Einde inhoudsopgave
Code of good practice in electoral matters
2 Equal suffrage
Geldend
Geldend vanaf 23-05-2003
- Bronpublicatie:
18-10-2002, Internet 2003, www.venice.coe.int (uitgifte: 23-05-2003, regelingnummer: CDL-AD(2002)23)
- Inwerkingtreding
23-05-2003
- Bronpublicatie inwerkingtreding:
18-10-2002, Internet 2003, www.venice.coe.int (uitgifte: 23-05-2003, regelingnummer: CDL-AD(2002)23)
- Vakgebied(en)
Staatsrecht / Kiesrecht
10
Equality in electoral matters comprises a variety of aspects. Some concern equality of suffrage, a value shared by the whole continent, while others go beyond this concept and cannot be deemed to reflect any common standard. The principles to be respected in all cases are numerical vote equality, equality in terms of electoral strength and equality of chances. On the other hand, equality of outcome achieved, for instance, by means of proportional representation of the parties or the sexes, cannot be imposed.
2.1. Equal voting rights
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Equality in voting rights requires each voter to be normally entitled to one vote, and to one vote only. Multiple voting, which is still a common irregularity in the new democracies, is obviously prohibited — both if it means a voter votes more than once in the same place and if it enables a voter to vote simultaneously in several different places, such as his or her place of current residence and place of former residence.
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In some electoral systems, the elector nonetheless has more than one vote. In, for example, a system that allows split voting (voting for candidates chosen from more than one list), the elector may have one vote per seat to be filled; another possibility is when one vote is cast in a small constituency and another in a larger constituency, as is often the case in systems combining single-member constituencies and proportional representation at the national or regional level.1. In this case, equal voting rights mean that all electors should have the same number of votes.
2.2. Equal voting power
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Equality in voting power, where the elections are not being held in one single constituency, requires constituency boundaries to be drawn in such a way that seats in the lower chambers representing the people are distributed equally among the constituencies, in accordance with a specific apportionment criterion, e.g. the number of residents in the constituency, the number of resident nationals (including minors), the number of registered electors, or possibly the number of people actually voting. An appropriate combination of these criteria is conceivable. The same rules apply to regional and local elections. When this principle is not complied with, we are confronted with what is known as electoral geometry, in the form either of ‘active electoral geometry’, namely a distribution of seats causing inequalities in representation as soon as it is applied, or of ‘passive electoral geometry’, arising from protracted retention of an unaltered territorial distribution of seats and constituencies. Furthermore, under systems tending towards a non-proportional result, particularly majority (or plurality) vote systems, gerrymandering may occur, which consists in favouring one party by means of an artificial delimitation of constituencies.
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Constituency boundaries may also be determined on the basis of geographical criteria and the administrative or indeed historic boundary lines, which often depend on geography.
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The maximum admissible departure from the distribution criterion adopted depends on the individual situation, although it should seldom exceed 10% and never 15%, except in really exceptional circumstances (a demographically weak administrative unit of the same importance as others with at least one lower-chamber representative, or concentration of a specific national minority).2.
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In order to avoid passive electoral geometry, seats should be redistributed at least every ten years, preferably outside election periods, as this will limit the risks of political manipulation.3.
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In multi-member constituencies electoral geometry can easily be avoided by regularly allocating seats to the constituencies in accordance with the distribution criterion adopted. Constituencies ought then to correspond to administrative units, and redistribution is undesirable. Where a uninominal method of voting is used, constituency boundaries need to be redrawn at each redistribution of seats. The political ramifications of (re)drawing electoral boundaries are very considerable, and it is therefore essential that the process should be non-partisan and should not disadvantage national minorities. The long-standing democracies have widely differing approaches to this problem, and operate along very different lines. The new democracies should adopt simple criteria and easy-to-implement procedures. The best solution would be to submit the problem in the first instance to a commission comprising a majority of independent members and, preferably, a geographer, a sociologist, a balanced representation of the parties and, where appropriate, representatives of national minorities. The parliament would then make a decision on the basis of the commission's proposals, with the possibility of a single appeal.
