (LBF vol. 19) 2020/3.8.2.1

3.8.2.1 Compatibility with the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle

Deze functie is alleen te gebruiken als je bent ingelogd.Deze functie is alleen te gebruiken als je bent ingelogd.Deze functie is alleen te gebruiken als je bent ingelogd.

In the context of implementing the burden-sharing principle, the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle should be adhered to. This entails that subordinated creditors should not receive less in economic terms than what their instruments would have been worth, if no State aid were to be granted.1 Respecting the principle predominantly depends on the conversion rate applied.2

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