State aid to banks
Einde inhoudsopgave
State aid to banks (IVOR nr. 109) 2018/13.10.5:13.10.5 Concluding remarks
State aid to banks (IVOR nr. 109) 2018/13.10.5
13.10.5 Concluding remarks
Documentgegevens:
mr. drs. R.E. van Lambalgen, datum 01-12-2017
- Datum
01-12-2017
- Auteur
mr. drs. R.E. van Lambalgen
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS593003:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Mededingingsrecht / EU-mededingingsrecht
Deze functie is alleen te gebruiken als je bent ingelogd.
The relevance of the price leadership ban was explained in subsection 13.10.1. As regards the elaboration of the price leadership ban, subsection 13.10.3 discussed that the modalities of the price leadership ban often differ. This is not problematic, as long as the Commission takes into account the differences in modalities. To some extent, the Commission has done this. However, with respect to the standard of comparison, an explanation as to why a specific standard of comparison was chosen, was completely lacking.
An even greater issue is the fact that the price leadership ban only appears in a handful of cases (see subsection 13.10.2). Can the absence of a price leadership ban be explained by the fact that the bank is subject to the other pricing restrictions? In my view, this question should be answered in the negative, because there is an important difference between the price leadership ban and the other pricing restrictions. The price leadership ban is exclusively aimed at limiting competition distortions, while the other pricing restrictions are also aimed at restoring the long-term viability of the bank. Thus, the price leadership ban and the other pricing restrictions are therefore not substitutes. This means that the absence of a price leadership ban cannot be explained by the mere fact that the bank is subject to the other pricing restrictions.
The price leadership ban is one of the most contentious behavioural restrictions. This compensatory measure has been heavily criticised in the literature. From this viewpoint, it might be a good thing that the Commission no longer requires a price leadership ban.
There are some cases in which there are no pricing restrictions at all. However, these cases are often characterised by a ban on aggressive commercial practices. To some extent, this ban is related to a pricing restriction, because this ban affects the pricing behaviour of the bank – depending on how this ban is interpreted. This behavioural restriction will be discussed in more detail in the following section.