State aid to banks
Einde inhoudsopgave
State aid to banks (IVOR nr. 109) 2018/11.4.3.2:11.4.3.2 The modalities of the remuneration restrictions
State aid to banks (IVOR nr. 109) 2018/11.4.3.2
11.4.3.2 The modalities of the remuneration restrictions
Documentgegevens:
mr. drs. R.E. van Lambalgen, datum 01-12-2017
- Datum
01-12-2017
- Auteur
mr. drs. R.E. van Lambalgen
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS590583:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Mededingingsrecht / EU-mededingingsrecht
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Remuneration restrictions can differ on their modalities. Some restructuring plans refer to a remuneration standard: such as the G20 principles and the FSA Remuneration Code (in the decision on RBS1) or the local guidelines of the ‘Adviescommissie Toekomst Banken’ (in the decision on SNS REAAL2). Other restructuring plans clearly indicate a cap on remuneration. For instance, BayernLB had committed to a cap of EUR 500.000 on staff remuneration.3 This is an absolute cap. By contrast, point 38 of the 2013 Banking Communication provides for a relative cap: the total remuneration of a board member or senior manager may not exceed 15 times the national average salary in the Member State where the beneficiary bank is incorporated or 10 times the average salary of employees in the beneficiary bank.
Another modality of the remuneration restrictions is the duration of these restrictions. In that regard, the 2013 Banking Communication specifies that the restrictions on remuneration should apply during the entire restructuring period, unless the beneficiary bank has repaid the State aid before the end of the restructuring period.
To conclude, the 2013 Banking Communication is quite clear on how the remuneration should be restricted. By contrast, in the pre-2013 Banking Communication, the remuneration restrictions were often designed in diverging ways.