Einde inhoudsopgave
EU Equity pre- and post-trade transparency regulation (LBF vol. 21) 2021/18.III.2.4
18.III.2.4 Preferences of market participants
mr. J.E.C. Gulyás, datum 01-02-2021
- Datum
01-02-2021
- Auteur
mr. J.E.C. Gulyás
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS266959:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Bank- en effectenrecht
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Financiële dienstverlening / Financieel toezicht
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
Reference is made to R.A Schwarz and R. Francioni, Equity Markets in Action, Wiley Trading, 2004, p. 14.
Art. 21 and art. 1(13) ISD and art. 5(c) MiFID I Implementing Regulation. Although not explicit under MiFID II, ESMA notes that the MiFID II transparency rules do not apply to ‘primary transactions’. ESMA gives examples of primary transactions, such as issuance, allotment or subscription for securities and the creation of redemption of units in ETFs (ESMA, Q&A on MiFID II and MiFIR transparency topics, 12 July 2019, p. 22)
See, for example, the Prospectus Regulation, the Transparency Directive, and the Market Abuse Regulation.
CEPS (M. Levin), Competition, Fragmentation and Transparency, April 2003, p. 9.
The benefits of deep liquidity for the buy- and sell-side include (a) reduced spreads, (b) reduced market impact (ability to trade in larger volumes with price swings), and (c) the ability to trade in a swift manner, thereby reducing opportunity costs and enabling position risk mitigation (T. Foucault, M. Pagano, and A. Röell, Market Liquidity, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 4).
See Scott-Quinn, who notes that ‘(w)ithout secondary markets to provide market liquidity (…), primary markets (…) would barely function, as few individuals would be willing to accept the illiquidity that long-term projects would otherwise force on them.’ (B. Scott-Quinn, ‘Liquidity: what is it?’, in B. Scott-Quinn (Ed.), Commercial and Investment Banking and the International Credit and Capital Markets, Palgrave MacMillan, 2012, p. 88).
The buy-side includes, among other things, retail and professional investors (e.g. institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies). The sell-side includes entities such as market makers and SIs, since both provide liquidity to the buy side. For an examination of the terms ‘buy side’ and ‘sell side’, reference is made to L. Harris, Trading & Exchanges: Market Microstructure for Practitioners, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 32-34.
A central aspect of a market structure are its market participants. Market participants refer to the so-called buy-side, sell-side, and issuers of financial instruments.1 Issuers are public companies that deliver their financial instruments to investors in public markets through primary market transactions.2 From the ISD to MiFID IIno pre- and post-trade transparency rules applied to the primary market transactions.3 In view of the EU, equity pre- and post-trade transparency rules only apply to so-called secondary market transactions, being financial instruments that have been admitted to trading on an RM or MTF or that are traded on such a venue (see paragraph above). Distinct transparency rules apply to primary market transactions.4 The latter does not mean that equity pre- and post-trade transparency rules are not important for issuers. In fact, equity pre- and post-trade transparency rules influence how financial instruments are traded by the buy- and sell-side.
The buy-side refers to entities that are involved in making investment decisions, such as retail and institutional investors. The sell-side facilitates the decision making of the buy-side, among other things, through providing liquidity by trading on own account or matching opposing client orders.5 Equity pre- and post-trade transparency can – if calibrated appropriately – support liquidity and price formation, thereby creating an efficient market. Liquidity and price formation in the secondary market benefit not only the buy- and sell-side,6 but also issuers due to cost reductions in raising capital in the primary market. The reason for this is that liquidity and price formation enable the buy- and sell-side to transfer a financial instrument after its issuance (primary market) with other market participants in the secondary market more easily.7 There is thus a direct link between the primary and secondary market, including the equity pre- and post-trade transparency available. Given the emphasis of the EU equity pre- and post-trade transparency rules on secondary markets, the next paragraphs focus on the buy- and sell-side only (not: issuer costs in the primary market).
As illustrated throughout this research, the EU has traditionally preferred a high degree of pre- and post-trade transparency for market participants, both buy- and sell-side.8 Already under the ISD a high degree of equity pre- and post-trade data publication was required under national law (and some minimum harmonised ISD standards), a situation that became institutionalised in EU regulation with MiFID I, and in particular MiFID II. Ever since MiFID I, EU equity transparency rules have applied regardless whether potential (pre-trade) and actual transactions (post-trade) took place on RMs, MTFs, SIs, or outside such venues. At the same time, the EU acknowledges that there may be circumstances where (equity) pre- and post-trade transparency publication can impair liquidity by requiring risk positions to be made public.9 The EU has therefore permitted several exceptions to the equity pre- and post-trade transparency rules. The exceptions have been adjusted in order to support specific market needs. The relation between transparency exceptions and market needs are examined below.
18.III.2.4.1 Dark liquidity on RMs and MTFs18.III.2.4.2 Dark liquidity outside RMs and MTFs18.III.2.4.3 Immediate versus deferred post-trade publication18.III.2.4.4 Characteristics and a growing demand for pre- and post-trade data