10.10.2 A hidden conflict: clash of CSR codes

After the OECD MNE Guidelines and ILO MNE Declaration were released in 2000, several MSIs emerged to translate these recommendations into practical working schemes for the business sector. In the Netherlands, SA 8000, BSCI and FWF are popular MSIs in the retail sector.1 MSIs are CSR initiatives based upon cooperation with stakeholders, such as the business society, trade unions and NGOs. Although some work on a not-for-profit basis, they usually require a fee from participating companies. As demand increased for CSR certification and verification systems (CSR Implementation Systems), competition became inevitable. In short, 'selling' CSR Implementation Systems became business. For various Dutch companies operating on an international level, the internationally operating MSIs - BSCI or SA 8000 - seem more logical to follow than the primarily Dutch FWF.2

CCC/ICN's campaign against G-Star was not a one-off event. In the spring of 2007, in the midst of their campaign against G-Star, CCC/ICN also campaigned against the Dutch retailer HEMA concerning the allegedly poor labour conditions under which their apparel supply was produced. CCC/ICN stressed that only the involvement of local organisations can provide a buyer with a good view of the labour conditions at its supplier.3 HEMA replied that its labour conditions complied with its own code of conduct, and that HEMA had joined BSCI for independent verification. CCC/ICN s response exemplifies the clash between competing CSR Implementation Systems. CCC/ICN asserted that the way BSCI works by no means guarantees fair labour conditions. CCC/ICN expressed its disappointment that HEMA did not make use of FWF's knowledge of the textile sector, and notified HEMA that it would continue its campaigning.4

On 27 February 2008, the Dutch Council for the Retail Sector (RND)5

complained to the Dutch Minister for Foreign Trade about CCC/ICN s campaign against 'a Dutch denim wear producer.' The RND moreover asserted that CCC/ICN, being a campaigning organisation on the one hand, and an initiator of FWF on the other, acts as a ' norm setting, verifying and judging body. The RND also expressed its discontent with the substantive subsidy which FWF received from the Dutch government, stating that 'apparently without this subsidy FWF does not seem to have a future. Above all, the RND called upon the Dutch government and civil society organisations to 'focus on a constructive dialogue with the Dutch business society, on the basis of (policy) choices made by the business society. 6

While the investigation for this contribution was being conducted, a consecutive development evolved in this 'clash of codes'. On 10 February 2009, CCC published a report blaming large European retailers for violating a whole series of fundamental labour rights.7 In the Netherlands, only a few days after its publication, the report led to questions by Members of Parliament to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and for Foreign Trade, asking them to demonstrate that they fully integrate CSR in their Dutch business promotion policies.8

The CCC's report also points at alleged flaws by various CSR Implementation Systems, such as the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI), the Global Social Compliance Program, SA 8000 and BSCI. Many of the retailers targeted in CCC s report, such as Aldi and Lidl, have indeed implemented one of these systems for securing fair labour conditions among their suppliers.9 CCC's Dutch website subsequently directs one to another report containing a comparison between several CSR Implementation Systems. This report argues that FWF offers the highest standards in implementing and verifying fair labour conditions, whereas other systems are all flawed in some way, especially BSCI.10

Concluding, the hidden conflict that the FFI/JKPL case study and the other campaigns reveal is the clash between competing CSR Implementation Systems.