EHRM, 09-07-2025, nr. 8019/16, nr. 43800/14, nr. 28525/20, nr. 11055/22

In November 2013 the government of Ukraine announced that they would suspend the preparations for signing an Association Agreement with the European Union (EU) and would renew the dialogue on trade and economic matters with the Russian Federation. This led to mass protests against the government across the country. These deteriorated into violent clashes between security forces and protesters. The protest movement became known as ‘Euromaidan’ (after Independence Square (‘Maidan Nezalezhnosti’) in Kyiv: see Shmorgunov and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 15367/14 and 13 others, §§ 9-17, 21 January 2021).

Violence escalated sharply on the evening of 18 February 2014. Hundreds of protestors, and some law enforcement officials, were killed or injured over the following days. On 21 February 2014, the then President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, and opposition leaders signed a compromise agreement which envisaged early elections by the end of the year.

On 22 February 2014 President Yanukovych left Kyiv and went to the Russian Federation. The Ukrainian Parliament voted to remove him from office on account of his failure to perform his constitutional duties. It elected a new speaker, who became acting President of Ukraine pending new elections on 25 May 2014. A new interim government was put in place. The interim government was not recognised by the government of the respondent State.

In late February 2014 unidentified armed men in green military uniforms without insignia began taking over strategic infrastructure in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (‘Crimea’). On 27 February 2014 armed groups took over the building of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Later that day, at gunpoint, members of the Supreme Council dismissed the government of Crimea and appointed Sergey Aksyonov as ‘Prime Minister’. It was also decided to hold a ‘referendum’ on the future status of Crimea (see Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC] (dec.), nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18, §§ 32–66 and 149–168, 16 December 2020).

The ‘referendum’ in Crimea took place on 16 March 2014 and according to the published results there was overwhelming support for Crimea joining the Russian Federation. On 18 March 2014 Crimea therefore purported to join the Russian Federation.

Meanwhile, in early March 2014, pro-Russian protests began across eastern regions of Ukraine, including in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The protestors objected to what they claimed to have been an unconstitutional change of power in Ukraine.

At the request of the government of Ukraine, the Office of the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) established the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (‘HRMMU’) to monitor and report on the human rights situation in Ukraine. The HRMMU was deployed on 14 March 2014.

The Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (‘SMM’) was deployed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on 21 March 2014, following a request by Ukraine's government and a consensus decision by all fifty-seven OSCE participating States, including the respondent State. The SMM's main tasks were to observe and report on the situation in Ukraine and to facilitate dialogue among all parties to the crisis.

From early April 2014 there was a rapid escalation of violence in eastern Ukraine. Armed groups were formed and they started to take control by force of public buildings as well as of police and security facilities in cities and towns across the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. They set up barricades and checkpoints to maintain control of the areas seized.

On 6 April 2014 armed groups in Luhansk seized the regional office of the Security Service of Ukraine (‘SBU’) and declared it to be the headquarters of the ‘South-East Army’.

That night, armed groups occupied the Regional State Administration building in Donetsk and, on 7 April 2014, they declared the independence of the ‘Donetsk People's Republic’ (‘DPR’).

On 12 April 2014 a group of armed men led by Russian national Igor Girkin seized public buildings in Sloviansk, in the Donetsk region. Public administration buildings in a number of surrounding towns were also seized in the following days.

On 14 April 2014 the government of Ukraine launched an ‘Anti-Terrorist Operation’ (‘ATO’) to re-establish control over territory controlled by the separatist armed groups, deploying units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces supported by volunteer battalions. Meanwhile, an increasing number of troops of the armed forces of the Russian Federation were deployed in the border area near Ukraine.

On 17 April 2014, following negotiations between the representatives of Ukraine, the EU, the United States of America and the Russian Federation, the Joint Geneva Statement on Ukraine was published. The parties notably agreed that all sides should refrain from any violence, intimidation or provocative actions; that all illegal armed groups should be disarmed; that all illegally seized buildings should be returned to legitimate owners; and that all illegally occupied streets, squares and other public places in Ukrainian cities and towns should be vacated.

On 27 April 2014 the ‘Lugansk People's Republic’ (‘LPR’) was declared in Luhansk. On 29 April 2014, the Luhansk Regional State Administration building was stormed and occupied by separatist armed groups.

In the following days and weeks, further buildings in towns and cities in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions were taken over by separatist armed groups.

On 11 May 2014, so-called ‘independence referendums’ took place in the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions under separatist control. The ‘DPR’ and the ‘LPR’ announced that a majority had voted in favour of independence. They declared themselves to be sovereign states and formed new ‘governments’.

On 6 June 2014 the ‘Normandy Format’, composed of Germany, France, Ukraine and the Russian Federation, was established. The diplomatic efforts of this group led to the establishment of the Trilateral Contact Group for the peaceful settlement of the situation in eastern Ukraine, composed of senior representatives from Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the OSCE. The Trilateral Contact Group held its first session on 8 June 2014.

In the course of June and July 2014, the Ukrainian armed forces regained control over a number of towns and strategic positions in Donbas. On 5 July 2014 the separatist forces retreated to Donetsk from Sloviansk and surrounding towns. There was heavy fighting in the south-eastern part of the Donetsk region as the separatists sought to hold the territory they had occupied and to gain control over a passage of land which would link the ‘DPR’ to the Russian border in the south. The Ukrainian forces used heavy artillery and air support to attack separatist positions.

On 17 July 2014 Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur was downed near Snizhne, in the Donetsk region. All 298 civilians aboard were killed. 196 of the victims were nationals of the Netherlands. According to the passenger manifest, the remaining victims were nationals of Malaysia, Australia, Indonesia, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, the Philippines, Canada or New Zealand. Some of the deceased had dual nationality. The Netherlands, working closely with Ukraine and other affected States, coordinated the recovery and repatriation efforts.

A new round of peace talks started on 31 July 2014 in Minsk, Belarus, in the context of the Trilateral Contact Group (see paragraph 52 above), with the informal participation of representatives of the ‘DPR’ and the ‘LPR’.

On 5 September 2014 senior representatives of Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the OSCE, the ‘DPR’ and the ‘LPR’ signed the Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group (‘Minsk Protocol’), which set out a 12-point peace plan including an immediate ceasefire. Despite the ceasefire, fighting continued. A Memorandum was signed on 19 September 2014 outlining the parameters for the implementation of commitments of the Minsk Protocol. A line of separation was created but fighting across the contact line persisted.

In early 2015 active hostilities began to increase considerably. In February 2015 intense fighting began around Debaltseve. As a result of peace talks held on 11 and 12 February 2015 in Minsk, the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements (‘Minsk II’) was adopted. Minsk II provided for a ceasefire to enter into force from 15 February 2015, the withdrawal of heavy weaponry from the contact line, the establishment of a security zone and the withdrawal of foreign armed formations, mercenaries and weapons from the territory of Ukraine.

Over the ensuing years, the conflict continued with regular attacks across the line of contact in eastern Ukraine. The intensity fluctuated, with a number of ceasefires being agreed which led to a reduction in hostilities in the immediate aftermath. However, these were followed in due course by escalations in hostilities.

On 22 July 2020 the Trilateral Contact Group, with the participation of ‘DPR’ and ‘LPR’ representatives, reached an agreement regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire. Following the enactment of the measures on 27 July 2020, the security situation in the conflict zone improved significantly. However, from March 2021 hostilities began to escalate once again. This coincided with a substantial build-up in April of Russian troops in areas bordering Ukraine, ostensibly for military exercises. Russia subsequently began to withdraw its troops and hostilities in the conflict zone decreased to levels similar to those seen in the second half of 2020.

From October 2021 there was a significant increase in Russian military activity along the border with Ukraine and in Crimea. A large number of troops and substantial amounts of military equipment were deployed to the border areas. This coincided with an escalation in active hostilities in eastern Ukraine. In November 2021 armed engagement across the contact line decreased. However, the military build-up continued to increase through to February 2022.

On 18 February 2022 the OSCE SMM reported a dramatic increase in activity along the contact line in eastern Ukraine over the preceding days. On the same date, the leaders of the ‘DPR’ and the ‘LPR’ announced a mass evacuation of residents of the two separatist entities to Russia.

On 21 February 2022 Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, adopted decrees on the recognition of the ‘DPR’ and the ‘LPR’ as ‘sovereign and independent states’. The decrees instructed the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation to carry out ‘functions on supporting peace’ in the ‘DPR’ and the ‘LPR’. That same evening, President Putin ordered the deployment of Russian troops in eastern Ukraine on a ‘peacekeeping mission’.

On 22 February 2022 the State Duma ratified the ‘Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Russian Federation and the Donetsk People's Republic’ and the ‘Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Russian Federation and the Lugansk People's Republic’.

By 23 February 2022 up to 190,000 Russian troops were estimated to be deployed in areas bordering Ukraine and in Crimea.

On 24 February 2022 the Russian President announced that he had decided ‘in accordance with Article 51 (Chapter VII) of the Charter of the United Nations … to conduct a special military operation with the approval of the Federation Council of Russia and pursuant to the treaties on friendship and mutual assistance with the Donetsk People's Republic and the Lugansk People's Republic’. He specified that the purpose of the ‘special operation’ was ‘to protect people who have been subjected to abuse and genocide by the Kiev regime for eight years’. He stated that the Russian Federation had to stop ‘a genocide’ against millions of people and that it would seek the prosecution of those who had committed numerous bloody crimes against civilians, including citizens of the Russian Federation.

On the same day, Russian troops crossed various border points into Ukraine, including through Belarus, and launched attacks by land, air and sea. Airstrikes were reported across Ukraine. Fighting opened on four fronts.

On the northern front, Russian armed forces advanced towards Kyiv from several directions, including from within Belarus, and conducted strikes on the capital, but fell short of capturing it. Russian troops took Hostomel airport and also took control of the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant. On the way to Kyiv, the Russian armed forces surrounded Chernihiv, which became the scene of heavy airstrikes and artillery fire. By the end of March 2022 the offensive towards Kyiv had stalled and the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant had been returned to Ukrainian personnel. After Ukrainian armed forces had regained control of areas north of Kyiv and Russian troops had withdrawn from localities they had temporarily occupied, evidence of grave human rights and international humanitarian law violations and large-scale destruction started to accumulate.

On the north-eastern front, Kharkiv and Sumy cities quickly became the scenes of heavy urban warfare with heavy shelling of residential and other key buildings that led to large-scale destruction. Starting on 28 February 2022, Russian armed forces attempted to capture the city of Izium, in the Kharkiv region. On 24 March 2022 the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence declared that Izium was under the full control of its forces. By April 2022 the Russian armed forces had withdrawn from the area around Sumy city. However, fighting in and around Kharkiv continued.

On the south-eastern front, as of 24 February 2022 Russian armed forces and ‘DPR’ separatists launched attacks on the city of Mariupol from within Russian-controlled areas in the Donetsk region and from Crimea. By 1 March 2022 they had encircled the city. They gradually gained control of swathes of territory as attacks intensified, leading to large-scale destruction. Heavy fighting hampered evacuation efforts and curtailed access to basic necessities for civilians. On 10 March 2022 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) announced that the humanitarian situation in Mariupol was becoming increasingly dire and desperate, and that hundreds of thousands of people had no food, water, heat, electricity, or medical care. The siege of Mariupol continued until 20 May 2022, when the Russian Federation declared that it had gained full control of the city.

On the southern front, on 2 March 2022 the city of Kherson became the first major Ukrainian city to fall. Russian armed forces gradually occupied surrounding localities. In the neighbouring Zaporizhzhia region, they seized Melitopol, Berdiansk, and Enerhodar. They took control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, Europe's largest such facility.

A second phase of the armed conflict was initiated in April 2022 with the launch of the ‘Battle for Donbas’, which, according to Sergei Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, was aimed at the ‘full liberation’ of the ‘DPR’ and the ‘LPR’. The offensive of the Russian armed forces concentrated on the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and other eastern areas, with the support of separatist armed groups.

On 25 May 2022 the President of the Russian Federation signed a decree simplifying the process for residents of Ukraine's Russian-occupied Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions to acquire Russian citizenship.

On 30 May 2022 the President of the Russian Federation signed a decree facilitating the acquisition of Russian nationality by orphaned children or children without parental care from the ‘DPR’, ‘LPR’ and in the occupied areas of the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. The decree authorised the heads of orphanages and other State institutions located in these areas to apply for Russian nationality for children under their care.

From late August 2022 Ukrainian forces led counter-offensive operations in the regions of Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk and Kherson which resulted in their retaking hundreds of settlements. Populations from recovered cities and settlements reported large-scale atrocities, such as unlawful killings, summary executions, torture, sexual violence and unlawful confinement during the period of occupation.

From 23 to 27 September 2022, Russian authorities in the occupied territory of the regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia purported to hold ‘referendums’ on these regions becoming part of the Russian Federation. On 30 September 2022 the President of the Russian Federation signed so-called ‘Treaties on the Accession of the Donetsk People's Republic, the Lugansk People's Republic, the Zaporozhye Region and the Kherson Region to the Russian Federation’. Part of the regions concerned was not in the hands of the Russian Federation at the time and Ukrainian control over further parts has since been restored.

