EU Equity pre- and post-trade transparency regulation: from ISD to MiFID II
Einde inhoudsopgave
EU Equity pre- and post-trade transparency regulation (LBF vol. 21) 2021/9.II.1.5.1:9.II.1.5.1 Goals of equity post-trade data publication
EU Equity pre- and post-trade transparency regulation (LBF vol. 21) 2021/9.II.1.5.1
9.II.1.5.1 Goals of equity post-trade data publication
Documentgegevens:
mr. J.E.C. Gulyás, datum 01-02-2021
- Datum
01-02-2021
- Auteur
mr. J.E.C. Gulyás
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS267199:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Bank- en effectenrecht
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Financiële dienstverlening / Financieel toezicht
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The importance of post-trade data was widely recognised during the MiFID I-review. In reviewing MiFID I, CESR noted that post-trade data supported the efficiency of the overall price formation process, assisted the operation of best execution obligations, and mitigated the potential adverse impact of market fragmentation. The post-trade information was also used, primarily by buy-side firms, to analyse the cost of transactions and to price portfolios.1 However, CESR expressed concerns about the ability of MiFID I to achieve the goals of post-trade transparency publication. Based on market consultation, CESR raised several concerns on the MiFID I post-trade transparency regime, most notably on (1) the quality; (2) timing; and (3) various barriers to consolidation of post-trade data.2
The Commission agreed with the findings of CESR. The Commission also saw post-trade transparency as an important means to integrate the European financial market. Furthermore, the Commission also observed quality, timing, and consolidation issues in terms of post-trade information. However, the Commission had a different view on how to change the MiFID I post-trade transparency regime in order to achieve the full benefits of post-trade information.
The European Parliament and Council reflected similar types of thinking as CESR and the Commission in terms of post-trade transparency goals and the issues of MiFID I. Sharp differences arose, however, in providing solutions for the MiFID II post-trade transparency regime. The controversy is reflected in the final MiFID II framework. On the one hand, MiFID II is characterized by the aim to achieve a high level of post-trade data. On the other hand, political compromise is apparent when it comes the MiFID II equity post-trade transparency provisions (see paragraph 1.5.2-1.5.6 and paragraph 2 below).