Einde inhoudsopgave
Public funding of failing banks in the European Union (LBF vol. 19) 2020/3.3.2.1
3.3.2.1 Market economy investor principle
mr. M. Louisse-Read, datum 01-06-2020
- Datum
01-06-2020
- Auteur
mr. M. Louisse-Read
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS213688:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Staatssteun (V)
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
See for an extensive discussion of the market economy investor principle Nicolaides 2017, p. 87-106.
Notice on the notion of State aid, point 74.
EC, 22 June 2009, C(2009) 5802 final (NN 40/2009 – Hypo Steiermark), par. 15-16.
EP Bail-in Analysis 2016, p. 11.
GC, 2 March 2012, T-29/10 and T-33/10, ECLI:EU:T:2012:98 (Netherlands and ING v Commission), par. 99.
EC, 11 May 2012, C(2012) 3150 final (SA.28855 – ING), par. 117-156.
ECJ, 3 April 2014, C-224/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2014:213 (Commission v Netherlands and ING), par. 29-38. See also Panero Rivas EStAL 2014; Nicolaides 2017, p. 97-99 with a critical note on the application of the private investor principle in this case; Cyndecka EStAL 2019 on the burden of proof.
EC, 26 February 2010, C(2010) 1180 final (C9/09 – Dexia), par.126. Bacon 2017, p. 368.
Bacon 2017, p. 368. See also, Gilliams E.L. Rev. 2011, p. 4-5.
EC, 10 February 2016, C(2016) 873 final, (SA.43390 – Italian Securitization Scheme), paras. 79-80.
The EU Courts have developed the ‘market economy investor principle’ to identify the presence of State aid in cases of public investment (in particular, capital injections).1 To determine whether a public body’s investment constitutes State aid, it is necessary to assess whether, in similar circumstances, a private investor of a comparable size operating in normal conditions of a market economy could have been prompted to make the investment in question.2 In most obvious cases, the State invests pari passu with private investors, meaning those private investors and the State share the same risks and rewards.
This was, for example, the case in relation to a capital injection by the Austrian State in Hypo Steiermark. This injection was held not to be aid where private investors subscribed to 75% of the capital increase.3
In less obvious cases, the Commission has to determine, on the basis of relevant benchmarks, whether the terms of the transaction are acceptable to private investors.4
In the case of ING, it was in debate whether the amendment to the repayment terms of the capital injection by the Netherlands constituted State aid. The Commission decided that the amendment constituted State aid, because it would result in an additional advantage for ING. The Netherlands and ING brought actions against this decision before the GC. The GC held in a judgment of 2 March 2012 that the Commission cannot evade its obligation to assess the economic rationality of the amendment to the repayment terms in the light of the private investor test solely on the ground that the capital injection subject to repayment itself already constituted State aid.5 The Commission appealed the judgment before the ECJ, but also took a new decision in which it concluded that a market economy private investor would not have agreed to those new terms. It therefore decided, again, that the amendment constituted State aid.6 The ECJ upheld the judgment of the GC. It assessed that an economic advantage must be assessed in the light of the private investor test, if it appears that the Member State concerned has conferred that advantage in its capacity as shareholder of the undertaking belonging to it. Where it appears that the private investor test may be applicable, the Commission is under a duty to ask the Member State concerned to provide it with all relevant information enabling it to determine whether the conditions governing the applicability and the application of the test are met. It furthermore considers that any holder of securities in whatever amount and of whatever nature may wish or agree to renegotiate the conditions of their redemption. It is, consequently, meaningful to compare the behaviour of the State in that regard with that of a hypothetical private investor in a comparable position. What is decisive in the context of that comparison is whether the amendment to the repayment terms of the capital injection has satisfied an economic rationality test, so that a private investor might also be in a position to accept such an amendment, in particular by increasing the prospects of obtaining the repayment of that injection.7
Another example of the application of the market economy investor principle is the participation of the State and private investors in Dexia. In this case, the Commission decided, albeit that the State and private investors participated on the same terms, that these terms were accepted at the height of the financial crisis under entire ly abnormal conditions. The Commission subsequently considered that the market economy investor principle only applies under normal market conditions and considered the participation of the State to be State aid.8 This approach has however been criticized in literature.9
Another – more recent – example concerns the Italian securitization scheme designed to assist Italian banks to move NPLs off their balance sheets. The Commission assessed that this scheme did not qualify as State aid, since the pricing structure provided was in line with market conditions. The risk taken by the State by guaranteeing the senior notes issued by the securitization vehicle buying the non-performing loans was remunerated at a level which a market operator would require, including a strong link between the risk taken and the composition of the benchmark basket as well as be tween the time during which that risk was retained and the remuneration paid.10