In October 2022 Ukrainian armed forces continued to recover control of cities and villages in eastern Ukraine. There was heavy fighting in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

On 10 October 2022, two days after an explosion caused damage to the ‘Crimean Bridge’ connecting the Russian Federation with Crimea, the Russian Federation launched a wave of missile and uncrewed aerial vehicle attacks targeting Ukraine's critical infrastructure. During the subsequent weeks and months, further similarly intense and large-scale attacks with missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles were carried out. The attacks affected numerous regions of Ukraine, targeting energy-related infrastructure. As a consequence, millions were left without heating, electricity and water. In the south, missile strikes hit the cities of Mykolaiv and Zaporizhzhia. Military activities and shelling repeatedly occurred at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

In November 2022 Ukrainian armed forces retook control of the Kherson city area, while Russian armed forces gradually withdrew.

Over the subsequent years, control over territory in Ukraine has shifted in the face of Russian advances and Ukrainian counter-offensives. The conflict remains intense, with heavy fighting continuing on multiple fronts. Russian aerial strikes continue across Ukraine.

On 7 August 2014 authorities from the Netherlands, Australia, Belgium and Ukraine established a joint investigation team (‘JIT’) to carry out a criminal investigation into the crash of flight MH17, with the participation of Malaysia and Eurojust.

On 9 September 2014 the Dutch Safety Board (‘DSB’), tasked with the technical investigation in accordance with Article 26 of the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention) into the cause of the crash of flight MH17, published its preliminary report. The report disclosed that no technical or operational issues had been found in respect of the aircraft or the crew and that the damage appeared to indicate that the aircraft had been penetrated by a large number of high-energy objects from outside.

On 13 October 2015 the DSB published its final report in the context of the technical investigation into the cause of the crash of flight MH17. It concluded that flight MH17 had been downed by a Buk missile fired from separatist-held territory. It said that further forensic research was required to determine the exact launch location.

On 28 September 2016 the JIT presented its first partial findings from its criminal investigation into the downing of flight MH17. It said that flight MH17 had been downed by a Buk missile from the 9M38-series, that the missile had been launched by a Buk-TELAR from a field south of Snizhne and west of Pervomaiskyi under the control of separatists, and that the Buk-TELAR had been transported from the Russian Federation into Ukraine and had returned to Russia after the launch.

On 24 May 2018 the JIT announced that the Buk-TELAR that had downed flight MH17 belonged to the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (‘AAMB’) of the armed forces of the Russian Federation.

In a joint diplomatic note of 25 May 2018 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation from their embassies, the Netherlands and Australia invoked the State responsibility of the Russian Federation for the downing of flight MH17. They invited the Russian Federation to enter into negotiations in relation to the legal consequences flowing from that responsibility. A number of meetings subsequently took place; the parties involved agreed to the confidentiality of the meetings. The Russian Federation withdrew from negotiations in October 2020.

Meanwhile, on 19 June 2019 the JIT announced that the Public Prosecution Service of the Netherlands (‘OM’) was bringing charges against four men (three Russian nationals and one Ukrainian) for causing the crash of flight MH17, resulting in the death of all persons on board, and for the murder of the 298 persons on board that flight. The defendants were Mr Girkin, Sergey Dubinskiy, Oleg Pulatov and Leonid Kharchenko.

The criminal trial started on 9 March 2020 before the first instance court in The Hague. Only Mr Pulatov instructed legal representation and entered an appearance in the proceedings. The other defendants were tried in absentia.

In March 2022 Australia and the Netherlands initiated legal proceedings against the Russian Federation in the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Council, under Article 84 of Chicago Convention, concerning the downing of flight MH17. They alleged that Russia had violated Article 3 bis of the Chicago Convention, which prohibits the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight.

On 17 November 2022 the first instance court in The Hague delivered its verdict. It determined that flight MH17 had been downed by a Buk missile fired from an agricultural field near Pervomaiskyi, resulting in the deaths of all 283 passengers and 15 crew members. It further found that the Russian Federation had had overall control over the ‘DPR’ from mid-May 2014 until at least the crash of flight MH17 and that the conflict was thus an international armed conflict. It found Mr Girkin, Mr Dubinskiy and Mr Kharchenko guilty of both charges and sentenced them to life imprisonment. Mr Pulatov was acquitted. Neither the defendants nor the OM appealed the judgment, which accordingly became final under Dutch law.

On 8 February 2023 the JIT held a further press conference on its investigation into the crew of the Buk TELAR that shot down MH17 and those responsible for supplying the weapon system. It announced that it had uncovered further information about the crew and about the decision-making process leading to the supply of the Buk TELAR. It underlined that any further evidence had to be sought in the Russian Federation. However, the Russian authorities continued to deny any involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine on and around 17 July 2014 and had, on multiple occasions, provided the JIT with falsified evidence exonerating the Russian Federation or had simply refused to provide any information. The information gathered by the JIT was not sufficiently conclusive and the JIT saw no further scope for investigation at that time without the cooperation of the Russian authorities. The investigation was therefore suspended. The JIT concluded that new information or a change in circumstances might lead to the resumption of the investigation or institution of new criminal proceedings.

In March 2023 the ICAO Council found that it had jurisdiction to consider the case filed in March 2022 (see paragraph 134 above). On 17 June 2024 the Russian Federation announced that it would no longer participate in the proceedings before the ICAO Council on the basis that it did not acknowledge ‘the Council's authority to entertain the allegations from Australia and the Netherlands, nor any decisions stemming from them’ (B474). On 12 May 2025 the ICAO Council voted that the Russian Federation failed to uphold its obligations under international air law in the 2014 downing of flight MH17. The Council agreed that the claims brought by Australia and the Netherlands (see paragraph 134 above) were well founded in fact and in law (B475).

Thirty third-party interveners provided written submissions to the Court.

Twenty-six High Contracting Parties (see paragraph 17 above) subscribed to a common pleading, comprised of an introduction, submissions on jurisdiction, submissions on the relationship between the Convention and international humanitarian law, and closing remarks. Eleven of those High Contracting Parties (Belgium, Croatia, the Czech Republic, France, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Spain and the United Kingdom) submitted, in addition, national pleadings which contained varying degrees of shared content among those Parties.

The Geneva Academy and the Human Rights Law Centre (see Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 25, and paragraphs 17–18 above) provided submissions on Article 1 jurisdiction and the relationship between the Convention and international humanitarian law.

The MH17 applicants (see Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 25, and paragraphs 17–18 above) provided submissions on the complaints made by the applicant Dutch Government regarding the downing of flight MH17.

The twenty-six High Contracting Parties also made a common oral submission at the hearing. The Government of Poland and the Government of the United Kingdom made additional national oral submissions. After the hearing, sixteen High Contracting Parties provided written answers to questions put by members of the Court prior to the hearing on 12 June 2024, having exceptionally been granted leave by the President to do so (see paragraph 31 above).

The content of the relevant third-party submissions concerning jurisdiction, the relationship between the Convention and international humanitarian law, and the alleged violations of the Convention in respect of the downing of flight MH17 is summarised in the corresponding parts of this judgment.

It is unprecedented for twenty-six High Contracting Parties to intervene as third parties in a case before the Court. This reflects their perception of the importance of this case to the Convention system as a whole. It is therefore unsurprising that their common third-party submissions express not only their joint position on the specific legal issues arising in the case but also their shared view of the conduct of the respondent State in the light of the underlying aims and objectives of the Council of Europe. It is important to record their submissions in this respect.

In their common pleading, they underlined their ‘support [for] accountability for all violations of international law by the Russian Federation’. They expressed support for efforts to hold the Russian Federation and its politicians and military personnel accountable, under applicable international legal frameworks, ‘for the aggression of the Russian Federation in violation of Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations …, as deplored in the strongest terms by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution A/RES/ES-11/1, and for the breaches of international humanitarian law … perpetrated by Russian forces’. They continued:

In their common oral submissions, the twenty-six High Contracting Parties reiterated that:

Under the terms of Article 32 of the Convention, the Court's jurisdiction ‘[extends] to all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and the protocols thereto which are referred to it as provided in Articles 33, 34, 46 and 47’. ‘In the event of dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction’, the decision is a matter for the Court (see Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 383). Its principal role, as defined by Article 19, is ‘to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto’ (see, in this respect, Cyprus v. Turkey, cited above § 78).

Article 33 of the Convention empowers any High Contracting Party to ‘refer to the Court any alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention and the Protocols thereto by another High Contracting Party’ (see Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 384).

The Court has repeatedly emphasised that the purpose of the High Contracting Parties in concluding the Convention was not to concede to each other reciprocal rights and obligations in pursuance of their individual national interests but to realise the aims and ideals of the Council of Europe, as expressed in its Statute, and ‘to establish a common public order of the free democracies of Europe with the object of safeguarding their common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law’ (see the Commission's decision on the admissibility of application no. 788/60, Austria v. Italy, 11 January 1961, Yearbook, vol. 4, p. 116 at p. 138, and Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 385). It follows that when a High Contracting Party or Parties refer an alleged breach of the Convention to the Court under Article 33 of the Convention, they are not to be regarded as exercising a right of action for the purpose of enforcing their own rights, but rather as bringing before the Court ‘an alleged violation of the public order of Europe’ (Austria v. Italy, cited above, p. 140. See also France, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Turkey, nos. 9940/82, 9942/82, 9944/82, 9941/82 and 9943/82, Commission decision of 6 December 1983, Decisions and Reports 35, p. 143 at p. 169, and Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 385).

It is important for the Court to acknowledge and set out the full context in which it is examining the present inter-State case. The Court will accordingly first review the historical context of the Council of Europe and the Convention, before turning to examine the present conflict.

On 5 May 1949 the Heads of State and Government of ten European States signed the Statute of the Council of Europe in London. This was a historic moment for the European continent, in a century that had already seen two world wars waged on its soil. As the High Contracting Parties recently underlined at the conclusion of the 4th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe in Reykjavík in May 2023 and, again, in their submissions to the Court (see paragraph 157 above and B342):

The Preamble to the Statute reflects this context, with the first recital referring to the High Contracting Parties' conviction that the ‘pursuit of peace based upon justice and international co-operation is vital for the preservation of human society and civilisation’. In creating the Council of Europe, the founding States were ‘[r]eaffirming their devotion to the spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of their peoples and the true source of individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, principles which form the basis of all genuine democracy’ (second recital at B63).

The aim of the Council of Europe, set out in Article 1 of the Statute, is to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress. Pursuant to Article 3 of the Statute, every member of the Council of Europe must ‘accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and collaborate sincerely and effectively in the realisation of the aim of the Council’ (B64-65).

In the preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights, the High Contracting Parties expressly reaffirmed ‘their profound belief in those fundamental freedoms which are the foundation of justice and peace in the world and are best maintained on the one hand by an effective political democracy and on the other by a common understanding and observance of the Human Rights upon which they depend’. This underlines that their purpose in concluding the Convention on 4 November 1950 was to realise the aims and ideals of the Council of Europe and to establish a common public order of the free democracies of Europe with the object of safeguarding their common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law (see the Commission's decision on the admissibility of application no. 788/60, Austria v. Italy, 11 January 1961, Yearbook, vol. 4, p. 116 at p. 138). The Convention is the cornerstone of the Council of Europe's activities and its ratification is a prerequisite for joining the Organisation.

The past seventy-five years have been largely characterised by peace in Europe and cooperation among Council of Europe member States. This does not mean that conflict has been entirely absent. In the early days of operation of the Convention system, the former Commission was confronted with large-scale human rights violations in the context of the Turkish invasion of northern Cyprus in July and August 1974 and the continuing division of the territory of Cyprus (see, for example, Cyprus v. Turkey, nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75, Commission decision of 26 May 1975, D.R. 2, p. 125; Cyprus v. Turkey, no. 8007/77, Commission decision of 10 July 1978, DR 13, p. 85; and Chrysostomos, Papachrysostomou and Loizidou v. Turkey, nos. 15299/89, 15300/89 and 15318/89, 4 March 1991, D.R. 68, p. 216). Several cases arising out of that conflict later came before the Court (see, notably, Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, Series A no. 310; Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 18 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI; and Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], cited above). In the 1990s, a number of regional conflicts erupted in what were at the time non-Contracting Parties, many linked to the fall of Communism and the break-up of the USSR and Yugoslavia. These States subsequently became members of the Council of Europe but in some cases were left with ‘frozen conflicts’ that have continued to flare up from time to time and to generate a sizeable proportion of the Court's case-load (see, for example, Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, ECHR 2004-VII; Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], nos. 43370/04 and 2 others, ECHR 2012 (extracts); Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 11138/10, 23 February 2016; Chiragov and Others v. Armenia [GC], no. 13216/05, ECHR 2015; Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], no. 40167/06, ECHR; 2015; and Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], no. 38263/08, 21 January 2021).

The present case arises from events dating back to the spring of 2014 with the occupation and annexation by Russia of Crimea, part of Ukrainian sovereign territory, and the appearance of separatist armed groups in eastern Ukraine who subsequently took control of territory in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and declared independence from Ukraine. The Court concluded that the events in Crimea from February 2014 fell within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and subsequently found multiple violations of the Convention on account of acts attributable to Russia within that territory (see Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (dec.) and the Grand Chamber judgment in Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), both cited above). In its admissibility decision in respect of eastern Ukraine, the Court held that by 11 May 2014, the separatist operation as a whole in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions was being managed and coordinated by the Russian Federation and that these areas were under the latter State's effective control (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, §§ 693 and 695).

