Remedies for infringements of EU law in legal relationships between private parties (LBF vol. 18) 2019/3.2.4.2:3.2.4.2 The direct horizontal effect results in nullità assoluta

Remedies for infringements of EU law in legal relationships between private parties (LBF vol. 18) 2019/3.2.4.2

3.2.4.2 The direct horizontal effect results in nullità assoluta

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55. Besides the Court of Justice, the Corte di Cassazione is the only court in this case that makes an explicit reference to the effect of Article 45 TFEU in horizontal legal relationships:

“La Corte di Giustizia ha affermato (con statuizione vincolante per il giudice nazionale) […] che il principio di libera circolazione dei lavoratori all’interno delle Comunità e di non discriminazione degli stessi, enunciato dall’articolo [45 TFEU] essendo formulato in termini generali, non è rivolto in modo particolare agli Stati membri, ma si applica direttamente anche ai privati.”1 [Edited: I.A.]

Nonetheless, the Pretore and the Corte d’Appello did use the Court’s conclusion that the requirement was contrary to Article 45 TFEU as a point of departure. From there on they focused on the determination of the concrete legal consequences regulated by Italian law, the first of which concerns the partial nullity of the bando di concorso.2

The legal character of a bando di concorso

56. A bando di concorso is an official public announcement (usually in a newspaper) of a recruitment competition. Usually only public authorities make use of a bando di concorso; private employers rather make use of the publication of vacancies or an informal call for curricula vitae. In this case the Bank, which in earlier times was a public body but now has become a primarily private entity3, published a bando di concorso.

57. The entity publishing a bando di concorso is in principle free to determine the conditions under which persons are allowed to participate in the recruitment competition, as long as those conditions are in conformity with the law. In other words, the bando di concorso may set reasonable requirements on qualification, education and working experience, but it may not include discriminatory conditions like the one in the case at hand: the Bank did not only require proof of bilingualism4; it required the possession of one specific patentino that could be obtained in only one province, from one specific authority and only after having taken an exam that was held only a few times per year. The Italian courts employed partial nullity as a mechanism to disapply the illegitimate requirement in question (Article 1418 jo. Article 1419 Codice civile).

58. The legal character of a bando di concorso is rather ambiguous. Not only is it of relevance whether the bando is published by a public authority or by a private entity; also the particular circumstances of the case are relevant for the answer to the question which natura giuridica the bando di concorso has. In the case at hand, none of the Italian courts involved referred to the juridical character of a bando di concorso. Its nullity, however, seems to be beyond questioning.

59. In case law and literature one finds different notions on the juridical qualification of the bando di concorso – which is usually published by a public authority.5 Firstly, the offerta al pubblico (Article 1336 Codice civile); secondly, the promessa al pubblico (Article 1989 Codice civile) and, thirdly, the invito ad offrire. In most cases, however, the Corte di cassazione qualifies a bando di concorso as a offerta al pubblico.6 It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss all three concepts to a further extent. It is more important to conclude that in relation to a bando di concorso published by a private entity, the communis opinio is that it is a juridical act for it produces legal effects in the form of rights and obligations7: everybody who complies with the (lawful) conditions imposed by the bando di concorso has the right to apply for the recruitment competition, and the entity that published the bando is obliged to allow all the candidates meeting the lawful conditions in the bando to participate in the recruitment competition (concorso) without any form of discrimination. More specifically related to the Italian system and terminology of fatti giuridici and atti giuridici, the bando di concorso is considered to be an atto unilaterale or negozio giuridico unilaterale, irrespective of the specific juridical label given to it in concrete cases.8

60. An atto unilaterale is a subcategory of the negozio giuridico, which is, in turn, a species within the category of juridical acts (attigiuridici). Attigiuridici are a subcategory of the general category of legal facts (fatti giuridici), which are all acts that in one way or the other produce legal effect.9 The concept of negozi giuridici is not regulated by law. Typically it concerns a doctrinal concept which has been used for decades.10 Provisions on attiunilaterali, one of the species of negozi giuridici, are, however, to some extent regulated in the Italian civil code. Article 1324 Codice civile for instance stipulates that the rules that regulate contracts apply, to the extent compatible, to unilateral inter vivos acts having patrimonial content. In view of the judgments in the case at hand as well as other case law on illegitimate conditions in a bando di concorso, Article 1324 Codice civile applies also to a bando di concorso.

