The Decoupling of Voting and Economic Ownership
Einde inhoudsopgave
The Decoupling of Voting and Economic Ownership (IVOR nr. 88) 2012/1.4.2.0:1.4.2.0 Introduction
The Decoupling of Voting and Economic Ownership (IVOR nr. 88) 2012/1.4.2.0
1.4.2.0 Introduction
Documentgegevens:
mr. M.C. Schouten, datum 01-06-2012
- Datum
01-06-2012
- Auteur
mr. M.C. Schouten
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS598268:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Ondernemingsrecht / Rechtspersonenrecht
Toon alle voetnoten
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
Thus, the following analysis only offers insight into the adverse effects caused by empty voting through its impact on transparency. It would fall outside the scope of this article to discuss the possible adverse effects caused by empty voting through its impact on other aspects of corporate govemance. For an emerging body of literature addressing this broader question, see references supra note 216.
Deze functie is alleen te gebruiken als je bent ingelogd.
Using as a framework for analysis the taxonomy of mechanisms through which ownership disclosure improves market efficiency and corporate govemance, it becomes clear that empty voting, too, severely undermines these mechanisms.1