Einde inhoudsopgave
EU Equity pre- and post-trade transparency regulation (LBF vol. 21) 2021/15.III
15.III National provisions
mr. J.E.C. Gulyás, datum 01-02-2021
- Datum
01-02-2021
- Auteur
mr. J.E.C. Gulyás
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS267266:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Bank- en effectenrecht
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Financiële dienstverlening / Financieel toezicht
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
‘Overall’, since CESR provided some standards on a ‘reasonable commercial basis’ for certain ATSs (see paragraph above).
K. Lannoo, ‘Financial Market Data and MiFID’, ECMI Policy Brief, March 2007, p. 1-2. Main reasons for the dominant position of RMs included the optional ISD concentration rule and the fact that RMs also aggregated (consolidated) data, alongside data vendors, such as Bloomberg and Thomson Financial and Reuters (ibid). For an examination, reference is made to chapter 10.
CESR, Public Consultation: Publication and Consolidation of MiFID Market Transparency Data, October 2006 (CESR/06-551) (CESR/06-551), p. 5.
K. Lannoo, Will financial market data be sufficiently consolidated and of high enough quality under MiFID?, Journal of Securities Operations & Custody, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2008 p. 185.
CESR, Public Consultation: Publication and Consolidation of MiFID Market Transparency Data, October 2006 (CESR/06-551) (CESR/06-551), p. 6.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
For an examination of the data price variables ‘head count’, ‘use restrictions’, and ‘type of pre- and post-trade data’, reference is made to chapter 14 above.
The lack of ISD/FESCO rules and guidance, as well as the broad CESR guidance, meant that the EU used a bottom-up approach with respect to data prices. National provisions were overall decisive during the ISD timeframe.1 RMs played a central role in selling and licensing equity pre- and post-trade data during the ISD timeframe.2 RMs sold or licensed the equity pre- and post-trade data indirectly (e.g. through other RMs and/or data vendors like Bloomberg), as well as directly to end-users.3 The consolidation of equity pre- and post-trade data was dominated by a few global data providers (data vendors).4
CESR gave an overview of how RMs and data vendors made equity pre- and post-trade data available across the individual Member States.5 CESR stated that RMs often charged a distribution license fee to each data provider that wished to distribute the RM’s data. Some RMs had multiple license fees they charged according to: (1) the ‘depth of book’ made available; (2) the time delay in making data available; and (3) other factors that affected the market value of data.6 CESR also noted that an additional license fee (a so-called ‘per-terminal fee’) was often charged by RMs per each end-user. The data vendors passed the per-terminal fees on directly to the customer.7 Many RMs made delayed information (typically 15 minutes) available for viewing on their website free of charge. CESR finally noted that, in addition to data fees of RMs, data vendors applied their own fees.8
In sum, during the ISD RMs often charged data prices based on a head count based on per-terminal fees for each end-user. Use restrictions and the type of equity pre- and post-trade data (e.g. depth and latency) were also relevant for how RMs charged data prices.9 Data vendors – in addition to RMs – applied their own fees. Prices of equity pre- and post-trade data were a matter of national law.