Following the initial period of intense fighting in eastern Ukraine after hostilities first began in April 2014, the ensuing years of the conflict saw continuing skirmishes at the contact line, with repeated attempts to agree lasting ceasefires resulting in periods of reduced hostilities followed by periods of more intense and extensive hostilities as ceasefires broke down. This was the context of the conflict that was before the Court at the time of its admissibility hearing on 26 January 2022. The admissibility hearing took place against the backdrop of increasing tensions in the region. Widespread reports of a renewed massive build-up of Russian troops at the border had been circulating since late 2021 (B380, 443, 2233 and 3353). The Minister of Justice of Ukraine appeared before the Court at the hearing in January 2022 and referred in his oral submissions to the fact that Russia had ‘recently … amassed enormous forces along the border of Ukraine, threatening … invasion and an all-out war’. He said, ‘Ukraine is facing a threat of invasion by [a] fully prepared Russian army of over one hundred thousand servicemen’.

Since the admissibility hearing, the nature of the conflict has substantially changed. By February 2022 it was estimated that there were some 190,000 Russian troops deployed in Russian border areas near Ukraine (see paragraph 64 above and B444 and 3356-57). Less than one month after the admissibility hearing, on 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian armed forces entered Ukrainian sovereign territory at various border points from Russia and Belarus and from Crimea and launched attacks by land, air and sea. In the north of Ukraine, Russian troops crossed into Ukraine from Belarus advancing towards Kyiv and were involved in attacks on Chernihiv, Slavutych, Bucha, Irpin, Hostomel and Vorzel. Russian forces also attacked from the north-eastern part of Ukraine, targeting Kharkiv, Sumy, Okhtyrka, Brovary, Volnovakha and Izium. Russian troops in the east attacked from Donbas, extending ‘DPR’ and ‘LPR’ territory there. In the south of Ukraine, Russian forces moved from Crimea in the direction of Odesa and attacked Kherson, Mykolaiv, Melitopol and Mariupol. Ukrainian towns and cities in these areas and beyond were subjected to heavy airstrikes and artillery fire causing large-scale death, injury and destruction. On 30 September 2022 the Russian Federation announced the ‘accession’ to the Russian Federation of the partially-occupied Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions of Ukraine (B27-29). As the Court deliberated on the case before it, the hostilities continued on Ukrainian territory, with every month that passed bringing new deaths and extensive destruction.

The actions of the Russian Federation have met with widespread condemnation from the international community. On 25 February 2022 the Russian Federation was suspended from its rights of representation in the Council of Europe (see paragraph 81 above). On the same day, a draft resolution demanding that the Russian Federation cease its use of force against Ukraine failed to pass in the United Nations Security Council owing to a veto by the Russian Federation (see paragraph 94 above). On 2 March 2022 the General Assembly of the United Nations demanded that the Russian Federation immediately cease its use of force against Ukraine and immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine (see paragraph 95 above). On 16 March 2022 the ICJ issued provisional measures ordering the Russian Federation inter alia immediately to suspend the military operations commenced on 24 February 2022 (see paragraph 110 above).

Meanwhile, on 15 March 2022, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe unanimously expressed the view that the military aggression of the Russian Federation had shown ‘disregard for the very essence of the Council of Europe, as enshrined in its Statute’ and had seriously breached Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe (see paragraph 165 above). The Parliamentary Assembly concluded that the Committee of Ministers should request the Russian Federation to withdraw immediately from the Council of Europe, or expel the Russian Federation from the Council of Europe (see paragraph 88 above). On 16 March 2022 the Committee of Ministers decided that as of that day the Russian Federation ceased to be a member of the Council of Europe (see paragraph 89 above). On 22 March 2022 the Court declared that the Russian Federation would cease to be a High Contracting Party to the Convention on 16 September 2022 (see paragraph 90 above).

At the Reykjavík Summit of the Council of Europe, the Heads of State and Government underlined that the ‘promise of ‘never again’’ upon which the Council of Europe had been built (see paragraph 163 above) had been ‘fundamentally challenged by Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine’. The declaration continued:

Even before the sharp escalation of military operations on 24 February 2022, a narrative seeking to undermine Ukraine's statehood which asserted Ukraine's history as part of Russia and claimed that it was ‘entirely a product of the Soviet era’ was being deliberately and strategically circulated in the Russia media (B1515-20). The transformation from covert to openly acknowledged operations in Ukraine has brought transparency to the objectives of the Russian Federation. These objectives appear to be no less than the destruction of Ukraine as an independent sovereign State, through the forcible acquisition of Ukrainian territory and the subjugation of any remaining Ukrainian nation to Russian influence and control. Through written articles, oral comments and posts on social media, the President of the respondent State and other senior Government figures have sought to portray the use of armed force and the forcible acquisition of territory in Ukraine as support for the right to self-determination of those residing in Russia's ‘historical lands’, as the defence of ethnic Russians against ‘genocide’ and as a matter of Russia's territorial integrity and sovereignty (for example, B1521-33, 1547-48, 1588-89 and 1592).

It is noteworthy that in disseminating this narrative, the Russian Federation has not identified any clear limitations to its territorial ambitions, either in Ukraine or beyond. On the contrary, representatives of the respondent State have publicly alluded to the forcible acquisition of the entire territory of Ukraine all the way to the Polish border (B1588-89, 1591-92 and 1595). Ukrainian cities, including Kyiv and Odesa, have been referred to as ‘Russian cities’ and reference has also been made to ‘temporarily occupied Poland and our Baltic provinces’ (B1590 and 1593. See also B1591-92). The President of the respondent State referred in January 2024 to Russians being ‘pushed out of’ Latvia and other Baltic countries, adding that these were ‘very serious matters that directly affect our country's security’ (B1557). Similar rhetoric has been employed in respect of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova (B1575-76).

The potential for further escalation has frequently been invoked by senior Russian political figures. When announcing the start of the February 2022 invasion the President of the Russian Federation warned that Russia would respond immediately to anyone who tried to stand in its way, with consequences ‘such as you have never seen in your entire history’ (B1532). He underlined that ‘all the necessary decisions in this regard have been taken’. He later warned that if Russia's territorial integrity or its people were threatened ‘we will certainly make use of all weapon systems available to us’, adding ‘[t]his is not a bluff.’ (B1542). While making the point that nuclear weapons could only be used in exceptional circumstances, he has nonetheless continuously repeated the grounds on which their use would be justified (B1548-49 and 1567-68), reiterating in February 2024 that ‘the strategic nuclear forces are on full combat alert and the ability to use them is assured (B1564). Other senior Russian political figures have been more explicit (B1596). As the Commission of Inquiry observed in its October 2022 report, ‘the threat by the Russian Federation of use of its nuclear capabilities became a major concern for the international community’ (C.II.32). On 25 September 2024 the President of the respondent State announced that changes to the conditions for the use of nuclear force by the Russian Federation were under consideration. He outlined that under the new proposals Russia would consider an attack from a non-nuclear state but ‘involving or supported by’ a nuclear state to be a ‘joint attack’ and that Russia would consider using nuclear weapons if it received ‘reliable information about a massive launch of air and space attack weapons and their crossing our state border’ (B1570). On 19 November 2024 the President of the respondent State signed an Executive Order implementing these changes. The amended State policy further permits the use of nuclear weapons in the event of ‘aggression’ against the Russian Federation and/or Belarus with the use of conventional weapons, which creates a ‘critical threat to their sovereignty and/or territorial integrity’ (B22-23).

As noted above, the Court has previously been required to examine applications arising out of situations of conflict in Europe (see paragraph 167 above). However, the events in Ukraine are unprecedented in the history of the Council of Europe. The nature and scale of the violence as well as the ominous statements concerning Ukraine's statehood, its independence and its very right to exist represent a threat to the peaceful co-existence that Europe has long taken for granted. As already explained, this dangerous rhetoric has also on occasion been extended to encompass other Council of Europe member States, including Poland, Moldova and the Baltic countries. These actions seek to undermine the very fabric of the democracy on which the Council of Europe and its member States are founded by their destruction of individual freedoms, their suppression of political liberties and their blatant disregard for the rule of law. In none of the conflicts previously before the Court has there been such near universal condemnation of the ‘flagrant’ disregard by the respondent State for the foundations of the international legal order established after the Second World War and such clear measures taken by the Council of Europe to sanction the respondent State's disrespect for the fundamental values of the Council of Europe: peace, as already underlined, but no less importantly human life, human dignity and the individual rights guaranteed by the Convention.

The Court's task under Article 19 is limited to ensuring the observance by the High Contracting Parties of the engagements undertaken in the Convention and its Protocols. The Court is not called upon to decide on the legality of Russia's invasion and occupation of Ukraine in the abstract or the individual criminal responsibility of those implicated in the events, but rather to decide on the conformity of the actions of the respondent State with the fundamental guarantees contained in the Convention and its Protocols.

Pursuant to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘the Vienna Convention’), the Court endeavours, in each case to come before it, to interpret the Convention in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. The underlying objectives of the Convention — namely to realise the aims and ideals of the Council of Europe by promoting peace based on justice and international cooperation — are of critical importance for the Court today in its interpretation of the Convention's provisions.

In its admissibility decision (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 393), the Court noted:

In view of the arguments advanced by the applicant Ukrainian Government, the Court must now consider whether it may take into account incidents subsequent to 16 September 2022 and, if so, whether such events themselves fall within its temporal jurisdiction such that a violation of the Convention might be found in respect of them.

In Pivkina and Others v. Russia (cited above), the Court had to determine its approach to acts spanning the termination date. In respect of allegations of ongoing violations, it explained that a ‘continuing situation’ that spanned the termination date fell within its temporal jurisdiction only for the part occurring before that date. However, where it could be demonstrated that the specific allegation related to the ‘continuous’ effect of an act that preceded the termination date, the entire period in which the effect of that act was felt fell within the Court's temporal jurisdiction. Thus a period of detention authorised before the termination date but extending beyond it fell within the Court's temporal jurisdiction in its entirety on account of the ‘continuous’ effect of the detention order. In contrast, a factual situation such as allegedly inhuman conditions of confinement, even if continuous, had no ‘overflowing’ effects and jurisdiction therefore ended at the termination date (ibid., § 61). In Pivkina and Others, the Court accordingly found a complaint against Russia about pre-trial detention until 11 October 2022 to fall within the Court's temporal jurisdiction on the basis that the decision authorising that period of detention had been taken before the termination date. This approach has since been confirmed and applied in the Grand Chamber judgment in Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (cited above, §§ 892-97).

In the present case, the allegations do not concern continuing situations in respect of alleged individual violations, but rather alleged ongoing administrative practices affecting a large number of individuals over a wide geographical area and a lengthy period of time. The Court has no jurisdiction to examine new occurrences of the alleged administrative practices which took place after the termination date. It notes, moreover, that the allegations advanced under Article 5 of the Convention in the present case do not concern the continuous effects of detention orders but rather an ongoing practice of arresting, abducting and detaining individuals, without any legal authority, which practice began before the termination date and continued after it.

The case of Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia) (cited above) does not assist the applicant Ukrainian Government in this respect. In that case, the ICJ found that it was competent to examine events which had taken place after the denunciation of the treaty giving it jurisdiction to rule on a dispute concerning compliance with international customary law had taken place. However, it is noteworthy that the treaty concerned in that case merely regulated the question of the court's jurisdiction: it had no impact on the continuing existence of the underlying obligations of the respondent State in that case, which arose from customary international law. This Court's jurisdiction extends, under Article 32 of the Convention, to ‘all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and the Protocols thereto which are referred to it as provided in [Article] 33 …’. Article 19 clarifies that the Court was established to ‘ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto’. The jurisdiction of the Court is thus explicitly linked to the existence of obligations under the Convention itself and it does not have the authority to ensure compliance with international treaties or obligations other than the Convention. The obligations of the Russian Federation under the Convention ceased after 16 September 2022. It is, therefore, irrelevant in this respect that the same or similar obligations may continue to exist under other treaties or indeed under customary international law (see Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], no. 53600/20, § 454, 9 April 2024).

In conclusion, having regard to the nature of the allegations it is called upon to examine in the present case, the Court finds that its temporal jurisdiction in this case extends no further than 16 September 2022 (cf. the judgment in Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), cited above, § 897). However, facts which fall outside the temporal jurisdiction of the Court as having occurred after the termination date may nonetheless be relevant to the overall context of the case (see, for example, paragraphs 330, 347, 1144, 1174, 1476–1478 and 1556–1563 below). The Court may, therefore, have regard to facts which occurred following the termination date in so far as it considers appropriate in its assessment of whether there was a violation of the Convention in respect of acts which occurred prior to the termination date (see, mutatis mutandis, Broniowski v. Poland (dec.) [GC], no. 31443/96, § 74, ECHR 2002-X; Kurić and Others v. Slovenia [GC], no. 26828/06, §§ 240-41, ECHR 2012 (extracts); and Savickis and Others v. Latvia [GC], no. 49270/11, § 211, 9 June 2022. Regarding the relevance of the pre-ratification case-law in this context, see Pivkina and Others, cited above, § 50).

The evidential material before the Court is summarised in annexes to the Court's admissibility decision in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia ((dec.), cited above) and to the present judgment. Annex A contains summaries of the evidence before the Court at the separate admissibility stage of the proceedings. Annex B contains summaries of the remaining evidence before the Court at this admissibility and merits stage of the proceedings. Annex C contains reports of the Commission of Inquiry (see paragraph 108 above). In view of the volume of the material submitted to the Court, the vast majority of the evidence is necessarily presented in the annexes in summary form. When reviewing the evidence in the context of the present judgment, the Court has, however, had regard to the source material. For this reason, the judgment may on occasion make reference to extracts of documents not summarised in the annexes. For reasons of readability, footnotes have been omitted in quotes from source material contained in the present judgment.

