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Sustainability Reporting in capital markets: A Black Box? (ZIFO nr. 30) 2019/5.2
5.2 Brief history of credit rating agencies
A. Duarte Correia, datum 20-11-2019
- Datum
20-11-2019
- Auteur
A. Duarte Correia
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS169138:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Bank- en effectenrecht
Ondernemingsrecht / Jaarrekeningenrecht
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
As identified by SustainAbility, in Values for Money 3, 2004.
SustainAbility, Rate the Raters Phase One, May 2010, pp.2 available at http://www.brevolutionconsulting.com/assets/SustainAbility_ratethe_raters11.pdf.
De Haan, J. & Amtenbrink, F. “Credit Rating Agencies”, DNB Working Paper No. 278/ January 2011, pp. 3.
New York University professor Richard Sylla explains the business of credit ratings in this World Bank report (PDF) http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/assets/images/historical_primer.pdf. More literature on the early developments of the rating agencies business see, James D. Norris, R.G. Dun & Co., 1841-1900: The Development of Credit Reporting in the Nineteenth Century (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978); Rowena Olegario, “Credit Reporting Agencies: What Can Developing Countries Learn from the U.S. Experience,” paper presented at the World Bank Summer Research Workshop on Market Institutions, July 17-19, 2000. James H. Madison, “The Evolution of Commercial Credit Reporting Agencies in Nineteenth-Century America,” Business History Review 48 (Summer 1974), 164- 86; Richard Cantor and Frank Packer, “The Credit Rating Industry,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review (Summer/Fall 1994).
Partnoy, 1999, pp. 638.
Partnoy, 1999, pp. 638.
Partnoy, 1999, pp. 639.
Partnoy, 1999, pp. 640.
Partnoy, 1999, pp. 648.
Association for Financial Professionals, 2002 & 2004. Rating agencies survey: accuracy, timeliness, and regulation. Bethesda, Maryland. See also, Xia, H, “Can investor-paid credit rating agencies improve the information quality of issuer-paid rating agencies?” November 2013, Journal of Financial Economics 111, (2014) 450-468: Available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X13002778.
Partnoy, 1999; Coffee, 2011; See also, Xia, H, “Can investor-paid credit rating agencies improve the information quality of issuer-paid rating agencies?” November 2013, Journal of Financial Economics 111, (2014) 450-468: Available at http:// www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X13002778.
Partnoy, 1999, pp. 690. In the same line of thought, also defending the regulatory license view see, Macey, 2006; Listokin and Taibleson, 2010. “Given the continued role of regulation in promoting the use of credit ratings (the Dodd– Frank Act notwithstanding), the root cause of the costs of rating agencies would be attributable to ineffective government-sponsored creation and empowerment of the credit rating system” (Robert J. Rhee, “Why Credit Rating Agencies Exist”, Economic Notes by Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 44, no. 2-2015: pp. 161–175, pp.162).
See, Robert J. Rhee, “Why Credit Rating Agencies Exist”, Economic Notes by Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 44, no. 2-2015: pp. 161–175, pp. 162.
In 1931 the United States Treasury Department enacted the first formal rule incorporating ratings, adopting credit ratings as a measures of the quality of the national banks’ bond accounts (Partnoy, 1999, pp. 687). Later 1973, following the credit crises of the early 1970s, the SEC adopted Rule 15c3-1,343 the first securities rule formally incorporating credit ratings and approving the use of certain credit rating agencies as Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations (NRSROs) (Partnoy, 1999, pp. 690). The US Government conferred a few rating agencies (e.g. S&P, Moody’s and Fitch) with the status of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO). The rating agencies with the NRSRO status have a license to regulate domains of investments by and capital structures of financial institutions, which reduces the net costs of regulation by relieving investors and regulators from erecting an analytic infrastructure that would analyze bond investments (Robert J. Rhee, “Why Credit Rating Agencies Exist”, Economic Notes by Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 44, no. 2-2015: pp. 161–175, pp.164). A line of thought is that the regulatory license theory still does not fully explain why CRAs exist. This is because of their market utility function and therefore, rating agencies may be able to exist independently of a regulatory function (Robert J. Rhee, “Why Credit Rating Agencies Exist”, Economic Notes by Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 44, no. 2-2015: pp. 161–175, pp.165).
See also, CFR.org, “The Credit Rating Controversy”, February 19, 2015. Available at: http://www.cfr.org/financial-crises/credit-rating-controversy/p22328.
See, Partnoy, 1999, pp. 703. See also, CFR.org, “The Credit Rating Controversy” February 19, 2015. Available at: http://www.cfr.org/financial-crises/credit-rating-controversy/p22328.
Partnoy, 1999, pp. 704.
