State aid to banks
Einde inhoudsopgave
State aid to banks (IVOR nr. 109) 2018/6.3.3:6.3.3 Why is the CJEU-definition unsatisfactory?
State aid to banks (IVOR nr. 109) 2018/6.3.3
6.3.3 Why is the CJEU-definition unsatisfactory?
Documentgegevens:
mr. drs. R.E. van Lambalgen, datum 01-12-2017
- Datum
01-12-2017
- Auteur
mr. drs. R.E. van Lambalgen
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS591775:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Mededingingsrecht / EU-mededingingsrecht
Toon alle voetnoten
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
As the General Court considered in case T-319/11 (ABN AMRO), para. 116.
T-319/11, para. 184. It should be noted that the comparison in the case of ABN AMRO was about a specific restructuring measure (i.e. the acquisition ban) rather than the total pack-age of restructuring measures. The Court held that a comparison of a specific restructuring measure is of little relevance, since the Commission undertakes an overall analysis on a case- by-case basis.
Deze functie is alleen te gebruiken als je bent ingelogd.
In my opinion, the CJEU-definition is unsatisfactory, because it does not provide a way of establishing whether the differences between the bank State aid cases justify the differences in treatment. The CJEU has held that “comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified”. However, since there are always circumstances that “call into question the comparability of the situations at issue”1, the CJEU-definition is in my view very narrow. This is underlined by the three cases discussed in section 5.20. For instance, in its judgment on ABN AMRO, the CJEU held that it is difficult to establish that situations are actually comparable when dealing with bank State aid decisions.2 This illustrates my point: since bank State aid cases are evidently different, the different treatment of those cases is completely in line with the principle of equal treatment, as defined by the CJEU.
For this reason, I am of the opinion that the principle of equal treatment is interpreted very narrowly by the CJEU. And because the CJEU-definition is so narrow, it cannot remedy the lack of clarity. Indeed, it cannot provide a way of establishing whether the differences between the bank State aid cases justify the differences in treatment. For this reason, I am of the opinion that the CJEU- definition is unsatisfactory for the purposes of this PhD-study.