5.3.2 Note on Methodology

The previous section has shown that interest groups potentially play a significant role in the European legislative process. Against this background, the following sections explore the hypothesis that the prevailing of the status quo on the issue of cross-border voting can be explained by taking into account the influence of interest groups on the legislative process surrounding the adoption of the Shareholders' Rights Directive. To this end, seven main stages of the legislative process are distinguished; four stages leading up to and including the adoption of the Directive, and three stages sub sequent to the adoption of the Directive. With respect to each stage, the following three analytical steps are taken:

First, the key development in terras of enabling ultimate investors to vote is described, for example the proposal of a tule that obliges financial intermediaries to facilitate cross-border voting by investors. Next, this key development is traced back to the outcome of the previous stage of the legislative process. This way it may become clear, for example, that a proposed tule has been derived from the recommendations of an expert group that wrote a report on the issue. Finally, using publicly available information, it is examined whether any interest group had a particularly strong voice at that previous stage. Such examination may reveal, for example, that the expert group that issued the recommendation consisted mostly of representatives of the same interest group and that the recommendation reflected the interests of this particular group.

By taking these three analytical steps with respect to each stage of the legislative process, we can get a sense of whether any particular interest group may have had a particularly strong voice throughout the legislative process. To be sure, this methodology has important limitations, and the outcome of the following analysis is qualified by these limitations. As a general matter, measuring interest group influence is notoriously difficult.1 With respect to the legislative process surrounding the adoption of the Shareholders' Rights Directive, the information that is publicly available offers only a partial view of the positions taken by the various interest groups and of their lobbying efforts. Indeed, it remains unclear what pressure they may or may not have exercised on lawmakers through other channels, for example through contacts with Commission staff members. Nevertheless, as the following section will demonstrate, an analysis of the available information allows for some interesting observations.