In its separate admissibility decision in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia, the Court explained that, aside from the parties' submissions and the evidential material provided by them, it had had regard to material in the public domain (ibid., § 405). It has once again followed this approach in the context of its present examination of the merits of application nos. 8019/16, 43800/14 and 28525/20 and the admissibility and merits of application no. 11055/22.

As the Court indicated in its separate decision on admissibility, the present case concerns the extent of the responsibility of the respondent State for the Convention violations alleged (ibid., § 395). Potential violations of the Convention or international humanitarian law by Ukraine are not therefore the subject of the Court's examination (see, in this respect, Russia v. Ukraine (dec), no. 36958/21, 4 July 2023; there are also approximately 4,000 applications pending against Ukraine related to the conflict). As a consequence, the summary of relevant evidence in the present judgment focuses on evidence concerning the conduct of Russia's de jure and de facto armed forces. Material related to the actions of the Ukrainian armed forces or volunteer battalions, and the shelling of territory in the hands of the ‘DPR’ and the ‘LPR’ by the Ukrainian armed forces, is not included in the summaries.

The evidence is vast and the factual material included in the present judgment is, necessarily, a summary of the most relevant reports and other material that have been submitted by the parties. Further relevant evidence to which the Court has had regard can be found in the annexes to the separate admissibility decision in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia ((dec.), cited above) and to the present judgment, and in the source material itself.

The Court set out, in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia, its general approach to evidence and to the burden and standard of proof and the drawing of inferences (ibid., §§ 396 and 434-53). It explained how it approached the particular allegations and the different categories of evidence in the case-file (ibid., §§ 454-81). These passages are equally relevant to the Court's examination of the evidence now before it. The Court will accordingly apply the principles and approaches outlined in its decision with one exception: in light of the fact that the Court is now also examining the merits of the alleged violations, the applicable standard of proof to be satisfied is that of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ (see the judgment in Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), cited above, §§ 849-51; and compare § 454 in fine of Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, concerning the lower standard of proof applicable at the admissibility stage of proceedings).

The Court must assess the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation under Article 1 of the Convention in three respects, namely: whether it had continuing jurisdiction in the ‘DPR’ and the ‘LPR’ following the date of the admissibility hearing, whether it had jurisdiction in respect of the complaints made in application no. 11055/22, and whether it had jurisdiction in respect of military attacks (see paragraphs 204–206 above).

At the separate admissibility stage of the present proceedings, the Court was asked to consider the relationship between the Convention and international humanitarian law in the context of an objection by the respondent Government that it lacked jurisdiction ratione materiae to deal with the complaints made. The objection was based on the contention that some of the complaints in particular were governed by international humanitarian law to the exclusion of the Convention (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, §§ 707-11). The arguments focussed on the incompatibility of the Convention with international humanitarian law in respect of the relevant complaints. It is for this reason that the Court, when dismissing the objection, commented on the existence or otherwise of any apparent conflict between the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law and the Convention provisions (ibid., § 720).

In their written submissions to the Grand Chamber at the present stage of the proceedings, the applicant Governments and third-party interveners invited the Court to clarify its approach to the interpretation of the provisions of the Convention in situations of armed conflict and the relevance in this respect of provisions of international humanitarian law, particularly in circumstances like those arising in the present case where no derogation under Article 15 of the Convention has been lodged.

The applicant Dutch Government complained that the respondent State had violated the right to life within the meaning of Article 2 of the Convention through its role in the downing of flight MH17. Article 2 provides:

Article 13 of the Convention provides:

The applicant Dutch Government complained that the attitude and conduct of the Russian Federation towards the next of kin of the victims of flight MH17 had caused and continued to cause them serious suffering in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. Article 3 of the Convention provides:

The applicant Dutch Government alleged that Article 13 of the Convention had been violated by the respondent Government on account of their failure to provide an effective remedy in respect of the complaint under Article 3.

As explained above, the respondent Government did not participate in the present proceedings on the merits of this complaint (see paragraph 142 above). At the separate admissibility stage of the present proceedings, they argued that Russian law provided effective remedies in respect of the Convention violations alleged by the applicant Dutch Government (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 945).

In concluding that there has been a violation of Article 3 in the present case, the Court has already taken into account the respondent Government's failure to respond to the calls of the families for information, their failure to investigate the circumstances of the downing of flight MH17, and their denials of any involvement whatsoever in the events leading to the downing of the aircraft. The Court therefore considers that it is not necessary to examine separately the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention taken together with Article 3 of the Convention.

The respondent Government did not take part in the proceedings on the admissibility and merits of this application and have not made any submissions with regard to the admissibility of application no. 11055/22 (see paragraph 142 above).

The applicant Ukrainian Government submitted that the admissibility requirements of the Convention were met. In particular, they argued that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies was inapplicable to administrative practices and that their application had been submitted within the applicable four-month time-limit. They also submitted that their complaints of administrative practices related to a continuing situation and that, therefore, the four-month time-limit had no application.

The applicant Ukrainian Government have alleged a number of administrative practices in breach of Convention rights. Most of the allegations made concern Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia or the treatment of detainees, and in respect of these allegations, the Court will determine whether the evidence shows repeated conduct in breach of each of the particular Convention Articles invoked. In order to do this, it will examine each Convention right one by one.

However, the Court will examine the allegation of unlawful military attacks in the context of the conduct of hostilities, in respect of which the applicant Ukrainian Government have pleaded a number of Convention Articles, as a single thematic complaint. Such attacks did not take place in occupied territory and it is therefore appropriate to address them separately from allegations concerning the conduct of Russian agents in occupied areas (in Section XIII below). It will also examine separately the allegation of the abduction and transfer to Russia of Ukrainian children (in Section XXI below), which concerns a particular course of conduct alleged to engage a number of Convention rights which occurred in both occupied Ukrainian territory and Russian sovereign territory.

No act by the authorities of a High Contracting State which interferes with Convention rights will be found to be justified if it is not lawful. In this sense, lawfulness is a thread that runs through the Convention. At a very minimum, it requires that there be a legal basis in domestic law for the actions taken by State authorities.

In the majority of cases before the Court, the domestic law being applied is the law of the High Contracting Party which has sovereignty over the territory in question and is the respondent State. However, in the present case the respondent State has been found to be exercising extra-territorial jurisdiction in sovereign Ukrainian territory in the context of an armed conflict. In this context, it is necessary for the Court to explain its approach to ‘domestic law’ in this case.

Article 43 of the Hague Regulations requires the occupying Power to respect, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country (B131). Article 64 GC IV further provides that the penal laws of the occupied territory must remain in force except where they constitute a threat to the security of the occupying Power or an obstacle to the application of the convention (B132). International humanitarian law therefore provides for the continued application of Ukrainian law in territory occupied by Russia. It follows that Ukrainian law may provide a legal basis for actions taken in occupied territory. It is for the respondent State, however, to show that any interference with a Convention right has a legal basis. In the present case, it was therefore for the Russian Federation to demonstrate that actions taken by its agents in, and general measures applied to, occupied territory were taken on the basis of Ukrainian law. The respondent Government have not argued in the present proceedings or in any other public statements to which the present judgment refers that provisions of Ukrainian law provide the legal basis for the impugned acts and measures. On the contrary, the numerous reports before the Court suggest that the separatist entities and other occupying administrations applied their own, or Russian, law in the territory concerned. The Court therefore has no grounds to conclude that any of the acts or measures concerned were based on Ukrainian law.

Insofar as the evidence before the Court indicates that purported legal acts adopted by the ‘DPR’ and the ‘LPR’ were applied in the areas in the hands of these two respective entities since 2014, the Court has already provided guidance on how ‘legal acts’ of subordinate administrations should be approached. As regards legal acts of the ‘TRNC’ applied to sovereign Cypriot territory in northern Cyprus, the Court in Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey ((dec.) [GC], nos. 46113/99 and 7 others, ECHR 2010) said:

The Court therefore accepts that legal acts of the ‘DPR’ and the ‘LPR’ are not precluded per se from constituting ‘domestic law’ for the purposes of its Convention assessment. However, the Court's case-law plainly shows that its examination of ‘lawfulness’ goes beyond mere formal legality and includes a qualitative assessment of the domestic law, by reference in particular to its compliance with the requirements of the rule of law and overall conformity with the Convention (see, for example, Denis and Irvine v. Belgium [GC], nos. 62819/17 and 63921/17, § 127, 1 June 2021 (Article 5); Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 58170/13 and 2 others, § 332, 25 May 2021 (Article 8); Bayatyan v. Armenia [GC], no. 23459/03, §§ 113-16, ECHR 2011 (Article 9); Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 45581/15, § 24, 15 May 2023 (Art 10); and Vistiņš and Perepjolkins v. Latvia [GC], no. 71243/01, § 96, 25 October 2012 (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1)). It is for the respondent State to identify the legal basis for the measures taken in respect of all relevant allegations, to provide detailed information on the content of the law applied and to demonstrate to the Court's satisfaction that the law complies with the ‘lawfulness’ requirement of the Convention in respect of the right under examination.

However, in the present case, the Russian Federation have not taken part in the proceedings on the merits. They have provided no information as to the legal basis for any measures taken by ‘DPR’ and ‘LPR’ authorities. They have not provided the Court with copies of any purported laws applied nor have they provided any analysis of the compatibility of such laws with the requirements of ‘lawfulness’. The Court's knowledge of relevant legal provisions purportedly adopted in the ‘DPR’ and the ‘LPR’ is derived solely from the reports and other evidence before it.

The Court further underlines that before accepting the legal acts of separatist entities as ‘law’ for the purposes of the Convention, it would have to be satisfied that the legal system reflects a judicial tradition compatible with the Convention and the standards inherent in it, including respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law (see, mutatis mutandis, the Court's judgments in Cyprus v. Turkey, §§ 231-37, and Mozer, §§ 148–150, both cited above; and more recently Lypovchenko and Halabudenco v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia, nos. 40926/16 and 73942/17, §§ 128-29, 20 February 2024, and Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, nos. 29999/04 and 41424/04, §§ 425-26, 7 March 2023). The respondent Government have provided no information, either at this merits stage or during the proceedings on admissibility in which they participated in the usual manner, which could allow the Court to assess the legal system in place in the ‘DPR’ and the ‘LPR’ during the relevant period.

It follows that the respondent Government have not provided the necessary information to enable the Court to conclude that any legal acts adopted by the ‘DPR’ and the ‘LPR’ may be accepted as ‘law’ for the purposes of its assessment of alleged Convention violations.

As regards the acts of other Russian occupying authorities, the Court has already emphasised in its judgment in Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) the need to interpret the notion of ‘lawfulness’ in the light of the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law (cited above, §§ 934-42). As already noted (see paragraph 600 above), these provisions notably require the occupying Power to respect, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country and provide that the penal laws of the occupied territory must remain in force except where they constitute a threat to the security of the occupying Power or an obstacle to the application of GC IV. Article 64 GC IV further permits the occupying Power to subject the population of the occupied territory to measures essential to enable it to fulfil its obligations under the convention, to maintain the orderly government of the territory and to ensure the occupying Power's security (B132).

The Court can only determine whether the occupying authorities of the Russian Federation may rely on legal acts adopted by them or on Russian law itself in the context of the ‘lawfulness’ assessment if it has been provided with all the necessary information to make such a determination. However, the respondent Government neither adduced any evidence nor submitted any arguments regarding the applicability of international humanitarian law in general or its relevance to, or impact on, the validity of such legal acts or Russian law within Ukrainian sovereign territory. In particular, there is no evidence at all that the Russian occupation authorities were ‘absolutely prevented’, within the meaning of the Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, from respecting the laws already in force in Ukrainian territory or that the conditions in Article 64 GC IV were satisfied so as to justify repealing or suspending already applicable penal laws. There is likewise no basis for concluding that the provisions made by the occupying Power were essential to enable it to fulfil its obligations under the GC IV, to maintain the orderly government of the territory or to ensure its security (see, in a similar vein, Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), cited above, §§ 943-45).

The Court further observes in this respect that a measure cannot be said to be ‘lawful’ for the purposes of the Convention merely because it may be permitted by Article 64 GC IV. The power granted in Article 64 is subject to an important restriction: if local laws are sufficient to secure the aims envisaged, any new provision applied by the occupying authorities could not be viewed as ‘essential’ and therefore lawful under Article 64. Moreover, the power afforded in Article 64 is expressed in broad terms and grants a significant degree of latitude to occupying authorities as to the measures they may apply in order to fulfil their obligations under the GC IV, to maintain orderly government or ensure security in occupied territory. This general legal basis must be reflected in the domestic legal order through more specific provisions in relevant legal instruments and appropriate guidance that satisfy the ‘quality of law’ requirement inherent in the notion of ‘lawfulness’. The respondent State has failed to make any argument concerning the applicability of Article 64 or to provide the Court with copies of any provisions adopted by the occupying authorities in purported application of that article.

It follows that the conditions required for Russian law or measures taken by the occupying authorities to be recognised as providing a valid legal basis, for Convention purposes, for acts undertaken in Ukraine have not been met in the present case (Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), cited above, § 946). The consequences of this conclusion will be addressed as appropriate in the Court's assessment of the alleged administrative practices, below.

