Einde inhoudsopgave
State aid to banks (IVOR nr. 109) 2018/9.8.4
9.8.4 Remuneration in case of an asset purchase
mr. drs. R.E. van Lambalgen, datum 01-12-2017
- Datum
01-12-2017
- Auteur
mr. drs. R.E. van Lambalgen
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS585872:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Mededingingsrecht / EU-mededingingsrecht
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
. Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor (NKBM), SA.35709, 18 December 2013, para. 94.
. Banco Mare Nostrum (BMN), SA.35488, 20 December 2012, para. 125.
. The latter consideration is derived from section II of Annex IV of the AIC. In that particular section, the Commission explains that any pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the State that takes account of the risks of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the real economic value. Such remuneration may be provided by setting the transfer price well below the real economic value to a sufficient extent so as to provide for adequate compensation for the risk in the form of a commensurate upside.
With respect to asset purchases, the pricing principle can be summed up as follows: the assets should be transferred at a price that matches or remains below their REV.
Interestingly, while in some cases, the Commission noted that the transfer had to take place “at a price not higher than the REV”1, in several other cases, the Commission noted that the transfer price had to be “well below the real economic value”. For instance, in the decision on Banco Mare Nostrum (BMN), the Commission noted that the assets had been fully written down to their transfer value, and that the transfer price was on a relative basis [50-60]% lower than their real economic value.2 The Commission concluded the compensation for the risk of the State was embedded in the low transfer price.3