Einde inhoudsopgave
Treaty Application for Companies in a Group (FM nr. 178) 2022/4.2.3.1
4.2.3.1 Introduction
L.C. van Hulten, datum 06-07-2022
- Datum
06-07-2022
- Auteur
L.C. van Hulten
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS659330:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Omzetbelasting / Plaats van levering en dienst
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
E.g., via internal loans, hybrid mismatches, fragmenting functions and treaty shopping.
OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, Paris: OECD Publishing 2013.
Tax Annex to the St. Petersburg G20 Leaders’ Declaration, September 2013, p. 4.
E.g., internal loans and hybrid entity mismatches.
CJEU, 12 September 2006, Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes plc and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas Ltd v Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ECLI:EU:C:2006:544. The basis for anti-abuse interpretation can be found in the field of indirect taxes, more specifically the Halifax judgment (CJEU, 21 February 2006, Case C-255/02, Halifax plc, Leeds Permanent Development Services Ltd, County Wide Property Investments Ltd, v Commissioners of Customs & Excise,ECLI:EU:C:2006:121. For more information see, e.g., F. Vanistendael, ‘Halifax and Cadbury Schweppes: One single European theory of abuse in tax law?’, EC Tax Review 2006, vol. 15, no. 4).
In the Lexel case (CJEU, 20 January 2021, Case C-484/19, Lexel AB v Skatteverket,ECLI:EU:C:2021:34) the CJEU decided in short that a Swedish interest deduction limitation rule is contrary to the freedom of establishment. The Lexel case again shows the difficulty the CJEU has regarding the treatment of separate entities versus economic entities. While the CJEU used the general anti-abuse concept in the Danish cases in a situation in which the juridical situation did not lead to a ‘proper’ result, this does not seem to be the approach taken in the Lexel case. From this judgment the conclusion seems that, if transactions are carried out under arm’s length conditions, the transactions as such cannot be artificial (CJEU, 20 January 2021, Case C-484/19, Lexel AB v Skatteverket,ECLI:EU:C:2021:34, point 56). In that situation a justification based on the fight against tax evasion and tax avoidance cannot be accepted. This means that if base erosion within a group is in line with the arm’s length principle, no abuse exists and the difference in treatment cannot be justified. The judgment thus seems to give room for base erosion.
The existence of groups of companies in which each entity is treated as a separate entity for tax purposes, provides base erosion and profit shifting opportunities.1 This is the main reason for the existence of the entire BEPS project of the OECD.2 The project was mandated to reform the international tax rules to ensure that multinational enterprises could be taxed ‘where economic activities take place and where value is created’.3 It should be kept in mind that abuse is not limited to groups of companies. Third parties can also agree on tax planning strategies. Still, in general, there are less tax planning strategies that can successfully be used in third party transactions in comparison to group situations.4
Anti-abuse provisions are an important element of the current tax systems. However, this topic is of a different order than loss compensation and other elements of tax groups as discussed above. These two topics are at the heart of the determination of the domestic tax base, whereas anti-abuse provisions generally aim to safeguard that base. An anti-abuse provision can therefore be seen as a precondition of an effectively functioning tax system rather than an independent element.
In the CJEU case law on direct taxation, the first clear anti-abuse interpretation can be found in the Cadbury Schweppes judgment.5 In that case the concept of ‘wholly artificial arrangement’ was used to describe situations in which a less favourable tax treatment for intra-EU cross-border situations could be justified because of the aim to reduce the risk of tax avoidance. Subsequently, the concept of anti-abuse has been concretised, inter alia, in the Deister Holding and Juhler Holding and in the Danish cases.6 The potential application of a group approach plays a role in the two later cases. Therefore, a brief summary of both cases is given below. Then, a conclusion is drawn with respect to the answer to the question whether a group approach for anti-abuse provisions should be applied according to the CJEU. Furthermore, the question whether the approach taken in the CJEU case law is also applied in the OECD MTC is answered, and if not, whether it would fit within the scope and objective of the OECD MTC to amend this.