In the context of their complaints of administrative practices under various Articles of the Convention, the applicant Ukrainian Government complained about the consequences of unlawful military attacks, notably bombing and shelling, against civilians and civilian objects conducted by agents of the Russian Federation since 11 May 2014. Such arguments were made in the context of the complaints, as qualified by the Court, under Articles 2, 3, 8, 9 and 10 of the Convention and Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

As explained above (see paragraph 585 above), the Court considers it appropriate to examine separately in the present chapter whether there has been an administrative practice of military attacks in breach of the Convention, since the alleged violations all stem from the alleged widespread campaign of targeted and indiscriminate bombing and shelling by Russian agents of territory in Ukraine which was not under Russian effective control. The essence of the complaints concerns the civilian deaths, the widespread destruction of homes and other property, and the terror and suffering caused to the local population by such military attacks. In so far as journalists, religious figures or teachers were killed in military attacks, or schools and churches were shelled, these are further examples of the death, suffering and destruction alleged under, notably, Articles 2 and 3 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The Court is not persuaded, taking into account its examination below of alleged administrative practices in violation of Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, that it is necessary to examine separately whether these Articles were also violated in the context of an alleged administrative practice of military attacks in breach of the Convention. In determining whether there has been such an administrative practice, the Court will therefore restrict its examination to Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

In the first place, regarding the period from 11 May 2014, the applicant Ukrainian Government complained of an administrative practice in breach of Article 2 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Under Article 2, they complained of the following:

The Court has decided that the complaint about the ‘trapping of civilians inside buildings and basements throughout the area within range of Russia's weapons’ falls to be examined under Article 2 (see paragraph 564 above). It has also decided to examine additional allegations related to attacks on civilians during evacuation or preventing their evacuation under Article 2 of the Convention (see paragraph 570 above). The relevant allegations are:

Under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, they complained of the following:

Second, in respect of the period from 24 February 2022, the applicant Ukrainian Government alleged that, in addition to the above allegations, the respondent State had also engaged in an administrative practice in breach of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. They moreover identified additional examples of conduct which they alleged formed part of the administrative practice in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

Under Article 3, they complained that, from 24 February 2022, there had been ‘attacks upon civilians and civilian objects causing suffering exceeding the minimum level of severity for Article 3’. The Court has further decided to examine their complaints about the ‘trapping of civilians inside buildings and basements throughout the area within range of Russia's weapons’ under this Article (see paragraph 564 above).

Under Article 8, the applicant Ukrainian Government complained of the ‘destruction of homes and personal possessions’.

Under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, in addition to the allegations concerning the period from 11 May 2014, they complained of the following from 24 February 2022:

The relevant Articles provide as follows:

Article 2

Article 3

Article 8

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

Reports of artillery shelling in the context of the conflict in eastern Ukraine can be found as early as 12 May 2014 (A271). The OHCHR report covering the period from 8 June to 15 July 2014 noted that the separatists were using heavy weaponry, including missiles, mortars and anti-aircraft guns (A140 and B528. See also A693). It referred to ‘intense fighting using heavy weaponry in and around population areas’ which it said had ‘devastated towns and villages, demolishing residential buildings and killing an increasing number of their inhabitants’ (A977 and B528). It later described ‘heavy shelling … from both sides’ to the conflict and observed, ‘[q]uestions arise about the conformity of these attacks with the rules governing the conduct of hostilities’ (B528). However, the report did not identify any specific artillery attacks on civilians or civilian targets by separatist forces, observing that the incidents involving civilian deaths had occurred ‘without any possibility to ascertain beyond any doubt whether the casualties were caused by Ukrainian forces or armed groups’ (A272). The OHCHR further found that the armed groups were locating their military assets in, and conducting attacks from, densely populated areas, thereby putting the whole civilian population at risk (A704). It noted that locating military objectives within or near a densely populated area and launching attacks from such areas might constitute a violation of international humanitarian law (B528).

On 17 July 2014 civilian flight MH17 was shot down over eastern Ukraine, killing all 298 people on board. It has already been established, based on the extensive evidence before the Court, that the plane was downed by a Buk missile provided by the Russian Federation and fired from separatist-controlled territory by a member of the Russian military crew of the Buk-TELAR or a member of the ‘DPR’ (see paragraph 452 above, Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 904, and A1496-620, 1644-793 and 1857-88).

While the SMM reported a number of shelling incidents in the conflict area between May and July 2014, the mission reports did not include findings as to the party responsible nor did they systematically disclose details of the damage caused by such attacks (A271, 280, 284-89 and 291-92; and B798, 800 and 802).

In August 2014 the OHCHR referred to numerous reports alleging the indiscriminate use of weapons, such as artillery, mortars and multiple rocket launcher systems, in and around densely populated areas (A712). The report continued:

The SMM also continued to report incidents of shelling throughout August 2014, but the details in their daily reports remained scarce and no findings as to the perpetrators of specific attacks were reported (A293-94, 296-97, 299, 302-05, 707-11 and 714-16). On 4 August 2014, for example, the SMM observed multiple incoming and outgoing mortars and artillery rounds near Petropavlivka and Rozsypne (A296). On 11 August 2014 the SMM heard from displaced residents of Pervomaisk that the town was being shelled by Ukrainian and separatist forces. The residents said that almost all apartment blocks in the town had sustained damage; that only 30% of detached houses remained intact; and that two hundred people had been killed and more than four hundred wounded (A709).

The events at Ilovaisk in August 2014 were the subject of a separate thematic report by the OHCHR. These events were described in the report as ‘emblematic of human rights violations and abuses and international humanitarian law violations that have been repeatedly committed during the conflict in eastern Ukraine’, including the shelling of residential areas resulting in civilian casualties (A717). The report observed (A719 and 988; and B535):

The report set out in further detail the shelling of Ilovaisk in August 2014 and the impact on civilians. However, while it identified dates and locations of shelling, it did not identify the perpetrators of particular attacks (B535).

The report further described negotiations to create a humanitarian corridor allowing the Ukrainian armed forces to retreat from the Ilovaisk area. On 29 August 2014 Ukrainian troops began a retreat from the Ilovaisk area through a humanitarian corridor discussed with the Russian Federation in two columns of armoured military vehicles, military and civilian trucks, buses and other vehicles. Soon after departing, the columns came under intense shelling and small arms fire. Hundreds of Ukrainian soldiers were killed and wounded in the attack (A718 and B536). Witnesses reported that an unarmoured truck carrying wounded soldiers and displaying a large white flag with a red cross was hit by a heavy weapon, killing all inside but one (B536). The 2016 Report on Preliminary Activities of the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC also referred to reports that many Ukrainian troops had been killed as they had attempted to retreat from the Ilovaisk area (A77). Witness statements provided by Ukrainian soldiers described how they had been involved in the retreat from Ilovaisk via an agreed ‘green’ corridor when they had come under artillery fire from the Russian armed forces (A1406, 1408, 1411, 1426, 1436, 1446, 1455 and 1458. See also A1152-53).

In early September 2014 Mariupol came under heavy shelling as the separatists closed in on the city (A311 and 317). On 6 September 2014 an SMM team reported artillery fire from Luhansk, which was under the control of the ‘LPR’, towards Stanytsia Luhanska, under Ukrainian control (A723). In its report published in September 2014, the OHCHR indicated that the majority of civilian deaths to date had been the result of indiscriminate shelling in residential areas and the use of heavy weaponry. The mission reported the allegation that civilians evacuating from Luhansk had been shelled by separatist armed groups between the settlements of Novosvitlivka and Khriashchuvate. Seventeen people had been killed and six wounded (A725).

Despite the agreement of the Minsk Protocol on 5 September 2014, which set out a peace plan including an immediate ceasefire (see paragraph 56 above), throughout the following months the SMM continued to report on frequent shelling incidents in areas subject to heavy fighting, causing death and damage to property (A318-87 and 727-35). In September 2014 there were a number of artillery attacks on or near Ukrainian checkpoints causing death, injury and damage to residential property (B805-06 and 808-09). The SMM also reported the shelling of government-controlled areas from ‘DPR’ or ‘LPR’ positions (B807 and 810-11). The SMM frequently referred to incoming and outgoing artillery fire (for example, A336-37, 343-44, 359 and 371). In October 2014 the SMM reported a number of instances of shelling of government-controlled territory. For example, in Krasnohorivka, it found traces of impact consistent with incoming Grad shelling (B812). It reported heavy shelling with Grad missiles to the north-east of Mariupol, fired from the east, killing seven and injuring fifteen (A730). In Hranitne, it observed recent shelling damage to houses and a school; it was able to ascertain that some of the impacts appeared to have been from mortar rounds fired from ‘DPR’-controlled territory (B814-15).

The OHCHR, in its report of 15 November 2014, commented on the conduct of hostilities as follows (B539):

In its report of 15 December 2014, the OHCHR reported that the ceasefire agreed upon in Minsk in September 2014 (see paragraph 56 above) had ‘stopped large-scale offensive activity, but skirmishing and heavy artillery exchanges continued on a daily basis’ (B549). It stated:

The SMM continued to publish its observations on the shelling of government-controlled areas causing deaths and injuries among the civilian population as well as significant damage to homes, schools, shops, banks and public buildings (B819-32). For example, it noted that two munitions found by Ukrainian soldiers in gardens in the village of Triokhizbenka in November 2014 appeared to have been fired from cluster carrier rockets (B820). It also reported on an attack with ten Grad rockets in Debaltseve on 15 December 2014. Ukrainian and Russian members of the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination of issues related to the ceasefire regime and the stabilization of the situation (‘JCCC’ — see Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 77) as well as representatives of the ‘DPR’ and the ‘LPR’ had agreed that the rockets had been fired from ‘LPR’-controlled territory (B829).

From mid-January 2015 hostilities began to escalate once again. Both the SMM and the HRMMU observed frequent shelling throughout January and early February 2015, resulting in civilian deaths and injuries and significant damage to residential and civilian infrastructure (B837-50). In its report of 15 February 2015, the OHCHR said that at least 359 civilians had died and at least 916 had been injured between 1 December 2014 and 15 February 2015 (A743). It reported heavy civilian tolls of dead and wounded resulting from the indiscriminate shelling of residential areas in government-controlled territory such as Avdiivka, Debaltseve, Popasna, Shchastia and Stanytsia Luhanska (A388). In government-controlled Hranitne village, residents told the SMM that they had been shelled almost daily for months. The mission saw the funeral of a child who residents said had been killed when a shell had struck her house on 11 January 2014, and saw severe damage to the roof of the house (A735). Both the SMM and the OHCHR reported that on 13 January 2015, shelling had struck close to a civilian bus which had stopped at a checkpoint manned by Ukrainian armed forces near government-controlled Volnovakha. The bus had been hit by a multiple launch rocket system Grad rocket launched from territory controlled by the ‘DPR’. At least thirteen people on the bus had been killed and a further eighteen injured. (A734 and 742).

On 24 January 2015 government-controlled Mariupol came under heavy shelling in an area around 400 metres from a Ukrainian armed forces checkpoint. The SMM went to the impact site and saw seven dead bodies. Within an area of 1.6km by 1.1km, which included an open market, the SMM saw multiple impacts on buildings, shops, homes and a school and observed cars on fire. At least twenty people died and seventy-five were injured and hospitalised. The SMM conducted a crater analysis and determined that Grad rockets originating in the area of Oktiabr, and Uragan rockets originating in the area of Zaichenko, had caused the impacts. Both Oktiabr and Zaichenko were, at the time, controlled by the ‘DPR’. The OHCHR reported that 31 civilians had died and 112 had been wounded in the attacks on Mariupol on 24 January (A736 and 742).

The attack in Mariupol was condemned by the UN Secretary General, who noted that the rockets appeared to have been launched indiscriminately into civilian areas in violation of international humanitarian law (A52). The UN Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs, in a speech of 26 January 2015 to the Security Council, referred to the barrage of attacks with multiple rocket launcher systems that had hit Mariupol on 24 January 2015, destroying buildings and impacting a market filled with civilians. He referred to the conclusion of the SMM that the rockets had been fired from ‘DPR’-controlled territory and concluded that the attackers had ‘knowingly targeted a civilian population’ in a city that lay ‘outside of the immediate conflict zone’ (A53). On 29 January 2015 the Council of the European Union condemned the indiscriminate shelling of Mariupol on 24 January and recent attacks on Debaltseve and other locations along the ‘line of contact’ (A125). The NATO Secretary General issued a statement in January 2015 concerning the attack on Mariupol, alleging that separatist shelling had killed at least twenty civilians and injured many more (A2900).

Amnesty International reported on 3 February 2015 that government-controlled Debaltseve had been under constant shelling by separatists for several days. Amnesty International's research on the ground indicated that some of the attacks might have been indiscriminate. The report asserted that the only road out of town was being shelled constantly, which made the escape of the remaining civilians even more dangerous (A2201. See also A2793-94). One of the volunteers leading the evacuation effort from Debaltseve and surrounding areas in the Donetsk region was reported as saying that the evacuation vehicles had become targets of Russian-backed separatists (A2793). According to a press article covering the evacuation attempts, on 1 February, a shell had hit a yellow evacuation bus just a minute after it had stopped by a bomb shelter in Debaltseve. Two drivers and two passengers had been wounded. The article further claimed that eight more people had been wounded by mortar shells while queuing for evacuation by the building of the local administration on the same day (A2794).

