Einde inhoudsopgave
Taxation of cross-border inheritances and donations (FM nr. 165) 2021/2.4.3
2.4.3 The tax equality justification
Dr. V. Dafnomilis Adv. LL.M., datum 01-02-2021
- Datum
01-02-2021
- Auteur
Dr. V. Dafnomilis Adv. LL.M.
- JCDI
JCDI:ADS263338:1
- Vakgebied(en)
Internationaal belastingrecht / Voorkoming van dubbele belasting
Schenk- en erfbelasting / Algemeen
Voetnoten
Voetnoten
See also Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 155. “Equal libertarianism implies that, in the absence of practical obstacles or other reasons to the contrary (a very large qualification), gratuitous receipts should be confiscated by the state and redistributed equally among all persons.”
Rajiv Prabhakar, Karen Rowlingson and Stuart White, How to Defend Inheritance Tax (London: Fabian Society, 2008), 18.
Jens Beckert, “Why is the Inheritance Tax so Controversial,” The Foundation for Law, Justice and Society 45, no. 6 (2008): 4.
Rajiv Prabhakar, Karen Rowlingson and Stuart White, How to Defend Inheritance Tax (London: Fabian Society, 2008), 18.
Stuart White notes that this does not necessarily mean that the person will have greater overall opportunity in the relevant sense, See Stuart White, “Moral objections to inheritance tax,” in Taxation: philosophical perspectives, ed. Martin O’ Neil and Shepley Orr (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 170.
Cf. Mark Ascher, “Curtailing Inherited Wealth,” Michigan Law Review 89, no. 1 (1990): 151. The author of this article is of the view that “[c]urtailing inheritance would significantly increase equality of opportunity.”
The tax equality justification dictates that the tax system cannot penalise relatively moral behaviours; states should not treat less favourably taxpayers who work and contribute to the social good than taxpayers who have not contributed to the creation of their received wealth and have not participated in upholding the social good. Therefore, death taxes safeguard the equality between taxpayers who work contributing to the social good and taxpayers who do not work and receive an unearned advantage without contribution to the society.1 From this perspective, the tax equality justification resembles the windfall justification. However, the windfall justification seems to focus more on the protection of the family property than the contribution to the social good.
There is another aspect of the tax equality justification that is based on a comparison between the individuals who have received an inheritance and those who have not (regardless of whether they are working). In the absence of inheritance, these individuals have comparable natural abilities to develop and benefit from their skills. However, the receipt of inheritance can give rise to inequalities among the members of the society, as individuals who have not received an inheritance have presumably fewer opportunities to evolve and benefit from their skills in the absence of financial support. Inequality in inheritance, however, might translate into inequality of opportunity.2
As a result, death taxation explained by the equality-of-opportunity justification safeguards the redistribution of inheritances through their taxation. It is input-oriented because it addresses the preconditions under which the members of the society enter competition over scarce material resources. By taking the private property that exists within the society and redistributing it equally as private property to the members of the next generation, this justification ensures that the members of the society will be given similar material starting positions.3 Therefore, the equality-of-opportunity justification safeguards the granting of equal chances to individuals with equal natural ability to develop and benefit from their skills.4, 5
However, one could argue that the aspect of the windfall justification concerning the protection of the family property cannot be easily reconciled with the tax equality justification based on which private property should be equally redistributed to the members of the society (and thus not only to family members). Therefore, I do not consider the tax equality justification the most important justification of death taxation as it does not seem to encompass family property considerations (that justify progression based on the kinship between the parties involved and the granting of subjective tax exemptions and allowances to parties sharing a degree of kinship).6