Einde inhoudsopgave
EU Equity pre- and post-trade transparency regulation (LBF vol. 21) 2021/18.III.2.1.3
18.III.2.1.3 Post-trade transparency: liquidity and the nature and size of the venue
mr. J.E.C. Gulyás, datum 01-02-2021
- Datum
01-02-2021
- Auteur
mr. J.E.C. Gulyás
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS266595:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Bank- en effectenrecht
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Financiële dienstverlening / Financieel toezicht
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
See, for example, CESR, MiFID I Review, July 2010(CESR/10-802) and ESMA, Consultation Paper: MiFID II/MiFIR, May 2014(ESMA/2014/549). See in this context also ESMA, MiFID II/MiFIR Review Report, 16 July 2020(ESMA70-156-2682), p. 33-35.
Art. 21 ISD. This perspective was in great part driven by the fact that trading was largely concentrated on highly transparent RMs. In other words, alternative trading systems and order internalising systems were not considered to be a major threat for price formation and the level playing field at the time, albeit that some concerns were raised (FESCO, The regulation alternative trading systems in Europe: A paper for the EU Commission, September 2000(FESCO/00-064c), p. 13-16).
Art. 28, 30, and 45 MiFID I. For example, MiFID I permitted investment firms operating outside RMs and MTFs not to publish post-trade data for certain orders (e.g. technical trades, such as so-called give-up or give-in transactions). By contrast, RMs and MTFs were required to publish such trades, albeit with a flag to distinguish the specific nature of the trade. For an examination, reference is made to chapter 8.
Liquidity is also a relevant element for equity post-trade transparency. The EU has traditionally upheld the opinion that - where liquidity is provided through large transactions - deferral of post-trade data publication is legitimate. The rationale here is that deferral of large transactions supports liquidity by giving protection against inventory risk (i.e. other market participants taking positions at the detriment of the recently expanded inventory of a market participant taking a large position).1 It is contentious, however, how long the time for deferral should be, as well as which conditions should be met.2
The nature and size of the venue play a less prominent role in terms of post-trade transparency. Under the ISD a minimum standard of post-trade data publication was seen as necessary for RMs. Alternative trading systems and order internalising systems were not subject to ISD transparency rules.3 The perspective changed under MiFID I, where the EU mandated equity post-trade transparency rules for RMs, MTFs, and investment firms operating outside such venues (including, but not limited to, SIs). Despite the differences in nature and size of these venues, MiFID I overall applied the same post-trade transparency rules to RMs, MTFs, and investment firms operating outside such venues. ‘Overall’, because lighter post-trade transparency rules applied to investment firms operating outside RMs and MTFs. The rationale here was, among other things, to alleviate (often smaller) investment firms operating outside RMs and MTFs from compliance costs.4 A similar perspective is apparent under MiFID II.5