The OSCE also reported, on 4 February 2015, that indiscriminate shelling around Debaltseve and other areas in eastern Ukraine had intensified, forcing innocent civilians to flee their homes, noting that many of them were in ‘mortal danger’ (B407). Following a truce agreed by both sides, on 6 February 2015 the SMM assisted in the evacuation of civilians from the ‘heavily-shelled city’. The mission observed ‘significant damage to civilian infrastructure and residences caused by artillery strikes’ (B408). In its 1 June 2015 report, the OHCHR referred to attacks by armed groups against Ukrainian troops around Debaltseve until 19 February, causing new casualties among the remaining civilian population (B556).

The SMM and the OHCHR reported that on 10 February 2015 there had also been shelling in heavily populated residential neighbourhoods in government-controlled Kramatorsk that had killed seven civilians and wounded twenty-six. Analysis had shown that the strike had been fired by one single launcher system, probably a BM-30 Smerch or Tornado multiple launch rocket system. All rockets had been equipped with sub-munition dispenser canisters. The OSCE Chief Monitor in Ukraine condemned the attack as another instance in which ‘innocent civilians are bearing the brunt of a violent conflict characterized by [an] increasing … death-toll and indiscriminate shelling.’ (A394 and 741; and B851-53).

The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions noted that there was evidence of the use of cluster munitions by the separatists in attacks against Artemivsk, Hrodivka and Kramatorsk in February 2015 (B1439). A Human Right Watch (‘HRW’) Technical Briefing Note of June 2015, referenced by the Special Rapporteur, was prepared on the basis of field investigations by HRW researchers in eastern Ukraine in October 2014 and January-February 2015 (B1623). The briefing documented widespread use of cluster munitions by both government forces and separatists in dozens of urban and rural locations. Setting out the methodology, the briefing explained:

The briefing set out some illustrative examples of cluster munition attacks, including attacks with Smerch rockets launched from separatist-held territory on the government-controlled towns of Hrodivka and Kramatorsk on 10 February and Artemivsk on 12 February 2015 (B1624).

The OHCHR report of 15 February 2015 highlighted the ‘heavy damage’ done to civilian property and vital infrastructure by the fighting and indiscriminate shelling (B551). It said (B552):

The report commented on the evacuation of civilians from affected government-controlled areas, which it reported had been hampered by ‘constant shelling’. The report further noted, ‘[r]eports suggest that some incidents of shelling coincided with the evacuation of civilians and may have been targeted to prevent it’ (B552).

Following the Minsk II Agreement and the ceasefire which entered into force on 15 February 2015 (see paragraph 57 above), there was an overall decrease in indiscriminate shelling according to the OHCHR's report of 1 June 2015 (B557). However, isolated clashes continued to occur, and civilians continued to be killed and wounded as a result of shelling. For example, the OHCHR reported that in government-controlled Avdiivka, on 22 February, three civilians had been killed by an artillery shell and on 4 March a woman had been killed when her apartment had been hit by a shell (ibid.).

The SMM also continued to observe damage and record deaths and injuries caused by shelling in government-controlled areas. On 23 February 2015, the SMM visited Avdiivka and saw many buildings damaged by shelling. On 9 March 2015 it observed significant damage to houses and a school caused by shelling in government-controlled Novotoshkivske (B857-59). On 10 March 2015 it visited Pisky and saw that most structures there had been damaged by shelling (B857). The mission also visited Avdiivka in March 2015 and observed damage from tank projectiles, shells and anti-tank guided missiles. The attacks had struck residential areas and a factory (B860-63). It was informed by the JCCC of shelling on 18 April 2015 when eight Grad rockets hit the outskirts of Avdiivka. Three rockets had hit the residential area of Avdiivka old town and five had landed in fields. The SMM went to the location and saw three impacts in the area, and related damage to residential property (B865). On 19 and 20 April 2015 the SMM was informed by the JCCC of shelling in residential areas in Avdiivka which had damaged civilian property and resulted in a civilian casualty (B865-66). On 23 April 2015 the SMM in Avdiivka saw mortar shells explode thirty metres from their patrol, injuring a civilian (B867). In early May 2015 there was an attack on Novotoshkivske from ‘LPR’-controlled Frunze and Donetskyi (B870) and the SMM heard more than one hundred detonations, estimated to be incoming fire from a Grad multiple launch rocket system, in Berdianske (B871. See also B872). There were also a number of ‘LPR’ attacks on Stanytsia Luhanska in May 2015 (B872-74). An industrial coke-chemical plant in Avdiivka was heavily shelled in May 2015 (B876-78). Throughout June, July and August 2015 the SMM continued to report on the shelling of government-controlled areas, killing and injuring civilians and causing damage to residential housing and to essential infrastructure, including electricity, gas and water supplies, schools and a hospital (B882-87, 889-90 and 892–923).

In its 15 August 2015 report, the OHCHR noted the absence of ‘large-scale offensives’ since mid-February. However, it reported that ‘locally-contained escalations of fighting’ had occurred in various places, including government-controlled Marinka on 3 June 2015 and Starohnativka on 9–10 August 2015 (B563). There were clashes and exchanges of fire along the contact line reported daily. The main flashpoints in government-controlled areas were, according to the OHCHR, Avdiivka, Marinka, Pisky and Shyrokyne in the Donetsk region, and Shchastia and Stanytsia Luhanska in the Luhansk region. Both sides continued to use ‘mortars, cannons, howitzers, tanks and multiple launch rocket systems’. The OHCHR reported that they ‘routinely did not comply with the international humanitarian law principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions, with numerous incidents of indiscriminate shelling of residential areas causing civilian casualties observed’ (ibid.). Since the ceasefire of 15 February 2015, there had been 165 casualties resulting from shelling in government-controlled areas, with most casualties occurring in Avdiivka, Marinka and Dzerzhynsk (B564).

In the autumn of 2015 SMM reports on the shelling of residential areas, essential infrastructure and schools in government-controlled areas continued at a lower frequency (B925-37). The mission met with village council heads in Hranitne and Valuiske. They were told that 600 houses in Hranitne had been partially damaged and 10 had been completely destroyed; and that in Valuiske, 1,012 houses had been damaged since the start of the conflict, with 18 civilians killed and 70 injured (B928). In its report of 9 December 2015 the OHCHR reported a considerable decrease in hostilities since a ‘cease-fire within a cease-fire’ had been agreed on 26 August 2015. In September and October 2015 exchanges of artillery fire had almost ceased. However, in the first half of November there had been increasing skirmishes along the contact line, including with the use of artillery. This raised fears of a ‘resumption of large-scale indiscriminate shelling of populated areas’ (B569). According to the report, there had been 87 casualties in government-controlled areas between 16 August and 15 November 2015, 21% of which had resulted from shelling (B570).

Over the winter of 2015-16 reports by the SMM of shelling in government-controlled areas increased, particularly around Marinka. A number of civilians were killed or injured, and residential buildings, schools and essential infrastructure was damaged (B938-56). The OHCHR's report of 3 March 2016 referred to an ‘overall de-escalation of hostilities’ but observed that isolated clashes, localised exchanges of fire and minor shifts in the contact line had continued. Exchanges of fire from artillery systems had been rare, the OHCHR reported, with eleven civilian casualties being reported altogether (in both government and separatist-controlled areas) during the reporting period (B574).

Shelling of residential areas and infrastructure continued throughout spring and early summer 2016 (B957-75). On 3 June 2016 the OHCHR reported that the ceasefire in place under the Minsk II agreement had ‘slowly unravelled’ during the reporting period. Skirmishes in Avdiivka and Yasynuvata that had erupted in early March 2016 were ongoing, affecting both towns which were located on either side of the contact line. There had been civilian casualties resulting from shelling in the government-controlled towns of Avdiivka and Marinka and villages of Novooleksandrivka, Pisky and Vodiane. In total, there had been forty-six casualties as a result of shelling by both parties in the reporting period (B579).

The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions published his report on his mission to Ukraine in May 2016. He referred to the latest figures from the OHCHR and observed that the majority of the deaths had been caused by shelling, ‘which it would appear has taken place indiscriminately on both sides or without the taking of adequate precautionary steps to protect civilians’ (B1439). The report continued:

In July 2016 the OHCHR published a report on accountability for killings in Ukraine from January 2014 to May 2016. It estimated that between mid-April 2014 and 31 May 2016, up to 2,000 civilians had been killed as a result of the conflict, around 85–90% of which had resulted from ‘the indiscriminate shelling of residential areas, in violation of the international humanitarian law principle of distinction’. A further 298 civilians had been killed when flight MH17 had been downed in July 2014 (A750 and B587).

In its report of 15 September 2016, covering the period from May to August, the OHCHR referred to an escalation in hostilities by both sides in the summer of 2016, with a corresponding increase in the number of casualties caused by shelling (B590). The SMM also continued to report on attacks on government-controlled areas, causing injuries and damage to homes and property (A756 and 1002-03). From June 2016 through to mid-September, the SMM reported incidents of shelling and artillery attacks in government-controlled areas on an almost daily basis (B976-1030). Most of the attacks reported had struck residential areas and caused damage to homes, with a number of civilians injured and killed. The OHCHR reported a marked escalation of clashes in the second half of August (B598).

In a report based on regular monitoring by the SMM from May to September 2016, the OSCE discussed a number of hotspots, where ceasefire violations frequently occurred (B1086). In the Luhansk region, the report noted new hotspots that had emerged in government-controlled Lobacheve and Lopaskyne, and in ‘LPR’-controlled Zhovte. It continued:

The report repeated previous findings that armed formations placed weapons and military hardware in populated areas and it provided various examples of this practice. As regards damage to property, it said (B1088):

There was a renewed de-escalation of hostilities following an agreement reached between the parties to the conflict on 21 September 2016 (B597). This led to a substantial decrease in civilian casualties in late September 2016. However, the OHCHR reported that in October civilian casualties scaled up again after a new upsurge in fighting along the contact line, before again decreasing following a decline in the intensity of the hostilities in November (B598; see also B1031-49). The OHCHR referred to the destruction and damage caused to civilians' lives by the ‘continuing … pattern of hostilities in densely populated towns and neighbourhoods’ around the contact line (B604). Its report published in December 2016 expressed ‘deep concern’ that government forces and armed groups operating in civilian areas ‘do not take all feasible precautions against the effects of fighting, resulting in damage to schools, kindergartens and medical facilities’ (ibid.).

In a resolution of 12 October 2016 (Resolution 2133 (2016)), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe referred to the ‘indiscriminate or even intentional shelling of civilian areas, sometimes provoked by the stationing of weapons in close proximity’ (A104).

An OSCE report entitled ‘Civilian casualties in eastern Ukraine 2016’ reported 442 confirmed civilian casualties in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the course of 2016, of which 88 were fatalities (B1140). Shelling represented the major cause of civilian casualties, with 32 killed and 231 injured in 2016. The report noted (ibid.):

In March 2017 the OHCHR reported that ‘spikes in hostilities in November and December 2016 and the drastic escalation over a very short time span at the end of January through the beginning of February 2017 caused damage to critical civilian infrastructure, including school and medical facilities, further endangering civilians and disrupting essential water, electricity and heating services amid freezing temperatures’ (B606). The SMM recorded regular shelling in government-controlled areas from late November through December 2016 and January and February 2017 (A1009 and B1050-94). The OHCHR noted that both sides continued to maintain positions in close proximity to towns and villages near the contact line in violation of international humanitarian law, to carry out indiscriminate shelling and to use explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas (B607). The mission referred to a flare-up of hostilities in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk airport triangle and in areas south of Donetsk between 29 January and 3 February 2017, which had caused 53 civilian casualties altogether, most of them a result of massive shelling of populated areas (ibid.). Thirteen of the casualties had been recorded in government-controlled areas.

In its eighteenth report covering spring 2017, the OHCHR referred to the routine use of heavy weaponry and observed that indiscriminate shelling continued to take a heavy toll on civilian lives, property and critical infrastructure, including those supplying water, electricity and gas, and health and educational facilities (B618). The mission referred to the ‘tense and dangerous’ situation for civilians, with spikes in hostilities in late February and early and late March, and recurrent fighting in several hotspots along the contact line (ibid.). It continued to witness the positioning of armed groups in or near residential areas, without taking necessary precautions, which it considered to be in violation of international humanitarian law (ibid.). The SMM reports also show frequent attacks against residential areas in government-controlled territory in spring 2017 which killed and injured a number of civilians and damaged civilian infrastructure, including schools, and residential and business property (B1095-120).

Artillery attacks continued throughout the summer and autumn of 2017. According to OHCHR figures, 1 person was killed and 28 were injured as a result of shelling in government-controlled areas between 16 May and 15 November 2017 (B625 and 633). The SMM continued to record in its daily reports regular incidents of shelling of government-controlled areas, including through the use of multiple launch rocket systems, which resulted in death, injury and damage to property, including homes and civilian infrastructure (B1121-44). The 2017 Report on Preliminary Examination Activities of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor referred to ‘intense shelling’ reported in Avdiivka and Yasynuvata, notably in built-up residential areas (A69). It further referred to at least 2,505 civilian deaths between April 2014 and August 2017, most of which had resulted from ‘the shelling of populated areas in both government-controlled territory and areas controlled by armed groups’ (A72).