Partnoy, 1999, pp. 705.
The increasing number of raters has triggered serious questions about the role and credibility of ratings, has there is, among others, lack of transparency in the ratings process, inadequate focus on material issues, lack of comparability of companies across industries, conflicts of interest in organizations that offer services, alongside to conducting ratings.1 Ultimately, the following questions remain, are sustainability ratings needed? For what purpose and in which form? Why do we need ESG ratings? Are these ratings truly driving companies and society towards a more just and sustainable world for present and future generations?2
These questions cannot be answered without briefly looking at the pioneer credit ratings provided by the credit rating agencies. Credit rating agencies evaluate the creditworthiness of borrowers (generally their financial capacity). Only the credit risk is evaluated, market or liquidity risks are not part of the ratings.3 The European Commission defined credit rating as “an opinion regarding the creditworthiness of an entity, a debt or financial obligation, debt security, preferred share or other financial instrument, or of an issuer of such a debt or financial obligation, debt security, preferred share or other financial instrument, issued using an established and defined ranking system of rating categories;” and defined credit rating agency as “a legal person whose occupation includes the issuing of credit ratings on a professional basis;”.
The first credit agency was “The Mercantile agency” created in 1841 by the Tappan brothers.4 The Tappan brothers were in the silk business and had the habit of keeping detailed credit information about current and prospective customers. After the silk crisis in 1837, they decided to use all the information gathered during the years they were active in business, by opening a mercantile credit agency. Later in the 1900s John Moody, a Wall Street analyst developed interest in applying the mercantile ratings’ methodology to bonds.
In 1909 John Moody published “Analysis of Railroad Investments” a book with the first rating scheme for bonds.5 In 1914 started the Moody’s Investor’s Service and in 1922 it had a formal rating department.6 The second rating agency was Poor’s Publishing Company created in 1922 and the third was Fitch Publishing Company created in 1924.7
In the 1920s rating agencies’ work consisted of gathering and synthetizing valuable information and they were exclusively financed by investors’ subscription fees.8 According to Partnoy (1999) the ratings’ system and scales did not have a substantial change since the 1930s, differently from their size and revenues, as both exponentially grew since the seventies.9
In capital markets similar questions remain. Do we need credit ratings, why? Should credit rating agencies exist? The credit rating industry is a monopoly of the three largest credit rating agencies, US-based Standards & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch ratings, often referred to as the Big Three, which is considered since 2000 to be the main reason for the low quality of the credit ratings.10 From existing literature on financial reporting I have learnt that credit rating agencies mostly repeat what is already reported by financial news and downgrades are public after those news are public (Partnoy, 1999; Coffee, 2011), they do not add new information to the market (Macey, 2006; Fitzpatrick and Sagers, 2009; Rhee, R.J., 2015, pp. 163) and rely mostly on publicly available information (Rhee, R.J., 2015, pp. 163). Credit rating agencies have failed to predict financial crises and to provide valuable information before a crisis.11 These agencies usually make their ratings public in reaction to an already public event. In his research Partnoy (1999) has concluded that rating agencies became more important and more profitable, not because they generated more valuable information but because they began selling more valuable regulatory licenses.12 As a result of their failure in forecasting information, e.g. failing to predict the Enron and WorldCom corporate scandals between 2001 and 2002 (Coffee, Jr., 2014 pp. 247), they have come under intense scrutiny which led to two major legislative Acts in the US, the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 and the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, and in Europe to the European Securities and Markets Authority, created in 2011, to hold the credit rating agencies accountable and to protect investors.131415 Before 2006 in the US, and before 2011 in Europe, credit rating agencies were not directly regulated (Coffee, Jr., 2014 pp. 246).
Ratings have since then become a tool of regulation and this change originated a new credit rating agencies’ selling product (introduced by US regulators) changing the credit rating agencies business model, which has remained intact since then.16 Issuers have since started to buy a license from the regulators and this is the fundamental reason for paying their rating fees (it is not to purchase credibility with the investor community). Only the few rating agencies obtaining the Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations status are allowed to sell regulatory licenses and this is regardless of their credibility within the investor community. A Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations benefits from a maximum credibility within the Government and have their business safe irrespective from their reputation and credibility within the investors, which contributes to the low quality of the ratings.
Partnoy (1999) recommends the elimination of the regulatory dependence on credit ratings and suggests the use of credit spreads instead of including credit ratings in regulation.17 Partnoy (1999) also explains that, as credit spreads are determined by the market as a whole and not by any individual entity or entities, a credit spread- based system would not create regulatory licenses for any approved agency.18 Besides, credit spreads already incorporate the information contained in credit ratings and are as accurate as credit ratings.