Public funding of failing banks in the European Union
Einde inhoudsopgave
Public funding of failing banks in the European Union (LBF vol. 19) 2020/4.5.2.4:4.5.2.4 No discretion in exercise of the PONV conversion power
Public funding of failing banks in the European Union (LBF vol. 19) 2020/4.5.2.4
4.5.2.4 No discretion in exercise of the PONV conversion power
Documentgegevens:
M. Louisse-Read, datum 01-06-2020
- Datum
01-06-2020
- Auteur
M. Louisse-Read
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS213824:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Staatssteun (V)
Deze functie is alleen te gebruiken als je bent ingelogd.
A last distinction can be found in the fact that the PONV conversion power does not allow any exemption, while the bail-in tool leaves the option to exempt certain eligible liabilities under Article 44(3) BRRD (Article 27(5) SRMR). When exercising the PONV conversion power, the resolution authority therefore has no discretion to leave certain capital instruments (and eligible liabilities under BRRD II and SRMR II) out of scope.