In its report of 1 September 2017, the OHCHR noted (B626):

In its 1 December 2017 report, the OHCHR referred to the repeated use of weapons with a wide impact area (such as artillery and mortars) or the capacity to deliver multiple munitions over a wide area (such as multiple launch rocket systems). It observed that ‘[t]he use of such weapons in densely populated areas can be considered incompatible with the principle of distinction and may amount to a violation of international humanitarian law due to the likelihood of indiscriminate effects’. During the reporting period, the HRMMU had documented civilian casualties and damage to civilian property caused by heavy weapons. The OHCHR further reported that it had continued to observe military presence in densely populated areas and military use of civilian property on both sides of the contact line. It emphasised that locating military positions and equipment within or near residential areas and objects indispensable for the survival of the civilian population fell short of taking all feasible steps to separate military objectives from the civilian population, in contravention of international humanitarian law (B632-34).

The pattern of shelling residential areas in government-controlled territory with heavy weaponry, including through the use of weapons with wide-area effects, continued throughout the winter of 2017/2018 (B1145-57). In its report of 1 March 2018 the OHCHR noted (B643):

The HRMMU documented 1 civilian death and eleven injured as a result of shelling or small arms and light weapons fire during this period (A781).

In its report of 1 June 2018 the OHCHR observed that the continued use of indirect and/or explosive weapons by parties to the conflict remained the primary concern regarding protection of civilians. It noted that while most civilian casualties from shelling appeared to occur indirectly in incidents that had not specifically targeted civilians, the conflict's civilian toll remained a serious concern. It recorded 3 casualties from the shelling of government-controlled areas in the reporting period (B648). The SMM daily reports show that although there was a relatively low casualty count for this three-month period, the shelling of government-controlled areas remained regular and strikes on or near residential property were common (B1158-63).

According to the OHCHR, between 16 May and 15 August 2018 hostilities were marked by the continued use of indirect and/or explosive weapons which impacted civilian residential areas and essential civilian infrastructure. The greatest number of civilian casualties during the reporting period had been caused by shelling or light weapons fire. Three civilians had been killed and 8 injured as a result of the shelling of government-controlled areas. All of the incidents had occurred in residential neighbourhoods, including the victims' houses, or other areas regularly frequented by civilians (A793 and B652). The reports of the SMM also indicate regular shelling of residential areas in government-controlled territory (B1164-79). In one incident on 28 May 2018, reported by both the OHCHR and the SMM, a 15-year-old girl was struck by shrapnel and killed instantly when a shell landed in the garden of her grandparents' home in Zalizne (B652 and 1169).

Between 16 August and 15 November 2018, the OHCHR documented 1 death and 1 injured civilian in government-controlled areas caused by shelling or small arms and light weapons fire (B657). The SMM also reported fewer incidents of shelling in government-controlled areas during this period (B1180-87). The OHCHR referred in its December 2018 report to a disregard by the parties to the conflict for the principles of distinction and precaution, resulting in civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure (A797).

The December 2018 Report on Preliminary Examination Activities of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor referred to widespread damage and destruction of civilian infrastructure, residential property, hospitals and other medical facilities, schools and kindergartens on account of the use of heavy weaponry by all sides to the conflict (A76).

Over the winter of 2018/2019, a decreasing number of ceasefire violations was reported by the SMM, but exchanges of fire across the contact line continued to impact residential areas and result in civilian casualties and damage to civilian property and infrastructure, including water facilities and electricity lines (B664 and 1188-91). Only 1 person was injured as a result of attacks on government-controlled territory (B664).

The remainder of 2019 saw a lower level of active hostilities, reflected in a lower rate of casualties among the civilian population. Between 16 February and 15 November 2019, the OHCHR recorded 2 civilian deaths and 14 civilians injured as a result of shelling of small arms and light weapons fire by the separatist armed groups (B670, 676 and 682). The SMM reports similarly showed less frequent, although nonetheless regular, shelling of government-controlled areas with residential property and operational schools being hit (B1192-212). In its report of 1 June 2019, the OHCHR noted that regular exchanges of fire across the contact line continued to expose those residing nearby to a constant threat of death or injury, while civilian property and critical civilian infrastructure continued to be damaged, ‘often in disregard for the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution’ (B670).

The year 2020 was characterised by a continuation of the lower level of civilian casualties seen in 2019. This was helped by the strengthened ceasefire agreed in the context of the Trilateral Contact Group, which took effect on 27 July 2020 (see paragraph 59 above) and led to a significant reduction in hostilities: in the three months from that date, the HRMMU recorded no civilian casualties resulting from active hostilities and no damage to civilian objects (except civilian housing, which the HRMMU did not document) (A808). Only 10 casualties resulting from shelling and small arms and light weapons fire were recorded that year in government-controlled areas: two deaths and eights injured (A809 and B692). The OHCHR also recorded a total of 10 incidents affecting civilian objects in government-controlled territory in 2020 (A1021-22 and B693). The de-escalation of active hostilities is also reflected in the reports of the SMM (B1213-230). The reports make it clear, however, that there were still regular attacks across the contact line which struck residential areas in government-controlled territory.

On 11 December 2020 the Prosecutor of the ICC announced the conclusion of the preliminary examination, having concluded that there was a reasonable basis to believe that a broad range of conduct constituting war crimes and crimes against humanity had been committed in Ukraine, including crimes in the context of the conduct of hostilities (A83).

In 2021 the number of ceasefire violations in the conflict zone considerably increased, with spikes occurring in March to May and August to November 2021 (B710 and 720). This resulted in an increase in civilian casualties caused by active hostilities and increased damage to civilian objects. In the period from 1 February 2021 to 31 January 2022, the OHCHR documented 1 death and 9 civilian injuries in government-controlled areas as a result of armed engagements (ibid.). It further documented 16 incidents involving shelling or small arms and light weapons fire that affected civilian infrastructure in government-controlled territory, noting that although none of these incidents had resulted in civilian casualties, they had endangered the lives of civilians in and near these institutions, and had affected the population's access to basic services (A1023-25 and B721). From 1 August 2021 to 31 January 2022 it recorded 114 cases of civilian housing in government-controlled areas being damaged or destroyed by active hostilities (B721). The SMM reports for 2021 and early 2022 provide further details of the attacks on residential areas and on other civilian objects in government-controlled areas, including a working hospital, working kindergartens or schools and commercial properties (B1231-69).

From 14 April 2014 to 31 January 2022, the OHCHR recorded a total of 3,405 conflict-related civilian deaths in eastern Ukraine. The number of injured civilians was estimated to exceed 7,000 (B720).

On 24 February 2022 the full-scale invasion began. Multiple military attacks by the separatists and the Russian armed forces were perpetrated across Ukrainian territory (B1270-71).

On 28 February 2022 the Prosecutor of the ICC opened an investigation into allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide (B325). He explained that a review of the preliminary examination of the situation in Ukraine had confirmed that there was a reasonable basis to proceed with opening an investigation. In particular, he was satisfied that there was a reasonable basis to believe that both alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity had been committed in Ukraine ‘in relation to the events already assessed during the preliminary examination by the Office’. Given the expansion of the conflict in recent days, the Prosecutor intended that the investigation encompass any new alleged crimes falling within the jurisdiction of his Office that were committed by any party to the conflict on any part of the territory of Ukraine.

In its report for the period from 1 February to 31 July 2022, the OHCHR noted that following 24 February, most of the hostilities had occurred in or near densely populated areas, including big cities such as Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Horlivka, Makiivka, Mariupol, Kherson and Mykolaiv. It observed that the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects, including shelling from heavy artillery, multiple launch rocket systems, missiles and air strikes in the vicinity of densely populated settlements, often in an indiscriminate manner, had resulted in civilian casualties on a massive scale and damage and destruction of civilian objects at an unprecedented level, far in excess of previous periods of hostilities since 2014. The hostilities had furthermore resulted in the contamination of broad swathes of territory of Ukraine by tens of thousands of mines and explosive remnants of war (B742). From 1 February to 31 July 2022, the OHCHR had recorded 12,649 civilian casualties in Ukraine: 5,385 civilians killed and 7,264 civilians injured. Of these, 11,398 (5,131 civilians killed and 6,267 injured) had been recorded in 518 settlements in areas under Ukrainian government control at the time the casualties had occurred, constituting 90.1% of civilian casualties recorded in the reporting period (B743). It added that the actual numbers were likely considerably higher, since many reports of civilian casualties were still pending corroboration by the OHCHR, for example in Mariupol, Izium, Lysychansk, Popasna and Sievierodonetsk (ibid.). 92.1% of the civilian casualties had been caused by the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects, including shelling from heavy artillery, multiple launch rocket systems, missiles and air strikes, in populated areas (ibid.).

The OHCHR further reported that it had verified the widespread destruction of and damage to civilian objects across Ukraine, in particular medical and educational facilities, and to housing in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Sumy, Donetsk, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk. The majority had been caused by explosive weapons used in populated areas. While the OHCHR had not been able to assess compliance with international humanitarian law for each individual incident, it observed that the scale of the damage and destruction strongly indicated that violations of international humanitarian law had occurred. The OHCHR had verified damage or destruction to 252 medical facilities caused by the hostilities, including 152 hospital, 12 psycho-neurological facilities and 88 other medical facilities. Out of those, 209 had been damaged, 24 had been destroyed and 19 had been looted. The OHCHR believed the actual number of affected medical facilities to be likely considerably higher. The OHCHR also verified that hostilities had damaged or destroyed 384 educational facilities (252 schools, 70 kindergartens, 41 specialised schools, 20 universities and 1 scientific centre). Of these, 79 had been destroyed, and 305 damaged. It said that some attacks on educational facilities were likely due to the belligerent parties' use of schools for military purposes. The OHCHR believed the actual number of affected education facilities was likely considerably higher (B744).

The OHCHR further noted that the wide-scale hostilities and the extensive use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas by both sides to the conflict had caused mass damage to and destruction of civilian housing in several regions, notably Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Sumy, Donetsk, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. It reported that according to the Deputy Head of the Ukrainian Parliamentary Committee for the Organisation of State Power, some 15 million square meters of housing had been damaged or destroyed in government-controlled territory by 7 July 2022 (ibid.). In its March 2023 report, the OHCHR reported that it had recorded 11,350 conflict-related civilian deaths from 14 April 2014 to 31 January 2023 (B757).

On 24 February 2022 the Secretary General of the OSCE decided to temporarily evacuate all international mission members from Ukraine as soon as possible. During the evacuation, the SMM continued to publish limited observations in the areas where it remained active until the completion of the evacuation and suspension of its reporting activities on 7 March 2022 (see paragraph 116 above). It reported multiple explosions, including multiple launch rocket system and heavy artillery fire, in and around the cities of Kyiv, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Mariupol, Shchastia and Odesa (B1270-80).

On 4 March 2022 the Commission of Inquiry was mandated by the UN HRC to investigate all alleged violations and abuses of human rights, violations of international humanitarian law and related crimes in the context of the aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation (see paragraph 97 above).

In its report of 18 October 2022 the Commission of Inquiry published its first findings about events since 24 February 2022 (C.II). It noted that military strikes using explosive weapons had been launched by the Russian armed forces across Ukraine, ‘including in areas situated far from the front lines, causing significant civilian casualties and large-scale destruction of residential buildings and critical infrastructure’ (C.II.26). On 24 February 2022 Russian armed forces had advanced towards Kyiv and captured key areas in the north and west of the city. They had also surrounded Chernihiv and had subjected it to heavy airstrikes and artillery fire, which had severed it from essential supply and evacuation routes (C.II.27). By the end of March 2022, however, the offensive on Kyiv had stalled (C.II.28). In north-eastern Ukraine, Kharkiv and Sumy had quickly become the scenes of heavy urban warfare. Shelling had ‘pounded residential and other key buildings and led to large-scale destruction’ in the cities (C.II.29). In April 2022 the Russian forces had withdrawn from the Sumy area and in May 2022 a Ukrainian counter-offensive had forced them to retreat from Kharkiv. However, artillery attacks on Kharkiv and localities nearby had continued (ibid.).

In southern Ukraine, Russian armed forces had attacked the regions of Kherson, Mykolaiv and Zaporizhzhia and had occupied several cities and localities (C.II.30). The report continued:

On 19 April 2022, the report explained, a second phase of the war had begun. This phase had concentrated mostly on the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk and on southern Ukraine. There had been intense fighting in and around the city of Sievierodonetsk until its eventual capture by Russian armed forces in June 2022, and in the region of Zaporizhzhia. Fighting had also raged in the Kharkiv region until September 2022, when the Ukrainian armed forces had recovered large swathes of territory in a counter-offensive (C.II.31).

As to the impact on civilians of the hostilities, the report recorded:

The report investigated whether international human rights law and international humanitarian law had been complied with. It examined the conduct of hostilities by the parties, and made the following general remarks:

On the impact of explosive weapons in civilian areas under attack by Russia, the Commission of Inquiry report noted that according to the OHCHR, the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas had caused 1,495 deaths and injuries in the regions of Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv and Sumy during the period under review, which represented 70% of the civilians killed and injured in those areas. The actual numbers were likely to be higher (C.II.39). Attacks with explosive weapons had had a ‘devastating effect’ on buildings and infrastructure. Thousands of residential buildings, schools, hospitals and facilities hosting essential infrastructure had been damaged or destroyed. In Chernihiv, the Commission of Inquiry had seen ‘dozens of houses and other buildings that had been destroyed or damaged during the attempt by Russian armed forces to take the city’. In Kharkiv, explosive weapons had ‘devastated entire areas of the city’ (C.II.40). Fighting and attacks had also affected a significant number of hospitals. The Commission of Inquiry had documented damage to or destruction of five hospitals, three in Chernihiv, one in Sumy and one in Kharkiv. Four of the hospitals had been operating when they had been hit by explosive weapons. Three had been severely or completely damaged, which had impacted access by the civilian population to health services (C.II.41). The Commission of Inquiry had documented attacks with explosive weapons that had affected educational institutions and had visited seven such institutions, where it had observed the damage first-hand (C.II.42).