2.3. Equality of opportunity
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Equality of opportunity should be ensured between parties and candidates and should prompt the state to be impartial towards them and to apply the same law uniformly to all. In particular, the neutrality requirement applies to the electoral campaign and coverage by the media, especially the publicly owned media, as well as to public funding of parties and campaigns. This means that there are two possible interpretations of equality: either ‘strict’ equality or ‘proportional’ equality. ‘Strict’ equality means that the political parties are treated without regard to their present strength in parliament or among the electorate. It must apply to the use of public facilities for electioneering purposes (for example bill posting, postal services and similar, public demonstrations, public meeting rooms). ‘Proportional’ equality implies that the treatment of political parties is in proportion to the number of votes. Equality of opportunity (strict and/or proportional) applies in particular to radio and television airtime, public funds and other forms of backing. Certain forms of backing may on the one hand be submitted to strict equality and on the other hand to proportional equality.
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The basic idea is that the main political forces should be able to voice their opinions in the main organs of the country's media and that all the political forces should be allowed to hold meetings, including on public thoroughfares, distribute literature and exercise their right to post bills. All of these rights must be clearly regulated, with due respect for freedom of expression, and any failure to observe them, either by the authorities or by the campaign participants, should be subject to appropriate sanctions. Quick rights of appeal must be available in order to remedy the situation before the elections. But the fact is that media failure to provide impartial information about the election campaign and candidates is one of the most frequent shortcomings arising during elections. The most important thing is to draw up a list of the media organisations in each country and to make sure that the candidates or parties are accorded sufficiently balanced amounts of airtime or advertising space, including on state radio and television stations.
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In conformity with freedom of expression, legal provision should be made to ensure that there is a minimum access to privately owned audiovisual media, with regard to the election campaign and to advertising, for all participants in elections.
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The question of funding, and in particular of the need for it to be transparent, will be considered later.4. Spending by political parties, particularly on advertising, may likewise be limited in order to guarantee equality of opportunity.
2.4. Equality and national minorities
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In accordance with the principles of international law, the electoral law must guarantee equality for persons belonging to national minorities, which includes prohibiting any discrimination against them.5. In particular, the national minorities must be allowed to set up political parties.6. Constituency delimitations and quorum regulations must not be such as to form an obstacle to the presence of persons belonging to minorities in the elected body.
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Certain measures taken to ensure minimum representation for minorities either by reserving seats for them7. or by providing for exceptions to the normal rules on seat distribution, eg by waiving the quorum for the national minorities' parties8. do not infringe the principle of equality. It may also be foreseen that people belonging to national minorities have the right to vote for both general and national minority lists. However, neither candidates nor electors must be required to indicate their affiliation with any national minority.9.,10.
2.5. Equality and parity of the sexes
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If there is a specific constitutional basis11., rules could be adopted guaranteeing some degree of balance between the two sexes in elected bodies, or even parity. In the absence of such a constitutional basis, such provisions could be considered contrary to the principle of equality and freedom of association.
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Moreover, the scope of these rules depends on the electoral system. In a fixed party list system, parity is imposed if the number of men and women who are eligible is the same. However, if preferential voting or cross-voting is possible, voters will not necessarily choose candidates from both sexes, and this may result in an unbalanced composition of the elected body, chosen by voters.
Voetnoten
See, for example, Article 64 of the Albanian Constitution and Section 1 of the German Federal Elections Act.
See CDL (98) 45, p. 3; CDL (99) 51, p. 8; CDL (2000) 2, p. 5; CDL-AD (2002) 9, para. 22.
CDL-AD (2002) 9, para. 23.
See below, Chapter II.3.5.
Article 4.1 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ETS 157).
Re. bans on political parties and similar measures, see CDL-INF (2000) 1.
As is the case in Slovenia and Croatia.
As is the case in Germany and Poland. Romanian law even provides for representation of minorities organisations if they have secured a number of votes equivalent to 5% (only) of the average number of validly cast votes required for the election of a deputy to the lower house country-wide.
Article 3 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ETS 157).
Re. electoral law and national minorities, see CDL-INF (2000) 4.
See Article 3.2 of the French Constitution; cf. judgment of 18 November 1982, Recueil des décisions du Conseil constitutionnel, 1982, pp. 66 ff.