How the Italian courts arrived at nullitá assoluta

61. The Pretore derived from the Court of Justice’s preliminary ruling that the clause in the bando di concorso was null and void for being in conflict with Union law which is considered to be law of a mandatory character – a so-called norma imperativa.11 Since Angonese could, in the eyes of the Pretore, not directly invoke Article 45 TFEU, the Pretore created an extension by applying several domestic provisions on the prohibition of discrimination to arrive at the same conclusion in the favour of Angonese: that of “the same type of nullity”.12

62. The Pretore determined that not the integral bando di concorso was declared null, yet only the discriminatory requirement. Hence, Article 1419 Codice civile on nullità parziale applied.13 Further, the Pretore stressed that the nullity applied concerned nullità assoluta, as opposed to nullità relativa (relative nullity; when a clause is voidable)14. Contrary to annulment, which can only be demanded by the party in whose interest the action for annulment is established in law (Article 1441 Codice civile), absolute nullity can be invoked by anyone who, in a particular case, has an interest in it (Article 1421 Codice civile).15 According to the Pretore, Angonese undoubtedly has an interest in invoking the nullity of the discriminatory clause in the bando di concorso.16 Both the Corte d’Appello and the Corte di Cassazione support the Pretore in its ultimate conclusion, but not its line of reasoning.

63. On the basis of the Court of Justice’s judgment, the Corte d’Appello concludes that the requirement in the bando di concorso clashes with Article 45 TFEU, and directly takes the step towards the nullity of the requirement without feeling the urge to create a domestic bridge between the Treaty provision and the sanction of nullity as found in the Italian civil code.17 The Corte d’Appello subsequently confirms the considerations of the Pretore relating to the absolute nullity.18

64. The Corte di Cassazione confirms the considerations and conclusions of the Corte d’Appello. In a short yet sharp consideration, the Corte di Cassazione links together the Court of Justice’s judgment, the requirement infringing Article 45 TFEU and the sanction of nullity:

“La Corte di Giustizia, con la menzionata sentenza, ha sostenuto che la clausola del bando di concorso con la quale il datore di lavoro obblighi i candidate a comprovare le loro cognizioni linguistiche esclusivamente mediante un unico diploma rilasciato in una sola provincial di uno Stato membro da una autorità amministrativa locale, si pone in contrasto con l’articolo [45 TFEU] perché rende difficile, o persino impossibilie, l’acquisizione dell’ attesto alle persone che non risiedano in detta provincial, la maggioranza delle quali ha la cittadinanza italiana, con l’ulteriore consequenza che detto obbligo sfavorisce i cittadini degli altri Stati membri rispetto a questi ultimi. Ora, poiché per quanto se è affermato nell’ esame del secondo motive la condizione dei lavoratori non cittadini va euiparata a quella dei cittadini che – al pari dell’ Angonese – soggiorno nel territorio di altro Stato membro al fine di conseguire una formazione utilizzabile anche in Italia, deve ritenersi che la clausola in questione, ponendosi in contrasto con una norma comunitaria inderogabile, sia affeta da nullità assoluta e non produca effetto alcuno.”

The Corte di Cassazione thus concludes that the clause in question, which is in conflict with mandatory Union law, is affected by absolute nullity and therefore does not produce any effect. Then, the Corte di Cassazione repeats what the Pretore already clarified in first instance: according to the principles of national private law, absolute nullity can be invoked by anyone who has an interest in it, whereas relative nullity can be demanded only by those in whose interest the law established the action for annulment. Italian law does not provide for any rule on annulment that could be applied to the situation at hand. Consequently, absolute nullity in the sense of Chapter XI of Book 4 of the Codice civile could be the only correct conclusion.19

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