17.II.4.1 Level 1: a tighter regime for data disaggregation

The legislative starting point of the MiFID II-rules is probably the CESR Consultation Paper in the Context of the MiFID I Review.1 CESR noted that concerns about the cost of real-time market data, which in the view of CESR restricted the availability of affordable consolidated European post-trade data. CESR proposed several solutions to fix this situation. The first proposal of CESR was to require equity pre- and post-trade data to be sold in an unbundled way.2 CESR noted that in the context of unbundling equity pre- and post-trade data there were different approaches in the EU.3 A majority of respondents to CESR’s consultation believed that unbundling equity pre- and post-trade data information would reduce the cost of post-trade data.4 By contrast, a number of respondents disagreed. These respondents did not believe that the CESR proposal would reduce data prices or believed that, without appropriate controls in place, the combined price of pre- and post-trade data might increase if this proposal was implemented.5 CESR’s final response mirrored the majority view of the respondents. In CESR’s view, the unbundling of pre- and post-trade data would probably improve the competitiveness of the market for data, since market participants could choose whether to purchase pre- or post-trade data, while data suppliers could still offer a package including both.6

The Commission’s MiFID II (MiFIR) Impact Assessment, reflected the reasoning of CESR. The Commission believed that unbundled pre- and post-trade data – provided that the unbundled data would be available at a reasonable price – would contribute to lower data prices for investors, while also facilitating the establishment of a consolidated tape at an affordable cost.7 The European Parliament, as well as the Council, adopted the Commission’s view without making amendments.8