The report also recorded the Commission of Inquiry's conclusion that several Russian attacks with explosive weapons that it had investigated had been indiscriminate and that feasible precautions to reduce civilian harm had not been taken (C.II.44). The indiscriminate attacks documented in the report had taken place in areas controlled by the Ukrainian armed forces during attempts by the Russian armed forces to capture those areas. In the city of Chernihiv, for example, when Russian armed forces had surrounded the city between 25 February and 31 March 2022, multiple indiscriminate attacks with the use of explosive weapons had occurred. In Sumy, attacks had occurred in the context of repeated attempts by Russian armed forces to seize the city through ground battles and airstrikes. In reaching the conclusion that the attacks had been indiscriminate, the Commission of Inquiry had taken into account the potential existence of military objectives. In some of the cases, the Commission of Inquiry had collected credible information about the presence of Ukrainian armed forces, which might have been the intended target of the attack, at or near the impact locations. However, the type and number of munitions used in the attacks had impacted civilians and civilian objects in a wider area, beyond any apparent military objective. For this reason, the Commission of Inquiry concluded, they had constituted indiscriminate attacks (C.II.47).

The Commission of Inquiry documented indiscriminate attacks by Russia with the use of cluster munitions, which it observed affected a large area and were therefore indiscriminate when used in populated areas. On 17 March 2022 an attack with cluster munitions had struck the Chernihiv Regional Children's Hospital at a time when some of the victims had been queuing for water on the premises of the hospital. It had killed several civilians and injured dozens (C.II.48).

The Commission of Inquiry also documented indiscriminate attacks by Russia with the use of unguided rockets, which it noted could not be precisely targeted and affected a large area when fired in salvos, and were therefore indiscriminate when used in populated areas. On 16 March 2022 several munitions, including unguided rockets, had struck an area in Chernihiv where more than 200 civilians had been queuing for bread near a supermarket and had killed at least 14 civilians and injured 26 (C.II.49).

The report noted that significant civilian harm, both in terms of casualties and damage to buildings and infrastructure, had resulted from indiscriminate airstrikes by the Russian armed forces using multiple unguided bombs in populated areas. On 3 March 2022 an aeroplane had dropped several unguided bombs on a residential area in the city of Chernihiv, killing at least 14 civilians and injuring dozens. The Commission of Inquiry had seen large craters and destruction, indicating that at least six munitions had struck within an area of about 130 metres, causing significant damage to the infrastructure. Around the same time, also in Chernihiv, an aeroplane had dropped several unguided bombs in the Podusivka district, about two kilometres east of the first attack, killing at least 6 civilians. The impact of the attack had spanned over 500 metres and had affected a large area, which included two schools and residential buildings. In both cases, the Commission of Inquiry had identified potential military objectives in the vicinity, which might have been the intended target. However, the area impacted had been much larger (C.II.50).

On 7 March 2022, in the city of Sumy, an airstrike had dropped at least two bombs on a residential area, killing at least 15 civilians and injuring 6. The Commission of Inquiry had seen two impact sites where 6 houses had been entirely destroyed. Other residential buildings had been significantly damaged in a radius of more than 100 meters from where the bombs had landed. The only potential military objective identified in the vicinity was a mobilisation office, which, according to residents, had not been in use at that time (C.II.51).

The report made findings concerning the impact on children of the Russian military attacks. It noted:

In its report of 16 March 2023 (C.III), the Commission of Inquiry provided further results of its investigations into events in Ukraine. It noted:

As regards the impact on the civilian population of the military attacks since 24 February 2022, the Commission of Inquiry observed:

Reporting its further findings on the conduct of hostilities by the Russian armed forces, the Commission of Inquiry began with the following general remarks:

The Commission of Inquiry noted that some of the attacks carried out with explosive weapons in populated areas controlled by the Ukrainian authorities had been conducted in the context of attempts by the armed forces of the Russian Federation to capture towns or cities, while others had struck areas far from the front lines. It clarified that the attacks it had investigated were a ‘small fraction of the total number’ (C.III.28). The documented attacks had affected civilian objects, including residential buildings, hospitals, schools, a hotel, shops, a theatre, a pharmacy, a kindergarten and a train station (C.III.29).

In some of the situations examined, the Commission of Inquiry had been unable to identify a military objective. Where possible military targets had been identified in the vicinity of some of the impact sites, the Commission of Inquiry had generally found that the Russian armed forces had used weapons that had struck both military and civilian objects without distinction. It had identified four types of weapons whose use in populated areas had led to indiscriminate attacks: unguided bombs dropped from aircraft; long-range anti-ship missiles of the Kh-22 or Kh-32 type, which had been ‘found to be inaccurate when striking land targets’; cluster munitions, which, ‘by design, spread small submunitions over a wide area’; and multiple-launch rocket systems, which ‘cover[ed] a large area using inaccurate rockets’ (C.III.30).

The circumstances of the attacks by Russia investigated by the Commission of Inquiry had led it to determine that the majority of them had been indiscriminate. This was the case, for example, for the attack of 16 March 2022 carried out during the siege of Mariupol on the city's theatre, which had killed and injured a large number of people; the attack of 8 April 2022 on Kramatorsk train station, which had killed 59 people and injured 92; and the attack of 27 June 2022 on a shopping mall in Kremenchuk, which had killed 21 people and injured dozens (C.III.31). In several attacks, the Russian armed forces had failed to take feasible precautions to verify whether civilians were present. Hundreds of civilians had gathered in the areas affected by the attacks on Kramatorsk train station and the Mariupol theatre. Similarly, hundreds of civilians had been in the residential areas of Chernihiv during attacks of 3 March 2022, which had killed at least 20 people and injured many others. The report noted that ‘[i]rrespective of whether there was a military objective, an assessment of the targets should have alerted the armed forces of the Russian Federation to the presence of large numbers of civilians’ (C.III.32). The Commission of Inquiry further considered that the fact that attacks had affected civilian buildings, such as functioning medical institutions, also manifested a failure to take precautions. Such attacks included that of 9 March 2022 on Maternity Ward No. 3 in Mariupol, in which at least one pregnant woman and her unborn child had been killed. Even if there had been military objectives in conducting the attacks, extra care ought to have been taken in view of the special protected status of medical institutions (C.III.33). The report noted:

The March 2023 report contained a section on attacks against Ukrainian energy-related infrastructure. It noted that ‘[c]ritical energy-related infrastructure in Ukraine had come under attack from the early stages of the invasion’ but the investigation was largely directed at the period following President Putin's announcement on 10 October 2022 of a ‘massive strike … against Ukrainian energy, military and communications facilities’ (C.III.40). The report observed that ‘attacks prior to 10 October 2022 had been focused mainly on fuel installations and electric infrastructure related to the railway system’, and that it was only after that date that attacks had ‘systematically targeted power plants and other infrastructure critical for the transmission of electricity and the generation of heat across Ukraine’ (C.III.41).

In its conference room paper of 29 August 2023 (C.IV), the Commission of Inquiry reiterated that since the outset and throughout the armed conflict, military strikes using explosive weapons with wide-area effects had been carried out in major Ukrainian cities with significant populations, including in areas situated far from frontlines. They had caused scores of civilian deaths and casualties and large-scale destruction (C.IV.68). The paper repeated to some extent the findings already outlined in earlier reports, with additional details emerging from subsequent investigations. Setting out the background, it summarised the start of the invasion as follows:

The paper discussed the siege of Mariupol, noting (C.IV.76):

The paper noted that large-scale attacks in Ukraine had destroyed residential buildings, hospitals and schools, and had curtailed people's access to heat, electricity, food and water. While the effect of the hostilities was particularly visible along frontlines, ‘the whole country’ was ‘deeply affected’. The report observed that people were living ‘in a climate of uncertainty and fear’ and that survivors were ‘coping with the physical, psychological, and socio-economic consequences of violent events and large-scale damage’ (C.IV.95-96 and 98).

The Commission of Inquiry referred to an OHCHR estimate that 90.3% of civilian casualties had been caused by explosive weapons (C.IV.110). It observed that such attacks had damaged or destroyed thousands of residential buildings, hospitals, schools and critical infrastructure. Entire neighbourhoods had been decimated. The paper continued:

The paper reiterated that while some of the attacks with explosive weapons had been conducted in the context of Russian armed forces' attempts to capture towns or cities, others had struck areas far from frontlines. Russian armed forces' waves of attacks systematically targeting power plants and other energy-related installations in Ukraine, which had intensified considerably since October 2022, had struck almost all the regions of Ukraine. These attacks had, during certain periods, deprived large portions of the civilian population of not only electricity, but also water, heating, telecommunications, means of preserving food and cooking, causing great harm and suffering, in particular during the cold months (C.IV.111).

The paper referred to the Commission of Inquiry's more detail investigation of twenty-five individual attacks with explosive weapons in populated areas in nine regions of Ukraine (see paragraph 714 above). It had inspected the attack sites where possible, heard witness testimonies and authenticated and analysed relevant photographs, satellite imagery and video footage. It found that these attacks had impacted a variety of civilian objects and places where civilians were present, and had caused deaths, injuries and considerable harm. It noted that ‘[t]he use of certain types of weapons has been particularly lethal in populated areas, as they could not be directed at a military objective, were inaccurate, or struck a wide area’ (C.IV.113 and 120). It reiterated:

The paper contained a discussion of the impact on civilians of hostilities and attacks with explosive weapons. It stated:

The paper documented a number of attacks, which the Commission of Inquiry described as ‘just a small sample of the multitude of attacks with explosive weapons since the beginning of the invasion’ (C.IV.127). As already noted in its March 2023 report, the majority of attacks had been found to be indiscriminate (see paragraph 717 above). They had impacted civilians or civilian objects and at times, no military target could be identified in the area of the attack. Where military targets could be identified, the Russian forces had used unguided or inaccurate explosive weapons designed to strike a wide area. The Commission of Inquiry said:

The Commission of Inquiry identified three types of weapons used in the attacks it had documented:

The Commission of Inquiry had also assessed whether the Russian forces had taken requisite feasible precautions to minimise civilian harm. The paper observed:

The paper outlined the main cases that the Commission of Inquiry had documented. It had investigated three attacks likely carried out with powerful and inaccurate long-range anti-ship missiles in densely populated areas in Dnipro and Kremenchuk cities and in the town of Serhiivka. It had also reviewed videos apparently showing attacks with the use of such missiles in populated areas in two other locations. Its summaries of the incidents in Kremenchuk and Serhiivka, which both occurred prior to 16 September 2022, were as follows:

Using open source material and satellite imagery, the Commission of Inquiry considered it likely that the 52nd Heavy Bomber Long-Range Aviation Regiment, located at the Shaykovka airbase in the Kaluga region of the Russian Federation, had carried out the attacks in Kremenchuk and Serhiivka (C.IV.149-51).

The Commission of Inquiry also investigated several attacks carried out, or likely carried out, with air-dropped bombs in populated areas in the cities of Chernihiv, Izium, Mariupol and Sumy. The paper described in detail five such attacks, as follows:

The Commission of Inquiry also investigated several attacks carried out with cluster munitions in populated areas. It noted that cluster munitions were ‘inherently indiscriminate when used in populated areas (C.IV.208). The paper described three attacks, in Chernihiv and Kramatorsk cities and in Okhtyrka town, and concluded that in respect of at least two of them, the Russian armed forces had been responsible for the attacks, which had been indiscriminate. The incidents were summarised as follows:

Finally, the Commission of Inquiry investigated attacks carried out with unguided artillery rockets in the cities of Chernihiv and Marhanets. It determined that both attacks were carried out by the Russian armed forces and were indiscriminate. It set out its findings in respect of the incidents as follows:

The Commission of Inquiry also investigated the series of large-scale attacks on energy-related installations in Ukraine. In its 29 August 2023 paper, it noted that since the beginning of the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine, both Russian and Ukrainian armed forces, albeit to a very different degree, had carried out attacks on energy-related installations in each other's countries. Although Russian armed forces had been carrying out strikes on Ukrainian energy facilities since the first days of the invasion, such attacks had been expanded onto a large scale from 10 October 2022. For the purposes of its investigations, the Commission of Inquiry had focused on the period from 10 October 2022 to 26 January 2023 (C.IV.267). However, as regards the earlier period, the paper noted:

It highlighted the difference between the attacks launched before and after 10 October 2022 in that the ‘intensity, geographical scope and type of installations targeted’ in the later attacks led the Commission of Inquiry to concluded that the objective of the large-scale attacks was not just to damage or destroy individual energy installations, which could serve a military purpose, but also to disrupt and destabilise the entire energy system in Ukraine C.IV.271). It further observed that, while attacks prior to 10 October 2022 had focused mainly on fuel installations and electric infrastructure related to the railway system, attacks after that date targeted systematically power plants and other infrastructure critical for the transmission of electricity and the generation of heat across Ukraine (C.IV.274).

The conference room paper discussed the heavy fighting at Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant following the 4 March 2022 Russian attack on the plant. It noted: