Einde inhoudsopgave
State aid to banks (IVOR nr. 109) 2018/11.3.1
11.3.1 Why is this a relevant characteristic?
mr. drs. R.E. van Lambalgen, datum 01-12-2017
- Datum
01-12-2017
- Auteur
mr. drs. R.E. van Lambalgen
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS591798:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Financieel recht / Europees financieel recht
Mededingingsrecht / EU-mededingingsrecht
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
This consideration can be found in many decisions on the Spanish banks. For instance: Banco Gallego, SA.36500, 25 July 2013, para. 16.
Pursuant to point 11 of the Restructuring Communication, the restructuring plan should provide information on the corporate governance framework of the beneficiary bank.
Point 44 of the Recapitalisation Communication.
There is no universally agreed-upon definition of ‘corporate governance’, but corporate governance usually includes the issues of risk management and executive remuneration. Since these issues also have an independent meaning, these issues will be addressed in sections 11.4 and 11.5. Notwithstanding this separate discussion, in several decisions, the issues of risk management and remuneration are mentioned in relation to corporate governance. Similarly, in the Slovenian banking cases, the pricing policy is treated in relation to the corporate governance framework and risk management framework. In this PhD-study, the pricing policy will be discussed in section 13.10.
First Investment Bank (FIB), SA.39854, 25 November 2014, para. 102.
A weak corporate governance framework may be one of the causes of the bank’s failure. For instance, the Commission noted that some of the Spanish banks “had several structural limitations, such as weak corporate governance systems which prevented those institutions from detecting problems at an early stage”.1 Consequently, restructuring plans should pay attention to corporate governance issues.2
The relevance of improving the corporate governance framework was already recognised in the 2004 R&R-guidelines. Point 37 of the R&R-guidelines required that “where the firm’s difficulties stem from flaws in its corporate governance system, appropriate adaptations will have to be introduced”. Furthermore, the Recapitalisation Communication provides that there should be “a thorough and far-reaching restructuring, including a change in management and corporate governance where appropriate”.3
The decisional practice of the Commission shows that the Commission recognises the importance of corporate governance.4 In many decisions, it welcomed measures aimed at improving the corporate governance. This can be illustrated by the following recital:
“The commitments on corporate governance ensure that strategy and decisions are business-oriented and are neither biased by objectives other than value maximisation nor subject to improper external influence. Planned changes to the corporate governance will make the Bank less vulnerable to external influence and at the same time will introduce more market discipline through enhanced control and transparency in management decisions”.5
This recital thus underlines that the fact that the beneficiary bank committed to strengthen its corporate governance framework is a relevant characteristic.